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Abstract
This dissertation investigates the potential 
applications of the scientific paradigm known as "chaos 
theory" in the examination of dramatic theory. By 
illuminating the limitations of traditional Newtonian 
physics and Euclidean geometry, chaos theory conveys 
philosophical implications that transcend the scientific 
and provide suitable tools for describing cultural and 
artistic phenomena. These implications include emphases on 
unpredictability, interaction and feedback, qualitative 
rather than quantitative analyses, and a nonlinear, 
continuous, even holistic perspective of systems 
traditionally viewed as dichotomous (such as order and 
disorder or part and whole).
This study examines several standard works of 
dramatic theory, concentrating on the relationship of the 
formal to the spontaneous in the creation of theatrical art 
and how chaos theory may provide a vocabulary for 
discussing intangible experiences (such as catharsis). 
Specific attention is given to Aristotle's P o e t i c s .
Dryden's "An Essay of Dramatic Poesy," Coleridge's 
Bioctraphia Literaria, and Artaud's The Theatre and Its 
D o u b l e . The conclusions include an analysis of Richard 
Foreman's theatrical art and theories in the contexts of 
poststructuralism and postmodernism.
The respective theoretical writings of the figures 
discussed in this dissertation each display attempts to
i v
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describe some sort of an ineffable, chaotic moment 
involving theatrical experience and/or creativity. This 
point alone brings no new insight to the works of these 
theorists. When examined through a framework of chaos 
theory, however, such emphasis on these moments reveals the 
central roles they play in the theorists' accounts of the 
creation and experience of the theatre event. In this 
light, the traditional distinctions between the theories of 
these four individuals collapse, revealing underlying 
commonalities in their analyses of the processes and 
effects of theatrical art.
Chaos theory, therefore, promises to offer a common 
foundation for speaking about the creation and reception of 
theatrical art. Although each theorist will experience a 
different perception of "nature," they will nevertheless 
observe the same similar patterns and chaotic moments of 
creation at work underneath it all. The same will be true 
in creation and perception of art, thus overcoming the 
poststructuralist lack of foundation and the postmodern 
impasse to meaning that limits contemporary theory.
v
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Chapter One: Introduction to Chaos Theory and Its
Implications for the Art of Theatre
Since Aristotle, dramatic theorists in the Western 
tradition have derived formal systems which seek to 
account for the perfect theatrical moment. This moment 
has been approached from various vantage points and 
described in sometimes conflicting terms; theorists have 
invoked a wide range of phenomena (i.e., catharsis, 
communitas, intellectual insight, various affective 
experiences, etc.) in their attempts at explanation.
Indeed, this moment has proven to be the fascination of 
theorists through the ages. It has also proven something 
of an irritant, however, by causing thinkers much 
consternation in their efforts to determine and in some 
measure qualify the often elusive aspects of such a 
moment.
A central problem theorists have encountered in their 
attempts to understand the experience of the theatre event 
stems from the basically mimetic orientation of Western 
theatre, which seeks to represent nature, especially human 
nature, onstage by appealing to an unchangeable order. 
Rooted in the linear, reductionist constructions of 
figures such as Aristotle, Descartes, and Newton, 
theorists have often praised those systems, rules, and 
styles which codify human experience and construct nature 
through fixed operations and principles of regularity. At 
the same time, many of these theorists have also
1
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acknowledged the presence (and even necessity) of certain 
intangible elements which defy calibration, whether it be 
the genius or inspiration of the creative artist or the 
catharsis or revelation of the spectator. Such elements, 
which may not be evoked with consistency or accounted for 
by systematic formulation, have also been relegated to the 
domain of nature--natural talent, natural reaction, gut 
instinct, intuition, etc.--though this sort of nature 
implies another set of qualities and characteristics.
In essence, Western intellectuals have long grappled 
with two very different views of nature: 1) the nature of 
consistency, which conforms to the physical, aesthetic, 
and moral schema constructed by human will and logic, and
2) the nature that occasionally (sometimes often) 
confounds systematic interpretation, apparently behaving 
according to its own mysterious and seemingly arbitrary 
rules. The problem in art and philosophy, therefore, 
arises in attempts to reconcile these two views of nature. 
Systems of the former view of nature have thus far failed 
consistently to account for and, especially, predict the 
observable phenomena of the latter type of nature. Does 
the perfect system remain to be discovered, or must these 
two views of nature fail to converge through their very 
definitions? This study will address the constantly 
changing relationship between the formal and the natural, 
the tangible and the intangible in the art of theatre,
2
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employing the scientific paradigm known as "chaos theory" 
as a tool for examination and comparison.
Not surprisingly, scientific views of nature have led 
to problems quite analogous to those inherent in the views 
of nature propounded by art and philosophy. Euclidean 
geometry, Cartesian coordinates, and Newtonian dynamics 
provide methods for describing the ideal realms of 
triangles, parabolas, and closed systems, but fail to 
account for the shapes and motions of mountains, trees, 
and waterfalls. Although the above examples again imply 
two different views of nature, scientists prior to the 
twentieth century dismissed apparent conflicts between the 
two as "noise" resulting from either experimental error or 
the non-ideal (non-laboratory) conditions of the "real" 
world. With the turn of the twentieth century, however, 
developments such as relativity and quantum mechanics 
began to expose the limitations of the essentially linear 
and mechanistic scientific view of nature often referred 
to today as the Newtonian paradigm. Even more recently, 
with the advent of computer technology and the mercuric 
ability to perform lengthy reiterative calculations that 
would take a lifetime to complete by hand, the nonlinear 
aspects of nature formerly dismissed as noise were shown 
to have their own underlying characteristics and laws, or 
more accurately, order. Such revelations, among numerous 
others, formed the basis of the current scientific
3
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paradigm known as chaos theory, which will serve as the 
framework of this study.
Stephen H. Kellert defines chaos theory as "the 
qualitative study of unstable aperiodic behavior in 
deterministic nonlinear dynamical systems" (2). Such a 
concise definition clearly deserves elaboration; the 
system of the earth's weather, a commonly-cited example of 
chaos theory at work, will be employed to illuminate the 
practical implications of the definition.
1) Chaos theory is considered a qualitative approach 
primarily for two reasons. First, very few of the 
nonlinear differential equations that govern the behavior 
of chaotic phenomena are solvable quantitatively. When 
forecasting the weather, for example, meteorologists look 
for familiar patterns in the data they collect. To 
numerically solve the dynamic equations that govern the 
weather would require an infinitely precise knowledge of 
the location of every air particle in the earth's 
atmosphere, just for starters. But where this initial 
reason appears limiting, the second reason is even more 
liberating, for qualitative approaches reveal information 
about the long-term behavior of a system that may not seem 
apparent through an exact, numerical solution. In other 
words, scientists do not typically employ chaos theory 
because it is the only tool available, but rather because 
the qualitative approaches of chaos theory reveal
4
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different and often more valuable information about the 
behavior of the phenomena they are studying.
2) Systems which behave according to the principles 
of chaos theory are described as unstable because they 
display a sensitive dependence on initial conditions. In 
other words, the system will never settle into a pattern 
of behavior consistent enough to remain unaffected by 
small disturbances. Unstable systems contain mathematical 
properties which often magnify errors rather than correct 
for them. This phenomenon is more popularly referred to 
as "the butterfly effect," which asserts that the 
incremental amount of wind generated from the beating of a 
butterfly's wings in Brazil can theoretically account for 
the difference between a sunny day and a tornadic 
thunderstorm in Texas (Kellert 4, 12).
3) When the mathematical variables of a system do not 
repeat at regular intervals, the behavior of the system is 
described as aperiodic. Kellert cites human history as an 
analogy of aperiodic behavior: "Although broad patterns in 
the rise and fall of civilizations may be sketched, events 
never repeat exactly--history is aperiodic" (4-5).
Kellert further states that the future behavior of a 
system becomes unpredictable when both aperiodic and 
unstable behavior are present. Of course, the ever- 
changing and unpredictable nature of the weather testifies 
tc its aperiodicity as well as its instability.
5
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4) The word "deterministic" is employed to describe 
mathematically simple systems. Such systems contain only 
a few differential equations that do not directly suggest 
chaotic behavior. In addition, all of the mathematical 
terms of the equations are known, or "determined."
Although more complex systems also behave according to 
chaos theory, the discovery that apparently simple, 
ordered systems exhibit complexity and unpredictability 
provided one of the revelations that has made this field 
so exciting to modern researchers. In fact, Edward 
Lorenz's discovery that the simple, "deterministic" 
equations that govern the behavior of the weather could 
yield instability resulted in his coining of the term:
"the butterfly effect" (Kellert 10-12).
5) Nonlinear dynamical systems are sets of 
mathematical differential equations that describe how a 
system changes through time and contain one or more 
nonlinear terms. The time-dependent (dynamical) equations 
employed by Lorenz in his modeling of the weather contain 
nonlinear terms. The presence of nonlinear terms often 
means that the equations may not be solved numerically, 
but, as mentioned above, other often more illuminating, 
information may be obtained through qualitative 
approaches.
The discovery that a great number of mathematically 
ordered systems display unpredictable behavior has 
resulted in a parallel revelation that much more of the
6
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universe operates according to the laws of chaos and
complexity than was previously believed. The more linear,
mechanized, and essentially causal view of science
advocated by the Newtonian paradigm actually proves to be
the exception, rather than the rule, when gazing through
the lens of chaos theory. James Gleick describes the
impact of this relatively new mode of observation in the
prologue to his book, Chaos:
Now that science is looking, chaos seems to be 
everywhere. A rising column of cigarette smoke 
breaks into wild swirls. A flag snaps back and 
forth in the wind. A dripping facet goes from a 
steady pattern to a random one. Chaos appears 
in the behavior of the weather, the behavior of 
an airplane in flight, the behavior of cars 
clustering on an expressway, the behavior of oil 
flowing in underground pipes. No matter what 
the medium, the behavior obeys the same newly 
discovered laws. That realization has begun to 
change the way business executives make 
decisions about insurance, the way astronomers 
look at the solar system, the way political 
theorists talk about the stresses leading to 
armed conflict. (5)
Because of the diversity of its potential applications,
Gleick views chaos theory as an holistic approach that
will ultimately lead to a unification of the various
scientific disciplines. But what do the disparate
phenomena cited by Gleick share in common, besides the
unpredictability which inherently results from Kellert's
definition of chaos theory?
An answer to this question lies in still another of 
the revolutionary discoveries that may be attributed to 
chaos theory concerning systems which behave
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
unpredictably, yet display an order that underlies the 
disorder; this order may actually appear quite similar in 
systems that are otherwise vastly dissimilar. In 
addition, the order may not be observed by merely studying 
or solving (if solvable) the dynamical equations which 
govern the behavior of the system. In fact, this order 
may be studied without even knowing the system's dynamical 
equations through the qualitative approaches of chaos 
theory. In short, the above-mentioned phenomena described 
by Gleick share common patterns that may be revealed 
through 1) strange attractors, 2) fractals, 3) self­
similarity; such patterns are created through processes 
such as 4) feedback and 5) self-organization.
1) A strange attractor is a special variety of the 
attractor, a graphical depiction of a system in state 
space (in which each coordinate of the graph corresponds 
to a variable of the system), towards which all 
trajectories of the system converge. Strange attractors 
are called "strange" because two points that are initially 
close together on the attractor may diverge dramatically; 
such a system would, therefore, display a sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions, because relatively 
(possibly even minutely) small changes in the variables of 
the system could produce extremely varied results.
Eecause similarly-shaped strange attractors indicate 
systems which are also similar mathematically, researchers 
often employ strange attractors to gain a feel for the
8
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patterns that drive the behavior of a phenomenon, even if 
the mathematical equations for the system are unknown. 
Lorenz discovered the first strange attractor while 
creating his computer models for the behavior of the 
weather. Strange attractors may also be used to gain 
quantitative information about a system by numerically 
calculating its "Lyapunov exponents" and "fractal 
dimension," each of which provide a different kind of 
measure of a system's degree of unpredictability.1
2) Benoit Mandelbrot has done perhaps the most well- 
known work with fractal dimensions when he created 
(through computer simulation) the set of geometric figures 
he calls "fractals." Mandelbrot's investigations were 
inspired by the incongruities he observed between 
Euclidean geometry and nature, because of the former's 
"inability to describe the shape of a cloud, a mountain, a 
coastline, or a tree. Clouds are not spheres, mountains 
are not cones, coastlines are not circles, and bark is not 
smooth, nor does lightning travel in a straight line" (1). 
Mandelbrot then attempted to recreate the shapes of nature 
mathematically by employing fractal dimensions, 
reiterating chaotic equations, and plotting the results by 
computer; by this method he succeeded in creating 
imaginary coastlines, mountains, and even trees. Although 
the complexity of the behaviors of both the computer 
equations and the natural forces involved make it 
impossible to recreate "real" objects of nature in this
9
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manner, his work has proved successful as a means of 
approaching a better understanding of the geometry of 
nature.
3) Another important element of chaos theory, which 
Mandelbrot discovered in both nature and his mathematical 
simulations of nature, is called self-simi1arity.
According to Mandelbrot, "When each piece of a shape is 
geometrically similar to the whole, both the shape and the 
(processes) that generate it are called self-simi1ar"
(34). The word "similar" is particularly key to this 
definition, for in nature, no two shapes are ever exactly 
alike; although the branches of a tree look like miniature 
trees in themselves, they each contain their own 
specificities and irregularities. Self-simi1arity has 
also been discovered in the shapes of coastlines and in 
the human body: the branching of bronchial tubes in the 
lungs is similar to that of the vascular and nervous 
systems. Although self-simi1a r i t y , by definition, refers 
to gecnetric shapes within the same system, John Briggs 
and F. David Peat cite research that the manner in which 
the human brain chooses neurons to respond to a stimulus 
is similar to the way the immune system chooses immune 
cells to respond to a disease, even though each of these 
systems has its own fractal dimension (107). This 
similarity is not so surprising, however, when one 
considers that each of these vastly different systems 
resides within the overall system of the human body. From
10
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such a perspective, the similar shapes of the branches of 
trees, lightning bolts, ice crystals, and human bronchial 
tubes do not seem as coincidental as one might initially 
assume. To many researchers, chaos theory is viewed as a 
science of holism, seeking to illuminate the self-similar 
patterns of the whole of nature and the congruities and 
interconnectedness that make up the overall system of the 
universe.
4) Another phenomenon associated with chaos theory 
that reinforces theories of holism and interconnectedness 
is feedback. Feedback occurs when one part of a system 
both affects and is affected by another part, the way two 
people involved in a conversation react according to the 
response each receives from the other. The feedback may 
be said to be positive when, for example, the conversation 
intensifies because the two individuals arrive at a topic 
that each finds interesting. In a like manner, negative 
feedback occurs if one person is not interested in a 
topic, either stopping or changing the direction of the 
conversation. Positive feedback may therefore be 
described as intensifying, or encouraging. Negative 
feedback, on the other hand, usually functions as a 
controlling phenomenon, as in the relationship between a 
heating furnace and its thermostat.2
Feedback is relevant to chaos theory on one level 
because of the reiterative nature of chaotic systems. 
Unstable, aperiodic systems display a sensitive dependence
11
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cn initial conditions because the difference between two 
initial points becomes magnified as the mathematical 
equations positively feed into themselves with each 
iteration. On another level, however, most systems are 
comprised of myriads of feedback loops in which nonlinear 
equations feed not only into themselves through 
reiteration, but into each other through interaction as 
well. The system of the weather, for example, (which 
contains numerous feedback loops in its own right) feeds 
back with the system of the earth's oceans, the system of 
human industrial manufacturing, and many others. Human 
social, economic, and political systems also interact in 
extremely complex feedback loops. Finally, biological 
systems contain perhaps the most complex feedback loops as 
the various cells within an individual body maintain 
constant interaction and even communication through 
chemical reactions.
5) Complex feedback loops in nonlinear systems often 
exhibit a phenomenon known as "self-organization," in 
which an entire system organizes itself into an ordered 
state from an apparent state of randomness or disorder.
M. Mitchell Waldrop refers to this phenomenon as 
"emergence" in his book on complexity theory (a sister 
science of chaos theory) entitled Como1exitv. Frequently 
in such phenomena, the individual parts of a system, 
display autonomous behavior, then suddenly organize into a 
pattern of collective behavior. Briggs and Peat cite
12
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examples of termites building nests and amoebae
aggregating into slime molds to sprout stalks and produce
spores, but they provide an even better analogy that
strikes closer to the human experience:
Driving between rush hours on the thruway, we're 
only minimally affected by other vehicles. But 
toward 4 o'clock, traffic becomes heavier and we 
begin to react and interact with the other 
drivers. At a certain critical point we begin to 
be "driven" by the total traffic pattern. The 
traffic has become a self-organizing system. (138)
Stuart Kauffman uses self-organization as the basis for 
his theories of the origin and evolution of life.
According to Kauffman, a mixture of chemicals with a 
sufficient diversity of molecule types creates such a 
complex web cf chemical reactions that it becomes 
autocatalytic, self-sustaining, alive. In other words, 
under chaos theory complexity just happens. The 
development of life on this planet no longer appears a 
fortunate accident (as in the spontaneous generation 
theory); rather, it is the expected result of a universe 
whose laws encourage increasing complexity and self­
organization (45).
Ilya Prigogine approaches self-organization from a 
thermodynamic point of view, finding "dissipative 
structures" in far-from-equi1ibrium systems. Dissipative 
structures are ordered states of chaotic systems which 
maintain their order by taking energy from and releasing 
entropy to their environment. The very term "dissipative 
structure" emphasizes the seemingly paradoxical,
13
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interactive relationship of order and disorder in the 
phenomenon of self-organization (Prigogine and Stengers 
142-143). The exciting aspect of Prigogine's work lies in 
the positive light it casts upon the notion of entropy; 
formerly, the second law of thermodynamics (entropy always 
increases in a closed system) implied decay and eventual 
equilibrium, but Prigogine emphasizes how the dissipation 
of entropy leads instead to self-organization and new 
levels of order in chaotic systems.
The notion of self-organization, that order arises 
spontaneously and naturally from disorder, holds various 
philosophical implications. Perhaps most fundamentally, 
the relationship of order and disorder must be viewed in 
this light as complex and continuous, rather than 
dichotomous. Simple, deterministic mathematical equations 
may harbor chaotic behavior, while order has been shown to 
underlie and even arise out of apparently random, chaotic 
behavior. Order and disorder are no longer oppositional, 
but instead interactive and complimentary in the driving 
forces of nature.
When combined with the notion of a sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions, self-organization also 
places a greater significance upon human action, even in 
the case of the individual. Rather than living in a 
stable, clockwork world, humans interact with an unstable, 
aperiodic universe where seemingly insignificant events 
may become magnified through nonlinear feedback, leading
14
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tc dramatically new levels of order. According to 
Prigogine, "since even small fluctuations may grow and 
change the overall structure, as a result, individual 
activity is not doomed to insignificance" (qtd. in Briggs 
and Peat 151). From this point of view, self-organization 
even offers hope for sometimes sudden or even radical 
change in political and social systems--the Berlin Wall, 
after all, came down rather quickly.
When examined in the context of strange attractors 
and self-simi1arity, sel f-organization implies that 
various, often recognizable, patterns appear in the 
behavior of natural phenomena. Because these patterns 
often exhibit general similarities with specific 
differences, qualitative approaches to understanding yield 
more profitable results than quantitative methods. 
Similarly, Kellert points out that to search for the laws 
that govern chaotic behavior "does violence" to the 
purpose of chaos theory, because such a search implies 
reductionism and a "doctrine of determinism as total 
predictability"; a more appropriate endeavor in a universe 
governed by an indeterminate determinism is to search for 
order, which helps to illuminate "how it happens" as 
opposed to "why it had to happen." Chaos theory, 
therefore, challenges the notion of linear causality, not 
only because most systems are comprised of multiple 
interactive feedback loops, but also because simple, 
apparently ordered systems may display chaotic behavior
15
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that breaks an otherwise direct and predictable 
relationship between cause and effect (112-113, 104-105).
The phenomena of self-organization and self­
similarity also suggest a nonlinear relationship between 
part and whole within a system. From a Newtonian point of 
view, the whole may be described as the sum of its parts; 
in the arts, the same may certainly be said about an 
aesthetic such as Zola's Naturalism. Under chaos theory, 
however, the part may not be taken out of the context of 
the whole in a nonlinear system. The linearly-connected 
gears of a clock, after all, work in a direct causal 
relationship to the overall system. In addition, a single 
gear may be easily removed and made to function in a 
different mechanical device, such as a wind-up toy; 
removal of the gear, however, breaks the causal chain, 
thus disrupting the function of the original device--the 
clock. A mechanical clock, therefore, does not and must 
not (in order to provide accurate time) display chaotic 
behavior: it is a linear system. In a nonlinear system, 
on the other hand, the part is not only connected, but 
interconnected with the whole--the same way a single human 
gene in a toenail, for instance, carries the coding 
information for the entire body; but removal of even an 
entire toenail (or toe) does not terminally disrupt the 
operation of the whole body. In addition, a sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions indicates that the 
activity of even the smallest part of an unstable,
16
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aperiodic system may become magnified, reordering the 
entire system through self-organization. Such a 
relationship of part to whole again supports chaos 
theory's emphasis on holism because the feedback between 
individual parts and between part and whole defy 
traditional reductionist analysis (Briggs and Peat 29).
A final implication of self-organization deals with 
its applicability to the study of human behavior, thought 
processes, and even the notion of creativity. Briggs and 
Peat provide the example of nineteenth-century scientist 
and mathematician, Henri Poincare (a pioneer in the ideas 
that later developed into chaos theory), who related 
during a lecture how he had gained insight into a problem 
that he had been struggling with for weeks: "Contrary to 
my custom, I drank black coffee and could not sleep. . .
ideas rose in crowds; I felt them collide until pairs 
interlocked, so to speak, making a stable combination" 
(192). Later, Poincare took part in a geological 
expedition, during which he momentarily forgot about his 
mathematical problem. As he boarded a field bus with his 
group, however, the rest of the solution to his problem 
suddenly occurred to him; he successfully verified the 
results upon returning home. Briggs and Peat cite 
Poincare's unforeseen bursts of inspiration as examples o 
self-organization; the new insights arose spontaneously 
from the disorder of frustration and confusion that his 
mind had associated with the problem. Furthermore, Erigg
17
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and Peat employ Arthur Koestler's theories concerning 
human thought processes to support their association of 
self-organization with Poincare's story (192-193).
Koestler's theory of inspiration is based on the 
notion of frames, or planes, of reference. Koestler 
asserts that when the individual mind wrestles with a 
problem, the thought processes often become trapped within 
patterns on one plane of reference; the solution to the 
problem lies within a different reference plane, however. 
The subject's frustration increases until a trivial event 
or piece of information, usually unconnected with the 
problem, changes the subject's plane of reference to one 
which contains the solution.. Koestler illustrates his 
theory with the story of the Greek scientist Archimedes 
who discovered how to measure the volume of gold in the 
king's crown through water displacement as he stepped into 
his bathtub; according to the story, Archimedes shouted 
"Eureka!" when he noticed the water displaced by his own 
body (105-108). Briggs and Peat take Koestler's theory a 
step further by equating his model for inspiration with 
self-organization. According to Briggs and Peat, the 
initial, "trapped" thought patterns are analogous to a 
linear, point attractor; mounting frustration, however, 
causes instability in the thought patterns, and the 
trivial event, much like the butterfly effect, spurs the 
thought processes to self-organize to another level of 
order, a different reference plane (192-193). Koestler
18
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also applies his theory to the inspiration of the artist, 
as well as the experience of art, which causes ordinary 
objects and events to be seen in a strange, new light 
(108).
Assuming Briggs and Peat's application of Koestler's 
theory is correct, the creative mind, when successful, 
operates in the nonlinear realm, tracing patterns that are 
more similar to strange attractors than simple, linear 
attractors. Similarly, the minds of those who experience 
works of art are transported in a nonlinear fashion as 
well. Western thought, however, has historically been 
dominated by linear, reductionist thought patterns, and 
dramatic theory is no exception. Such thinking may be 
observed most clearly, perhaps, in French Neoclassicism. 
Neoclassicists intended to present a view of life that 
seemed "natural" and admitted aesthetic experiences that 
could not be described linearly, such as pleasure or 
emotion. However, given their insistence on prescriptive 
dramatic codes, the Neoclassicists were baffled by authors 
like Shakespeare, whose works produced the results they 
desired while displaying little adherence to their rules 
of writing.
One might therefore conclude that intuitive and 
experiential perspectives have been historically 
undervalued by theorists and practitioners of theatre. 
Although such a statement contains some relative truth, 
historical documents consistently refer to the more
19
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intangible aspects of drama and performance, often holding 
such elements in high regard, even if they are not well 
defined. A reading of Aristotle's Poetics, for example, 
does not reveal a clear understanding of the term 
"catharsis," but this component is a significant--and 
arguably even the most important--element in Aristotle's 
theatrical construct. In more recent times, Antonin 
Artaud made elaborate theoretical attempts to construct a 
theatre appealing to the most primal human emotions and 
impulses, but his results can only be described as vague 
and m y s t i c a l .
The work of each of the above-mentioned theorists 
gropes for a different, but nevertheless similar, kind of 
"natural" order to serve as the basis for understanding 
the creation or experience of theatrical art. In relation 
tc the creative aspects of artistic production, such an 
order manifests itself in the moments of chaos normally 
referred to as genius, inspiration, or intuition. Another 
type of "natural" order may also be observed in the 
moments of catharsis, revelation, or communitas in the 
spectator's experience of theatrical art. According to 
chaos theory, self-organization (or "order out of chaos") 
occurs only in the unstable, aperiodic behavior of 
nonlinear systems, a point which explains why formally 
structured approaches to the creation of theatrical art 
often produce seemingly uninspired results; very few of 
the plays which were written as a result of the influence
20
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of Zola's Naturalism, for example, have stood the test of 
time as great works of art. More successful approaches to 
theatrical creation, on the other hand, usually include 
chaos in the mix. Stanislavsky's writings on acting, for 
example, specifically state that his system should not be 
applied universally as a rigidly formal set of rules; 
rather, he provides a general set of suggestions from 
which the individual performance style appropriate to the 
desired play or character may be discovered. But 
Stanislavsky's work has, of course, been misused in this 
respect, consequently producing many uninspired 
performances, particularly since its introduction to 
theatre in the United States.
Human schema which attempt to codify nature, 
therefore, tend to become linearly oversimplified because 
they do not account for natural unpredictability and its 
capacity to create its own organic order. To their 
credit, the theorists to be examined in this study have 
recognized the spontaneous creative power of the "chaotic 
moment," even as they could not devise systems which 
explain such a moment. This study will therefore employ 
chaos theory in the analysis of specific theoretical 
texts, including Aristotle's Poetics. Dryden's "An Essay 
of Dramatic Poesy," Coleridge's essays on theatrical .art 
and aesthetics, and Artaud's The Theatre and Its Double. 
The theoretical writings of the theatre artist, Richard 
Foreman, will be briefly examined as part of a larger
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exploration of poststructuralism and postmodernism in the 
concluding chapter. Furthermore, this study will probe 
each theorist's conception of "natural" order, examining 
his formal constructions (if any) for specific 
philosophical similarities with chaos theory (i.e., 
continuous and interactive relationship of order to 
disorder and part to whole; unpredictability and the 
butterfly effect; an indeterminate determinism; self­
organization; patterns and intuition).
This study will begin with an examination of 
Aristotle's P o e t i c s . particularly emphasizing the rather 
elusive concept of catharsis and how it relates to the 
more formal aspects of Aristotle's critical structure. 
Since the notion of catharsis has remained dominant in the 
study of the experience of theatrical art throughout 
theatre history, this chapter will establish a basis that 
the successive chapters may build upon, just as Aristotle 
provided the critical foundation for subsequent Western 
theorists.
The next document this study will investigate is John 
Dryden's "An Essay of Dramatic Poesy." In addition to 
being one of the most historically well-known works of 
dramatic theory, Dryden's work is important to this study 
because of its attention to questions of form and audience 
reception. By comparing various formal styles of drama-- 
that of the ancients, the French Neoclassicists, and the
22
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more "irregular" English (both pre- and post-Restoration)- 
-Dryden is able to place value upon the more "lively" 
aspects of drama, which arguably come more from the 
instincts, or "soul," of the dramatist than strict 
adherence to a particular form or style (in this case, 
neoclassicism).
Samuel Taylor Coleridge's theoretical and critical 
ideas, particularly those found in his Biograohia 
Literaria, will be examined in the context of the Romantic 
aesthetic viewpoint. Coleridge's theory of the 
imagination particularly reflects the romantic view of the
relationship of the spiritual and the material.
Furthermore, his famous measuring-stick of beauty, 
"multeity in unity," provides a pertinent perspective of 
the relationship of part to whole for the purposes of this 
study.
An analysis of Antonin Artaud's The Theatre and Its 
Double will focus on Artaud's appeal to a spiritual unity 
that he believes must be rediscovered to cure the world of 
violence and injustice. Artaud asserts that theatre 
should serve as the ultimate tool for achieving such unity
by directly and forcibly (and hence "cruelly") operating 
on the psyches of the audience. Archetypal patterns that 
touch the essential, primal core of the spectator provide 
the basis for this "Theatre of Cruelty."
The conclusions of this study will provide an 
abbreviated examination of the theoretical concepts of the
23
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director, designer, and playwright, Richard Foreman. 
Approaching Foreman from a perspective of
poststructuralism and postmodernism, Elinor Fuchs' book. 
The Death of Character, provides an analysis of Foreman's 
art and ideas that sets up this study's application of 
chaos theory to poststructuralism/postmodernism and 
Foreman. Foreman's own theoretical insights, as expressed 
in his book, Unbalancing A c t s , proves useful as well.
This study will draw upon a number of works that have 
been published in the scientific literature on the subject 
of chaos theory. The most noteworthy deal with the 
philosophical implications of this new paradigm, including 
Briggs and Peat's Turbulent Mirror, Kellert's In the Wake 
of C h a o s , and Prigogine and Stengers' Order Out of C h aos. 
Other works significant to this study include Waldrop's 
Compl er.i tv . Mandelbrot’s The Fractal Geometry of Nature, 
Kauffman's At Home in the Universe, and Gleick's Chaos:
Making a New Science. All of these works have been
referenced in the above discussion of the fundamental 
concepts of chaos theory. Most of the remaining works in 
this field contain material too technical to be of 
applicable interest to the dramatic theorist.
Chaos theory has also proven a fertile subject for
publication in literary criticism and theory. N.
Katherine Kayles has produced some of the earliest and 
most influential of this work in her book, Chaos B ound, 
and in the collection of essays which she edited, entitled
24
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Chaos and O r d e r ; many of the essays in this latter work 
treat chaos theory as a paradigm for justifying 
postmodernism and poststructuralism, mainly by stressing 
chaos theory's emphases on complexity and 
unpredictability. A few scholars are attempting to use 
chaos theory as a paradigm to transcend poststructuralism, 
however, and this line of study appears as a more 
promising approach for the application of chaos theory's 
philosophical implications in literary theory and 
criticism. A notable essay in this trend is Barbara 
P.iebling's "Remodeling Truth, Power, and Society" in After 
Poststructuralism, ed. by Nancy Easterlin and Barbara
In theatre, only a few publications have appeared 
that deal primarily with chaos theory. The most 
significant include Michael Vanden Heuvel's "The Politics 
of the Paradigm: a Case Study in Chaos Theory," published 
in New Theatre Quarterly (August 19 93), and William W. 
Demastes' "Re-Inspecting the Crack in the Chimney: Chaos 
Theory from Ibsen to Stoppard," also published in New 
Theatre Quarterly (August 1994). Vanden Heuvel applies 
the order/disorder metaphor to the theatrical system of 
text/performance. He argues that contemporary 
"alternative" theatre (i.e., Robert Wilson, performance 
art) has overemphasized uncertainty and disorder through 
adherence to a mistaken view of deconstruction informed by 
quantum mechanics; the resulting theatre presents disorder
25
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fcr its own sake, consequently ignoring political and 
cultural messages that might provide a "productive 
experience" fcr the audience. Vanden Keuvel offers chaos 
theory as a paradigm for a more purposeful theatre and 
praises the Wooster Group for their employment of a 
balance between text and performance that informs as well 
as deconstructs.
Demastes applies the chaos theory paradigm to 
dramatic literature, arguing that the unpredictability 
inherent in the butterfly effect denies naturalistic 
causality and determinism. He then illustrates this 
proposition by pointing out non-causal relations in 
Ibsen's The Master Builder. Demastes also calls attention 
to the mini-pockets of order that lie within the plays of 
Samuel Beckett, which depart from the more random brand of 
disorder that characterizes the absurdist style as defined 
by Martin Esslin. Finally, Demastes discusses Tom 
Stoppard's conscious employment of chaos theory in his 
play Arcadia and cites David Rabe as a contemporary 
playwright who seems in touch with current views of 
reality and whose work appears to be informed by the ideas 
that comprise chaos theory.3
A small and, to varying degrees, significant body of 
work has been produced to date, therefore, on the subject 
cf chaos theory and the art of theatre. Each of these 
works has, at least in part, served as an introduction to 
chaos theory and its implications for theatre; this study
26
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is certainly no exception in this respect. This study 
departs from its predecessors, however, in both subject 
matter and scope. By directly investigating works of 
dramatic theory, this study aspires to employ chaos theory 
as a means of illuminating, or at least approaching more 
intimately, the fundamental nature of concepts such as 
creativity and the experience of theatrical art. By 
examining documents from various periods of theatre 
history, this study attempts to arrive at the more 
universal aspects of these concepts, which transcend 
movements in philosophy or period style.
Ultimately, this study strives to achieve the above- 
mentioned goals by answering the following questions: (1) 
How has the relationship of order and disorder been 
perceived by theorists at various points in theatre 
history? (2) How has the "chaotic moment" been addressed 
and explained in the works of these same artists, and how 
does such a moment relate to their individual conceptions 
of the perfect theatrical moment? (3) How do the various 
philosophical implications of chaos theory function with 
respect to the specific works studied? (4) How might 
chaos theory illuminate the ideas of these theorists in 
new ways that in turn offer new insights into their 
respective works? (5) What possibilities, if any, does 
chaos theory offer for approaching the creation and 
reception of theatrical art in the future? Finally, this 
study dees not purport to be a manifesto upon chaos theory
27
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and the art of theatre; hopefully, chaos theory will serve 
merely as a useful tool for confronting the more important 
questions set forth in this introduction concerning the 
intangible elements of theatrical art. If this 
investigation yields encouraging results, then perhaps it 
may serve as a starting point from which future 
explorations may be undertaken concerning chaos theory and 
the art of theatre.
End Notes
1 Lyapunov exponents are derived from a measurement of 
the speed at which two nearby points on the attractor 
diverge. These numbers also correspond to the rapidity 
with which two nearby points in a system (such as a 
turbulent river) diverge, therefore representing the 
degree of unpredictability in the system. The fractal 
dimension of an attractor lies somewhere between the 
standard whcle-number dimensions used, for example, in 
Euclidean geometry. This number provides researchers with 
a topological assessment of how a system behaves in 
response to changes in its parameters. The fractal 
dimension also indicates the degree and type of self­
similarity (recurring geometric features) within the 
layers cf the strange attractor (Kellert 15-19).
7 The thermostat reacts to a drop in air temperature 
by telling the furnace to turn itself on. The thermostat 
then tells the furnace to turn itself off after the air 
temperature has risen to a specified level. The 
relationship between the thermostat and the furnace would 
be described as positive feedback if the thermostat told 
the furnace to turn itself on after the air temperature 
rises above a certain level; in this case, the furnace 
would never turn itself off (theoretically).
3Beeb Salzer published an article entitled "Regarding 
Chaos and the Theatre" in Theatre Design and Technology 
(Spring 1992) that serves as an introduction to chaos 
theory from a production/design point of view. Although 
Salser's ideas about applying chaos theory to theatre are 
not fully developed, he does allude to an "order as form" 
and "chaos as creativity" approach that somewhat 
correlates with this study.
Laura Morrow and Edward Morrow published two essays 
in 1992 which apply the concepts that inform chaos theory
28
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to the plays of Tennessee Williams. The first appeared in 
Studies in American Drama, 1945-Present (vol. 8, no. 2) 
and was entitled "Humpty-Dumpty Lives!: Complexity Theory 
as an Alternative to the Omelet Scenario in The Glass 
Menagerie." The second was "The Ontological 
Potentialities of Antichaos and Adaptation in A Streetcar 
Named D e s i r e ." which appeared in Confronting Tennessee 
W i 11 j am.s ' A Streetcar Named Desire (ed. Philip C. Kolin). 
Each of these articles interprets chaos theory in terms of 
human behavior, dealing primarily with issues of 
complexity and alternating patterns of order and disorder. 
Morrow and Morrow then approach each of the Williams plays 
by studying the behavior patterns of the various 
characters according to this perspective.
Simon Jones tangentially touches upon the 
intersection of chaos theory with the issues of creativity 
and the experience of theatrical art in his essay, 
"Demor.ology: Some Thoughts Towards a Science of Chaos in 
P.ecsr.t Performance," published in Contemporary Theatre 
Reviow (vol. 2, part 2). The most exciting aspect of 
Jones' speculations concerns his relation of creativity to 
Michel Serres1 "demon," which is itself a characterization 
cf Lucretius' "clinamen." Unfortunately, Jones ironically 
fails when he sets out to challenge "theorizations of 
performance as text," as his own writing becomes bogged 
down in theoretical jargon. His blatant defiance of 
theory accomplishes little more than to permit him to 
emanate a stream of ambiguous, unsupported, and subjective 
statements. Much like the dramatic theorists to be 
examined in this study, Jones knows what he wants to say, 
but does not know how to say it.
Cara Gargano examines Maria Irene Fornes' play, M u d , 
through a framework of chaos theory in her article, "The 
Starfish and the Strange Attractor: Myth, Science, and 
Theatre as Laboratory in Maria Irene Fornes' 'Mud' (sic)," 
published in New Theatre Quarterly (August 1997). Gargano 
approaches the world of the pi ay as a fractal worid in 
which order and disorder play out in random but self­
similar patterns. The characters of the play, according 
to Gargano. find themselves in an interactive continuum 
between primal instinct and social constructedness, 
essentially at a bifurcation point in the evolution of 
humanity. she finds continuous order/disorder 
relationships and fractal self-simi1arity in the form cf 
the text as well. Gargano's analysis, therefore, is 
essentially textual, although she briefly touches upon 
some cf the deeper theoretical issues to be raised in this 
study, such as the relationship of the formal to the 
fn'-ffnble (the latter being passion and lyricism in this 
case). Finally, although Gargano relies upon 
pest structuralist/postmodern thought in many of her 
arguments, she seems to want to use chaos theory to 
^ranscend such concepts, even though she never states so
o V  ̂  ̂ n  ̂  ̂V
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Chapter Two: Catharsis, Creativity, and Chaos in 
Aristotle's Poetics
In his Poetics. Aristotle introduces a number of key 
concepts whose interpretations remain a source of debate 
even today. Terms such as m i mesis, h a m a r t i a , peripeteia. 
anagnorisis. and pathos have each acquired various 
meanings dependent upon the point of view or approach of 
the individual interpreter. However, of all Aristotle's 
elements of poetry/tragedy, the definition of catharsis 
has aroused the most controversy; such controversy demands 
that a working definition of catharsis be derived before 
proceeding with an analysis of the remainder of the 
Poeti c s .
This chapter will therefore begin with a survey of 
the literature concerning the interpretation of 
Aristotle's term catharsis, ultimately arriving at a 
definition consistent with chaos theory. Once such a 
definition has been determined, several other questions 
involving the interpretation of the Poetics begin to fall 
in line. This chapter will then address the following 
issues through a framework of chaos theory: 1) the 
interpretation of the term m i m e s i s . 2) the development of 
the forms of comedy and tragedy, 3) Aristotle's emphasis 
upon "order," 4) the relationship of part to whole in the 
Poetics, 5) causality and unpredictability, 6) the 
hamartia. 7) character, 8) thought, 9) cognitive and 
emotional audience experiences, and 10) cognitive and 
emotional approaches to playwriting.
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Since an understanding of several of Aristotle's 
arguments in his Poetics (including most of those listed 
above) depend upon the individual scholar's definition of 
catharsis, a thorough examination of the traditional 
approaches to the meaning of catharsis will now be 
undertaken, culminating in a working definition of the 
term informed by a perspective based in chaos theory. 
Probably the greatest number Aristotelian scholars have 
defined catharsis as a process of "purgation." Advocates 
of the purgation theory typically treat catharsis as a 
homeopathic medical process, which "purges" the tragic 
spectator of unhealthy or undesirable emotions. This 
definition was first proposed by the earliest commentators 
on the Poetics, was later revived by nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century interpreters such as J. Bernays and S.
K. Butcher, and has been reinforced by the appropriation 
of the term by psychoanalytical theorists, beginning of 
course with Freud's notable discussion.
The purgative theory of catharsis derives primarily 
from three sources. First, the notion of a medical 
purgation appears as the most common usage of the term in 
classical times, although several scholiasts employ the 
word metaphorically. Secondly, because Aristotle's father 
practiced medicine, and since Aristotle himself employs a 
somewhat biological point of view in his writing 
(particularly in the construction of his formal systems), 
a medical definition of the term seems appropriate. The
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final source for a curative reading of catharsis springs 
from the now-famous/infamous passage in the Politics where 
Aristotle refers to the word as a function of music. This 
latter argument deserves further discussion, especially in 
light of the copious number of modern commentators who 
have treated the reference.
In the Po l i t i c s , Aristotle differentiates three kinds 
of music: ethical, practical, and enthusiastic. Ethical 
music is employed in education; practical music provides 
entertainment; and enthusiastic music results in 
catharsis. Aristotle continues by stating that all people 
experience emotions, such as pity, fear, and religious 
passion, but some are subject to more extreme emotions 
than ethers; enthusiastic music seems to have a calming, 
"healing." effect on people susceptible to fits cf 
excessive emotions. Although Aristotle promises to treat 
this subject further in his Poetics (Politics 251), such a 
discussion is lost or was never written.
Aristotle's employment of the medical sense of the 
term catharsis in the Politics is quite clear and is cited 
to advantage by proponents of the purgative definition of 
the word. Others, however, have argued that Aristotle 
uses the term in a different sense and with, therefore, a 
different meaning in the Poetics. K. D. F. Kitto, for 
example, states that no evidence exists to support that 
catharsis was a special, technical term in the Ancient 
Greek language, whose unique usage would imply only one
32
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definition (135). Leon Golden further points out that 
Epicurus and Philodemus each employ the word in a sense 
that implies intellectual clarification rather than strict 
medical purgation ("Purgation" 474). The word catharsis, 
therefore, may have been in common use among the Ancient 
Greeks and was certainly subject to metaphorical usages.
Kitto also identifies specific conflicts between 
Aristotle's applications of the term in the Politics and 
the Poetics. Because Aristotle differentiates catharsis- 
producing music from educational and moral music in the 
Politics, one must assume that he did not consider tragedy 
to be moral or educational if, in fact, he intended the 
word catharsis to convey the same meaning in the Poetics 
(135). Golden presents a similar argument when he states 
that the subject matter and final aims (one might even say 
"final causes," although Golden does not use this term) of 
the Poli ti cs and Poetics are quite different and cites 
specific conflicts between the two documents to illustrate 
these distinctions. According to Golden, Aristotle was 
writing from the perspective of a law-maker while 
composing the Politics, therefore giving primary focus to 
political, social, and ethical concerns. In the Poetics, 
on the other hand, Aristotle was interested only in 
exploring the nature of art and thus restricted his 
observations to a purely aesthetic point of view 
("Purgation" 474-476). The term catharsis, therefore, may 
have been employed with alternate meanings in the two
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works because the context of its use was quite likely 
different in each case. So even though the purgative 
theory of catharsis is supported by the literal meaning of 
the word, the context of the Poetics suggests an alternate 
definition.
The second interpretation of catharsis to be 
considered here involves a traditional alternative to the 
purgative definition and stems from the view that the term 
refers more generally to a process of purification. The 
interpretation of catharsis as a purifying function seems 
to have originated during the seventeenth- and eighteenth- 
centuries when emotional reactions were highly valued; 
Aristotelian critics of the period (John Dryden, for 
example) stated that emotions in the audience, such as 
pity and fear, were purified through catharsis, rather 
than being purged--which would instead imply a devaluation 
of emotions (Keesey 193). From such a perspective, tragic 
pleasure derives from affective reactions that have been 
refined through the experience of the play.
On the other hand, twentieth-century commentators 
usually employ the word "purification" in reference to 
catharsis as a process of ritual or moral cleansing 
occurring in the spectator, the text, or both. Gerald 
Else regards catharsis as a process of the purification of 
the pathos , "the fatal or painful act which is the basic 
stuff of tragedy," within the text (423). This 
purification occurs by means of the pitiful and fearful
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incidents of the plot. Else connects Aristotle's 
preference for tragic pathos containing violence or 
threats of violence by one family member upon another with 
the Ancient Greek association of murder with pollution, 
particularly when the murder involves blood kin. The 
Greek need for the purification of a polluted person, 
therefore, is fulfilled through the action of the plot of 
the tragedy, such as the hero's suffering (pitiful and 
fearful incidents), but particularly through the 
anagnorisis. the recognition that the hero has been 
polluted in ignorance because of his/her hamartia 
(mistake), rather than through deliberate, conscious 
actions.
The upshot of Else's analysis of the catharsis 
question concerns the notion that the process of 
purification occurs in the text rather than in the 
spectator. Such a suggestion revolutionized the debate 
over the meaning of the term catharsis in the Poetics when 
Else's thorough examination of Aristotle's document first 
appeared in 1957. Most subsequent treatments of the 
subject have either built upon or challenged Else's 
arguments to varying degrees. Isaiah Smithson, for 
example, accepts Else's emphasis of the moral dimension of 
tragedy, but relocates the results of the cathartic 
process within the spectator rather than
the text. Catharsis, for Smithson, educates the audience 
about the moral implications of their own actions (16).
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The third and most recent line of development in the 
catharsis controversy builds upon Else's new perspective 
of catharsis as a function of the text; these ideas may be 
traced in the respective work of Kitto and Golden, each of 
whom supports the "clarification" theory of catharsis. 
Kitto actually prefers the word "cleansing" as the most 
appropriate description of the cathartic process, but also 
mentions "clarification," in passing, as a somewhat 
equivalent definition (140). Kitto challenges Else's 
assertion that the pathos "pollutes" the hero, instead 
defining the tragic act as "shocking." As a result, the 
process of catharsis operates in a purely literary and 
aesthetic manner within the text, cleansing the pitiful 
and fearful incidents of the plot through the m i mesis. the 
imitation of an action, which serves as the source of 
pleasure for the spectator. In other words, catharsis 
cleanses the mimesis by framing it as art, removing the 
harshness cf the pathos that would be too painful to 
witness in real 1ife--without diminishing the emotional 
impact--ultimately making the action of the tragedy 
significant and universal to an extent that the audience 
derives pleasure from their new-found understanding. One 
of Kitto's strongest arguments for his "cleansing" theory 
asserts that this definition of the function of catharsis 
within the text conforms to Aristotle's reasons for 
writing the Poetics. which were literary and artistic, 
rather than religious, moral, or medical.
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Golden's interpretation of catharsis essentially 
parallels K i t t o ’s arguments, with three significant 
distinctions. First, Golden more clearly distinguishes 
between the words "cleansing" and "clarification," 
ultimately favoring the latter as the correct translation 
of catharsis as it is employed by Aristotle. Even though 
Kitto mentions "clarification" as a similar word choice to 
his preferred term, "cleansing," Golden’s interpretation 
of catharsis as "clarification" clearly rules out the word 
"cleansing" as an equivalent meaning. Secondly, Golden 
returns a sense of importance to catharsis as the end or 
final cause of tragedy in the Poetics. Both Else and 
Kitto admittedly devalue the term through their respective 
definitions, instead placing emphasis upon either the 
anagnorisis or the mimesis. These elements also play 
important roles in Golden's analysis, but each depends 
upon the catharsis for its effect. Finally, Golden 
deviates from both Kitto's and Else's theories of 
catharsis by including (actually, re-including) the 
spectator in the cathartic process. Golden agrees that 
catharsis functions within the text as a means of 
clarifying the action, but he also emphasizes its effect 
upon the audience. Golden even asserts that in some 
instances the catharsis may be performed by the audience 
through cognitive responses to the clarification of the 
action. Golden therefore agrees with Kitto that the 
source of tragic pleasure derives from a moment of
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clarification or insight, related to Aristotle's emphasis 
upon the pleasure of learning, that occurs in the 
audience. Golden deviates from Kitto, however, when he 
locates the process of catharsis itself within the 
audience as well as the text, rather than in the text 
alone. (Kitto seems to imply that merely the results of 
the catharsis [i.e., a cleansed mimesis! cause tragic 
pleasure in the audience.)
Of the three different descriptions of the cathartic 
process discussed thus far (purgation, purification, and 
cleansing/clarification), Golden’s view of catharsis as 
clarification certainly appears the most attractive. More 
importantly, the cathartic process as defined by Golden 
also functions in a manner most consistent with a 
perspective based in chaos theory. By placing the effect 
as well as the process of catharsis in both the text and 
the spectator, Golden creates a complex, interactive 
system that exhibits the trademark feedback loops of chaos 
theory. Golden's explanation of the term therefore 
displays a certain level of ambiguity (i.e., does the 
catharsis take place separately in the text and spectator 
respectively, or somewhere between the two?), which 
reflects the ambiguity in the catharsis clause of the 
Poetics.
Donald Keesey, in fact, points out that the ambiguity 
of Golden's employment of the word "clarification" as a 
definition of catharsis best serves the text of the
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Po etics, for whether Aristotle intended the term to apply 
to a clarification of the mimesis--or action of the text-- 
or to a clarification in the insight of the audience, "the 
term works equally well in either context" (203).
Golden's ambiguous interpretation of catharsis functions 
most accurately if Aristotle, in fact, intended the term 
to apply to both text and spectator. Francis Sparshott, 
for example, states that Aristotle wrote the catharsis 
clause vaguely so that a number of possible 
interpretations would be valid, including the purgation 
and purification theories as well. By taking such an 
ambiguous approach, Aristotle's purposes for writing the 
apparently conflicting Politics and Poetics would 
ultimately not conflict.
The notion that Aristotle intentionally wrote the 
catharsis clause of his Poetics in ambiguous language 
might prove difficult for some to accept, but perhaps the 
ambiguity of the clause was not intentional after all. 
Assuming that the term catharsis carries significance as 
an end of tragedy, then Aristotle was dealing with a very 
tricky question when he composed the clause, particularly 
if the term was intended to apply in some way to the 
pleasure of the spectator. The ambiguity of the wording 
of the clause may very well reflect Aristotle's 
uncertainty about--or unclear understanding of--the effect 
of the tragic experience upon an audience. On the other 
hand, Aristotle may have recognized his own uncertainty
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and purposefully chosen words that would not commit him to 
a particular point of view. At any rate, the lack of a 
consensus on the interpretation of catharsis makes the 
term inherently ambiguous today, even if one accepts 
Else's and Kitto's assertions that the cathartic process 
functions only within the text and thus plays little, if 
any, role in the tragic experience of the spectator.
Taking the ambiguity of the catharsis clause into 
account, Leon Golden's interpretation certainly remains 
the most attractive. The theories of the purgation or 
purification of the emotions of the spectators fail to 
account for the essentially literary approach Aristotle 
takes in the Poetics. On the other hand, Else's theory 
concerning the purification of the pollution of the 
pathos. as well as Kitto's cleansing of the mimesis to 
raise it to the level of art, each eliminate the role of 
the spectator, effectively diminishing the importance of 
catharsis in Aristotle's dramatic construct. Golden, 
however, provides the best of both worlds in his 
explanation of catharsis because he accommodates 
Aristotle's emphasis upon plot as the most important 
element of tragedy, while at the same time stressing the 
significance of the pleasure of the audience, which 
Aristotle refers to frequently throughout the text of the 
Poetics. Golden draws these two apparently conflicting 
aspects of Aristotle's work together so that they actually 
seem to function in response to one another. The
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clarification of the formal structure of the plot 
contributes to the clarification of the spectator's 
understanding, ultimately resulting in an experience of 
tragic pleasure by the spectator deriving from this 
understanding. But at the same time, the clarification of 
the spectator's understanding also contributes to the 
clarification of the plot within the spectator's 
particular frame of reference. Golden's interpretation, 
therefore, breaks down the dichotomy between the formal 
structural aspects of the Poetics and more experiential, 
affective readings of Aristotle, which has served as the 
focal point of the catharsis controversy.
At this point, Golden's interpretation of the 
catharsis question also appears the most attractive from a 
point of view of chaos theory. By breaking down the 
dichotomy between the formal and affective aspects of the 
Poetics, Golden's analysis parallels chaos theory's 
breakdown of the traditional order/disorder dichotomy into 
a more continuous and interactive relationship between the 
two apparent opposites. Furthermore, with respect to the 
ambiguity inherent in Golden’s interpretation, Aristotle's 
very inclusion of the catharsis clause into the Poetics 
admits elements of uncertainty and holism into a work that 
otherwise conforms neatly to the linear reductionism 
typically associated with the formalism of his other 
treatises. This element is related somewhat to the 
Cartesian assertion that the mind may be separated from
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the object of study; Golden's translation of catharsis as 
"clarification" implies that Aristotle must have 
recognized on some level (perhaps not consciously) that 
art, and especially literature, involve the fusion of 
thought and the object of study, the latter being language 
and thought itself in this case.1
By interconnecting the formal and the cognitive in a 
manner consistent with chaos theory's interconnection of 
order and disorder, Golden's analysis of the catharsis 
clause holds direct implications for many of the other 
concepts Aristotle introduces in his Poetics. Typically, 
interpreters have distinguished the catharsis clause from 
the remainder of Aristotle's definition of tragedy in 
chapter six of the Poetics by pointing out that the 
concept of catharsis seems to appear "like a bolt from the 
blue" (Kitto 136), whereas each of the other elements of 
the definition were set up, or anticipated, in previous 
chapters. Such an assertion, of course, reinforces Else's 
and Kitto's deemphasis of the significance of catharsis to 
the principal arguments of the Poetics (which for them 
concern the formal structural elements of the plot). On 
the other hand, M. Pabst Battin agrees that the notion of 
catharsis appears suddenly, but states that Aristotle "was 
willing, so to speak, to spoil an otherwise perfectly 
straightforward and rigorous definition to include the 
notion of catharsis," which "suggests that he accorded it
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more than ordinary importance and surely considered it a 
central feature of tragedy" (301).
Aristotle, however, states that his definition of 
tragedy is drawn "from what has already been said" (38), 
and Golden finds reason to take Aristotle at his word. 
Golden asserts that Aristotle anticipates the catharsis 
clause prior to his definition of tragedy by logically 
interconnecting catharsis and mimesis through the 
following reasoning: 1) tragedy is a form of m i m e s i s , 2) 
mimesis is a representation of an action, 3) the instinct 
for enjoying works of mimesis and (therefore) tragedy 
derives from the pleasure of learning,2 4) it follows that 
the clarification (catharsis) of the incidents of action 
(mimesis) must provide a pleasurable experience for the 
spectator. This interconnection of catharsis with 
Aristotle's prior discussions of mimesis in the Poetics is 
supported by a later statement (chapter fourteen) in which 
Aristotle declares that pity and fear, through the events 
of the plot (mimesis). produce tragic pleasure (49). 
Golden, therefore, asserts that the notion of catharsis 
conforms "with the intellectual signification that makes 
it an integral part of the general argument of the 
Poetics" ("Katharsis" 45).
When Aristotle states, therefore, that his 
introduction of catharsis in chapter six of the Poetics 
derives from his previous arguments, he has not erred or 
cited a "missing" section of the document. Golden
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demonstrates quite clearly that Aristotle refers to his 
earlier discussions of m i m e s i s . thus deeply 
interconnecting the most significant function (catharsis) 
with the most fundamental element (mimesis) of Aristotle's 
theoretical construction of tragedy. Because these two 
elements of tragedy each contribute to the definition of 
the other, a more detailed discussion of mimesis must be 
undertaken to clearly understand the whole of Aristotle's 
tragic construct.
An examination of the definition of mimesis proves 
tricky, for like catharsis, the interpretation of mimesis 
has also been debated by critical scholars throughout the 
history of criticism. Traditionally, the central debate 
in the controversy over mimesis has concerned the 
distinction between the copy of an object and the object 
itself. The question lies in whether Aristotle advocates 
a sort of literal realism in which the artistic copy 
remains faithful to the object depicted, or an 
interpretive form of art in which the copy becomes a 
newly-created object that merely alludes to the original. 
More directly, does mimesis imply an ineffable difference 
between art and the object depicted? If so, does the 
spectator experience such a difference or merely view the 
work of art as a mirror-image of the object imitated? As 
with the catharsis question, Aristotle ambiguously 
straddles both sides of this debate. He states, for 
example, in chapter four that people "enjoy seeing
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likenesses because . . . they acquire information . . .
and discover, for instance, that 'this is a picture of so 
and so.'" But this same statement is preceded by an 
assertion that people enjoy seeing representations of 
objects that would be painful to see in actuality (35). A 
combination of these two statements implies that the 
pleasure associated with mimesis derives from the learning 
experience related to the general truths conveyed through 
viewing the work of art rather than through the object of 
imitation; in fact, an association of the process of 
learning with poetry and the pleasure of mimesis arises 
repeatedly in the Poetics. affirming learning as one of 
the most significant theoretical elements of the text. 
Furthermore, Aristotle observes that representations of 
people in painting or poetry may be better, worse, or the 
same as people really are, indicating no preference among 
the three types; if he indeed preferred realistic 
imitations as the most accurate form of m i m e s i s . then he 
could easily have stated his case in the course of this 
discussion (33). These contradictions are compounded by 
the accusative that accompanies the word mimesis in the 
text of the Poetics, which may refer to the original, the 
copy, or both (Bal 172).
Aristotle indicates that representation takes 
precedence over imitation, however, when he gives advice 
to critics of poetry in chapter twenty-five of the 
Poetics. Since poetry is not held to rigid standards of
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correctness, two types of faults may be made by the poet: 
essential and incidental. An essential fault occurs when 
the poet makes a mistake "through sheer lack of skill"; an 
error that occurs because of the poet's lack of knowledge, 
however, results only in an incidental fault (70). 
Aristotle states that an incidental fault, although still 
a fault, may be excused as long as it intensifies the 
effect of the poem; the poem would be better, however, if 
the same effect could be achieved without including the 
fault. As an equivalent example from the visual arts, 
Aristotle states that "it is a less serious fault not to 
know that a female deer has no horns than to make an 
unrecognizable picture of one" (70). Clearly, Aristotle 
considers skill to be the most important attribute of the 
poet; even if the content of a work represents untruths, 
thus straying from "reality," the effectiveness of the 
poem in terms of pleasure or catharsis may make up for 
such inadequacies. This view reveals a preference for the 
more nonlinear, intangible elements of poetry concerning 
the impact of a work on an audience, as opposed to the 
more linear process of fact-checking; ultimately, the 
realism of mimesis as exact imitation must never come at 
the expense of tragic effect.
Tragic effect even governs the most basic impulse for 
mimesis and, consequently, for poetry as well, which for 
Aristotle originates in "human nature" and separates 
humans from animals. He therefore cites two ultimate
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causes for the creation of poetry in chapter four of the 
Poetics: the instinct for mimesis and the instinct to 
enjoy works of m i m e s i s . The latter of these instincts 
derives from the inherent pleasure of learning (not only 
for philosophers, but others as well) and the notion that 
humans learn by seeing representations. This cognitive 
brand of pleasure provides the most direct connection 
between mimesis and the cathartic process; according to 
Golden, the tragic pleasure derives from the learning 
experience associated with catharsis, i.e., the 
clarification of the incidents of action, or mimesis. 
Furthermore, this same type of "natural" cognitive 
pleasure occurs within the individual incidents of action 
as well, but on a less elevated level.
Aristotle's reliance upon nature (human instinct) as 
the origin of m i m e s i s . his most fundamental constituent of 
poetry, is not surprising, for theorists have always 
employed nature as the ultimate justification for their 
formal systems. However, where later theorists devised 
rules for the representation of nature (usually from their 
own subjective point of view), Aristotle seems to take 
nature for granted, for he does not attempt to explain why 
certain forms are more natural than others or even what 
makes some forms appear more natural. The clearest 
evidence appears when Aristotle refers to the development 
of tragedy and comedy from "improvisation"; such a 
statement implies an element of chance or trial and error
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in what he later describes as very structured final 
products. Furthermore, because only a few of the families 
in the traditional stories have experienced the kinds of 
oathos that Aristotle favors, he states that "it was by 
chance rather than technical knowledge that the poets 
discovered how to gain tragic effects in their plots"
(51). According to Aristotle, once the most effective 
stories in terms of pathos and audience response were 
discovered, the playwrights then used the same families 
repeatedly in their tragedies. Here, Aristotle directly 
employs the word "chance" in his discussion of tragedy; 
chance not only plays a role in the effectiveness of the 
pathcs within the plot, but also influenced the 
development of the form of tragedy, which, as Aristotle 
implies, was discovered gradually through the somewhat 
spontaneous selections of traditional stories by the 
tragic poets. His strictly linear, causally-oriented 
precepts for the ordering of the incidents of action were 
therefore determined through chance, chaotic moments of 
trial and error and inspiration from which the order of 
the most effective examples of tragic pathos would 
eventually take form. To this point, Aristotle seems to 
present a view of nature consistent with chaos theory, for 
as individuals follow their "instincts"3 in pursuit of 
mimetic fulfillment, they are likely to exercise thought 
processes similar to those described by Koestler in his 
theories of inspiration and creativity, efficiently
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shifting planes of reference for new sources of artistic 
inspiration--particular1y as techniques such as 
improvisation are employed. In addition, the great number 
of "natural" mimetic impulses that Aristotle relates as 
the rudiments of poetic creation are capable of 
interacting and feeding into one another in a manner that 
would encourage unstable, aperiodic behavior in the 
system; such behavior would, of course, result in the 
emergence of the forms of comedy and tragedy through self- 
organization, or order out of chaos, rather than through a 
rigidly controlled, linear methodology. Although 
Aristotle certainly implies nothing of this sort himself, 
he wants to give credit to "natural" instincts and 
processes, such as improvisation, which at least 
demonstrates that he acknowledges the power of mere 
nonlinear forces, as opposed to a stricter, linear 
causa1i t y .
Although playwrights discovered the forms of comedy 
and tragedy gradually through "chance, rather than 
technical knowledge," Aristotle certainly implies that the 
most effective forms of each genre had been available long 
before the time of his writing; the seed had finished 
germinating, and Aristotle intended to describe the mature 
flower. For tragedy, the key to its most effective form 
1ies in the proper arrangement of the incidents of 
mimes i s ; since tragedy is a representation of an action 
rather than of individuals, "the incidents and the plot
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are the end aimed at in tragedy, and as always, the end is 
everything." (40). Aristotle's emphasis upon plot, of 
course, reveals his preference for linear order; in fact, 
the word order first arises in the Poetics when Aristotle 
defines plot as the ordered incidents of action. Order 
becomes an important aspect of plot for Aristotle because 
of his key concepts of peripeteia (reversal) and 
anagnorisis (recognition or discovery), "the two most 
important means by which tragedy plays on our feelings" 
(40). Furthermore, Aristotle supports his concern for 
order in plot with an analogy from the visual arts: "for 
if an artist were to daub his canvas with the most 
beautiful colours laid on at random, he would not give the 
same pleasure as he would by drawing a recognizable 
portrait in black and white" (40). The employment of the 
words "feelings" and "pleasure" in the two above quotes 
indicates that, for Aristotle, the playwright must plan 
the events of the tragedy with the discrimination of a 
master architect4 in order to achieve the desired effect, 
which is ultimately, and somewhat ironically, the more 
chaotic phenomenon of catharsis.
As a contrast to A^ristotle's view of the playwright 
and to further emphasize the overall importance of order 
in the Greek world view, one need only recall the words 
that Plate ascribes to Socrates in his Apoloqy, in which 
Socrates explains the playwright's "genius" as a natural 
sort of inspiration that lacks the more important
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qualities of wisdom and understanding (79). From the 
point of view of Plato's Socrates, inspiration clearly 
relates to passion, or irrationality, while wisdom and 
understanding represent rational, ordered modes of 
thought; this delineation may be observed more directly in 
Plato's I o n . where Socrates goes so far as to ascribe a 
divine origin to genius and depreciates the practical 
value of poetry.5 This position works against Aristotle's 
view of the playwright as a master architect who must 
think linearly to correctly order the constituent parts of 
his work and achieve the maximum effect. Plato's refusal 
to include a position for the poet/playwright in his 
Repub1i c , therefore, also indicates a distain for or 
distrust of genius; essentially, Plato embraces a false 
dichotomy of order versus disorder, rationality versus 
genius, and practicality versus passion. For Aristotle, 
however, genius may inspire order; pleasure and passion as 
well produce positive results in tragedy by inspiring the 
spectator to learn about what has been witnessed.
Finally, Aristotle holds such high regard for order in 
plotting because through this order the underlying chaotic 
process of catharsis may be achieved, both with respect to 
the structure of tragedy, as well as in the emotional and 
cognitive responses of the audience.
In addition to his high regard for order in plotting, 
Aristotle also emphasizes the importance of "size." In 
the conclusion to chapter seven, for example, Aristotle
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states that "beauty is bound up with size and order" (42). 
He goes on to assert that details become lost in something 
that is too small, while something too large frustrates 
the comprehension of unity or wholeness in the object; the 
proper length of a plot should, therefore, be appropriate 
for the completion of the action according to 
"probability" or "necessity." Compared to many of the 
other linearly, causally informed precepts Aristotle 
outlines in the Poetics. his discussion of size appears 
quite flexible. For example, Aristotle places equal 
importance upon specific details and wholeness as factors 
governing size in his overall aesthetic construct, which 
emphasizes the included middle, rather than the 
dichctomous extremes, thus implying a continuum of part 
and whole. The same applies in chaos theory, for a 
sensitive dependence on initial conditions dictates that 
no detail may be ignored, while approaches to qualitative 
understanding, such as strange attractors, emphasize 
T.’hol eness .
The relationship of part and whole also plays an 
integral role in Aristotle's discussion of unity of plot, 
which, of course, means unity of action in the Poetics; 
similar to his prescription for determining the size of 
the plot, what should be included in the action is 
governed by "probability" and "necessity." Although at 
first this precept appears as equally unrestrictive as 
Aristotle's employment of the same two words with respect
52
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to size, he dictates that, with respect to the action of 
the plot, a unified whole implies that each individual 
incident of action must be necessary to the whole; in 
other words, if any individual incident of action is 
removed, then the effectiveness of the overall plot would 
be disrupted, "for if the presence or absence of something 
makes no apparent difference, it is no real part of the 
whole" (43).
Of the "three unities" that would later be championed 
by the neoclassicists, Aristotle advocates only the unity 
of action with any vigor in the P oetics, and here he 
clearly advances a much more rigorous definition of this 
unity than the most common neoclassical interpretation of 
a single plot line. Rather than merely stating that the 
plot should contain no extraneous incidents of action and 
be confined to a single subject, Aristotle proposes that 
each event of the plot should be necessary to the action 
to such an extent that the overall plot would suffer in 
its absence. Such a point of view not only linearizes the 
plot by emphasizing causal relationships, but also 
endorses a linear, clockwork relationship between part and 
whole. Under a mechanistic, Newtonian world view, every 
part must function properly for the whole to operate; 
every gear in the clock represents a necessary link in the 
causal chain. In an unstable, aperiodic system, however, 
the absence of one part does not necessarily damage the 
whole irreparably; water may be removed from a stream, or
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a limb may be removed from a tree (or even a human body), 
and although some effect certainly results, the operation 
cf the overall system will not necessarily be disrupted 
terminal 1y .
As mentioned earlier, a nonlinear relationship 
between part and whole also implies a continuous, rather 
than dichotomous, relationship between the universal and 
the particular. In the ninth chapter of his Poetics, 
Aristotle seems at first to dichotomize the universal and 
particular by making them the respective domains of the 
poet and the historian. According to Aristotle, the poet 
deals with what might happen according to probability and 
necessity, while the historian treats events that have 
actually happened; the poet, therefore, handles subjects 
involving universal truths, while the historian works only 
with particular facts. The work of the poet, and 
particularly the tragedian, is therefore more 
philosophical and worthy of serious attention than that of 
the historian. Aristotle does not, however, completely 
separate the universal from the particular in this 
discussion, for he states that tragedians traditionally 
draw their characters and plots from history, rather than 
fiction; the tragic playwright must therefore elevate 
these historical characters and events to the level of the 
universal in order to be effective. The particular facts 
of history, therefore, merge and even interact with the 
universal truths of fiction in the form of tragedy.
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For the same reasons that extraneous incidents of 
action should be avoided when constructing tragic plots, 
Aristotle states that episodic plots are the worst kind of 
"simple" plot (one which lacks a recognition and reversal) 
because the sequence of events disregards probability and 
necessity, thus breaking the continuity of the action.
This assertion, of course, conforms with Aristotle's 
emphasis in the previous chapter upon the necessity of a 
causal relationship between the incidents of action. 
Although such a view concerning the construction of plot 
appears quite linear, Aristotle does recognize that 
unexpected events more effectively heighten pity and fear 
than incidents of action that appear mechanistically 
constructed by the playwright, or merely accidental. The 
favored types of events he refers to must seem logical as 
well as unexpected, for "even chance occurrences seem most 
remarkable when they have the appearance of having been 
brought about by design." As an example, Aristotle refers 
to a myth in which a statue of Mitys falls upon and kills 
the man who had caused Mitys' death; such an incident does
not seem like a mere chance occurance (45). This
perspective not only advocates a kind of determinism that
one might refer to as poetic justice, but an element of
determinism also resides in the playwright’s engineering 
of an event such as the example given above. At the same 
time, however, the effectiveness of the incident of action 
also relies upon the illusion of chance, or
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unpredictability, in its occurence. Here, Aristotle seems 
to favor a kind of indeterminate determinism with a strong 
affinity for the unpredictable yet deterministic view of 
the universe supported by chaos theory.
Such allusions to unpredictability are often 
outweighed by other more linearly causal statements in the 
Poetics, however. For example, after discussing one type 
of simple plot, the "episodic," Aristotle defines simple 
and complex plots in chapter ten as those which 
respectively lack or contain a peripeteia (reversal), an 
anagnorisis (recognition), or both. The introduction of 
the peripeteia or anagnorisis into the plot also exhibits 
Aristotle's preference for causality because either of 
these events should occur as "inevitable or probable" 
consequences of the prior incidents of action, "for there 
is a big difference between what happens as a result of 
something else and what merely happens after it" (45).
The most effective plots must not only be of the 
complex variety (containing a recognition and/or 
reversal), however; such plots must also represent actions 
that are capable of awakening pity and fear. In a 
discussion of several examples of plot reversals,
Aristotle decides that 1) good persons who regress from 
good fortune to bad, and 2) evil persons who experience a 
change of fortune from either extreme to the other, each 
fails to arouse pity and fear. This leads to an 
exploration of the sources of these tragic emotions and
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the following conclusions: pity is awakened by undeserved 
misfortune, while fear is aroused by the misfortune of 
someone with whom the audience can identify. The most 
tragic of reversals, therefore, entail a transition from 
prosperity to misfortune; since Aristotle has already 
ruled out reversals which involve both good and evil 
persons in this respect, he decides that there must be a 
medium between good and evil that most satisfactorily 
produces pity and fear. He then describes the most 
tragically appealing reversals as those which involve a 
person of high repute and prosperity who falls into 
misfortune because of an hamartia (error), rather than 
through vice or depravity.
Ey introducing the concept of the hamartia, Aristotle 
has broken down another dichotomy, that of good and evil. 
Even though the best tragic plots end in misfortune, a 
"good" person who falls from prosperity into misfortune 
through no fault of his/her own only arouses "disgust," 
while an "evil" person who faces the same situation may 
appeal to one's humanity, but does not inspire pity or 
fear because the misfortune is deserved and most, if not 
all, spectators would refuse to identify with a totally 
evil character. The type of character most "like 
ourselves," therefore, lies on the continuum somewhere 
between good and evil. In addition, the misfortune of the 
character must be undeserved, yet not so undeserved as to 
arouse disgust; the hamartia, therefore, functions as
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evidence of an essentially good character's al1-too-human 
fallibility. This complex approach to characterization 
departs from the neoclassical notion of poetic justice, in 
which one-dimensional good and evil characters are 
rewarded and punished accordingly. Instead, Aristotle 
presents a view of human behavior conforming to a universe 
of included middles, rather than dichotomies.
Furthermore, the notion of the hamartia resonates with the 
phenomenon of a sensitive dependence on initial conditions 
occurring in unstable, aperiodic systems; in a manner 
quite analogous to the butterfly effect, the tragic 
protagonist's error becomes magnified (especially through 
a recognition) until a seemingly undeserved reversal of 
fortune occurs, thus producing pity and fear, and 
ultimately, catharsis.
Later in the Poetics (chapter twenty-five), Aristotle 
again displays a relative--and therefore continuous--view 
of good and evil when he discusses the moral judgement of 
acts that are represented in works of poetry. Before 
judging the goodness or badness of something that is said 
or done in a work of poetry, the critic should first 
consider who said or did it, to whom it was said or done, 
as well as the occasion, means, and reason concerning the 
incident. Something said or done in a poem may appear 
obviously good or evil, yet occur for the purposes of 
averting a greater evil or bringing about a greater good. 
As with qualities of character, each incident of action
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therefore lies on a continuum containing relative degrees 
of goodness or badness, depending on a number of 
circumstances.
A continuum of good/evil, as well as order/disorder 
also arises in Aristotle's more detailed discussion of 
character in chapter fifteen, though more analogously, as 
he calls for a mixture of universal and particular traits 
in the construction of tragic characters. In other words, 
the playwright must portray enough specific traits, 
including defects, to make the character recognizable, yet 
at the same time depict the character as a decent (good) 
person, because "tragedy is a representation of people who 
are better than the average" (52). This dual attitude 
toward character illustrates the reasons for debate among 
modern scholars concerning whether Aristotle advocates 
realism or idealism in drama. Aristotle states, for 
example, that four qualities contribute to effective 
characterization, the first being that the character 
display goodness through his/her speech and actions; here 
Aristotle clearly favors a kind of universalization of 
character that supports Golden's view of Aristotle's 
theoretical arguments, in which tragedy (through 
catharsis) encourages a learning experience, particularly 
concerning the universal human condition. Aristotle's 
second quality, that a character should be depicted 
appropriately with respect to his/her class, gender, etc., 
also universalizes characterization (through
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categorization) more than it individualizes or 
particularizes character; this quality resembles the 
neoclassical precept of "decorum," which also emphasizes 
universality (although the neoclassicists borrowed this 
term from Horace, rather than Aristotle). The third 
quality of a well-crafted character, however, appears more 
realistic than universally idealized; this quality 
Aristotle vaguely refers to as "like," which is typically 
interpreted to mean "lifelike" with implications of human 
complexity. Aristotle says nothing more about this 
precept for characterization, except that it is different 
from making characters good or appropriate. The final 
quality is "consistent," which seems to apply equally to 
both universal and realistic arguments concerning 
characterization, for a consistent trait or mannerism 
might individualize the character in relation to other 
characters or, alternately (and perhaps in some instances, 
simultaneously), universalize the character with respect 
to a broad category such as class or gender.
The upshot of chapter fifteen is that Aristotle 
believes the construction of the characters of a tragedy 
should derive directly from the plot; his emphasis upon 
the goodness of a character, for example, echoes his 
earlier discussion of plot in which he stated that the 
tragic protagonist should be an essentially good person 
who commits a mistake (hamartia). In addition, he points
out that characters, like the plot, should follow
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probability and necessity, which provides the same 
impression of an indeterminate determinism that he had 
earlier suggested in plot (that an event should occur 
unexpectedly, yet at the same time provide the appearance 
of design). The balance and even interplay, in other 
words, between order and disorder that appeared in 
Aristotle's treatment of the plot of tragedy may also be 
found in his reasoning concerning characterization, for 
both the universal (goodness) and the particular 
(hamartia) must be emphasized for the character to serve 
the p i o t .
Because characters perform the acts of mimesis in 
tragedy, Aristotle states that the element of character 
should be drawn according to the "nature" of the 
individuals who carry out the incidents of action in order 
to most appropriately serve the plot; such a statement 
supports Aristotle's position that character should 
contain a combination of the universal and particular, 
especially through a framework of chaos theory, in which 
the universal and particular not only exist side by side 
in nature, but also interact and feed into one another. 
Aristotle carefully delineates the tragic element of 
"thought" with respect to character, however, by stating 
that thought arises when the figure is "proving a point or 
expressing an opinion" (39). At first, this contrast 
appears to dichotomize character and thought, for the 
former is described as a more instinctual element,6 while
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Aristotle relegates the latter to the more linear or 
logical aspects of the individual mind.
However, in his more detailed discussion of thought 
in chapter nineteen of the P o e t i c s . Aristotle defines 
thought much more broadly as any result produced through 
the use of language. Aristotle provides the same linear 
examples, such as proofs and refutations, but also lists 
"the awakening of emotions such as pity, fear, anger, and 
the like," as well as exaggerations and devaluations as 
instances of thought in tragedy (58). Aristotle, 
therefore, incorporates both the linear and the nonlinear 
within the realm of appropriate tragic thought by grouping 
together such orderly linear concepts as proof and 
refutation with the more chaotic nonlinear emotional 
effects of tragedy; one may assume that his inclusion of 
the tragic emotions of pity and fear in this discourse 
inherently links the element of thought with the more 
nonlinear process of catharsis, as well.
Like most other elements of tragedy, thought must 
also serve the action of the play in order to function 
effectively, whether the thought is intended to produce 
pity and fear or to provide a sense of importance or 
probability. Aristotle distinguishes, however, between 
two different means through which thought may be employed. 
In the awakening of pity and fear, for example, thought 
should be related without explicit explanations; the 
tragic emotions must be produced through the natural and
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truthful actions of the characters, rather than through 
rhetoric. Essentially, Aristotle states here that humans 
universally tend to experience certain emotions when 
confronted with certain circumstances (Else 565); the 
playwright, therefore, should rely on these more natural 
means of arousing emotion (through the plot: the natural 
actions of the characters), rather than attempting to 
incite emotions through the language of the play alone.
If the playwright intends to employ thought for the 
purposes of importance or probability, however, then such 
effects should be produced directly through the speech of 
the characters.
The significance of this discussion directly concerns 
the process of catharsis and the playwright's ability to 
effectively employ this essential element of tragedy. In 
order to arouse the cathartic emotions of pity and fear, 
Aristotle basically states that the playwright must avoid 
rhetoric, instead making the characters of the tragedy 
behave in a such manner that the audience will 
spontaneously identify with the characters and their 
situations. This conclusion supports the notion that 
catharsis operates in a manner similar to chaos t h eory’s 
notion of self-organization; certain circumstances, when 
related truthfully through the action of the tragedy, 
trigger an emotional response in the audience which 
results in a new level of order, or in this case, 
understanding--an understanding that, for Aristotle, even
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runs as deep as what he proposes to be universal human 
experience. In other words, by appealing to human 
experience (audience reaction/emotion), the playwright 
helps the audience to learn about human experience 
(catharsis/cognition); the Cartesian separation of the 
rr.ind (thought) from the object of study (tragedy) does, in 
fact, break down in the Poetics.7
In order for the cognitive and emotional elements of 
catharsis to function most efficiently, Aristotle states 
that a w el1-constructed plot must have a "single 
interest," implying one plot line, or one change from 
prosperity to misery due to a character's h a m a r t i a . The 
double plot, in which the good characters are rewarded and 
the bad characters punished, ranks only second best for 
Aristotle (49). Although he admits that this type of plot 
is the most popular with the common play-goer, Aristotle 
blames the "feeble taste" of the audience for their 
failure to comprehend the "proper" tragic pleasure.
Comedy, on the other hand, more easily accommodates the 
double plot line because, as Aristotle describes in a tone 
that seems somewhat sarcastic, "the bitterest of enemies .
. . go off at the end as friends, and nobody is killed by
anybody" (48-49). Perhaps Aristotle displays his 
frustration in this section of the Poetics with spectators 
and critics who do not seem to appreciate the cognitive 
pleasures associated with learning that Golden interprets 
from Aristotle's discussion of catharsis, and which
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Aristotle himself ascribes to "human nature"; clearly, the 
double plot line does not lend itself to the appropriate 
pathos nor to the increased universal significance of the 
mimesi s necessary to stimulate cognitive pleasures and the 
pleasures associated with emotions such as pity and fear.
At another point in the Poetics (chapter eighteen), 
Aristotle refers more directly to both the cognitive and 
emotional pleasures of tragedy when he reasserts his 
belief that the playwright should confine the plot to one 
story and particularly avoid the epic structure. The 
proper tragic effect is achieved, therefore, when the 
tragedy contains a single plot with a reversal; Aristotle 
defines this effect as "one which is tragic and appeals to 
our humanity" (57). Examples of plots which might achieve 
such an effect may be seen in the clever but wicked man 
who is outwitted or the brave but unjust man who is 
defeated; clearly, these examples also rely heavily upon 
the hamartia of the character. Aristotle then quotes a 
witticism of Agathon to support his examples: "it is 
plausible that many things should also happen contrary to 
plausibility" (Else's translation [541]). Although Else 
dismisses this latter statement as ironical and a 
testament to Aristotle's weakness for Agathon's wit, it 
makes sense when one considers that to outwit a clever man 
or defeat a brave man would appear to lie outside the 
realm of "probability," which Aristotle preaches 
repeatedly throughout the Poeti c s . In a manner, Aristotle
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quotes Agathon in order to defend his preference for the 
hamartia when it seemingly conflicts with his emphasis on 
profcabi1i t y .
From a point of view of chaos theory, however, 
Agathon's witticism appears even more significant; in a 
universe governed by an indeterminate determinism, 
unplausible events suddenly seem much more plausible. The 
statement that was so easily dismissed by Else, therefore, 
also serves another purpose; it not only supports 
Aristotle's preference for unexpected events in tragedy, 
but finally provides a logical reason for this preference: 
the incidents of action must conform to probability, but 
improbable events occur often enough so as to make them 
probable--at the playwright's discretion. As Aristotle 
states elsewhere in the Poetics (chapter twenty-four): 
"Probable impossibilities are to be preferred to 
improbable possibilities" (68). Clearly, necessity must 
also become a factor at this point; the improbable event 
should be necessary to the plot, particularly for the 
purposes of arousing pity and fear.
For Aristotle, the most effective means of arousing 
pity and fear come through the structure of the plot, 
rather than through the spectacle of stagecraft, for an 
appropriate story will provoke pity and fear in one who 
only hears about the events of the the plot, without ever 
seeing it performed on the stage. This argument strongly 
supports scholars such as Else, Kitto, and Golden, who
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interpret catharsis as a formal function of the plot, for 
the mark of a good playwright, according to Aristotle, 
lies in the ability to awaken pity and fear through the 
incidents of action alone, and these emotions are then 
responsible for the clarification of the action.
Furthermore, the most pitiable and fearful events in 
tragedy involve characters who perform deeds that inflict 
suffering upon persons close to them, such as family 
members; because the traditional stories abound with such 
events, the playwright should not tamper with them, but 
may use imagination to effectively relate the material.
To elaborate upon the manner in which the playwright might 
tell the story, Aristotle lists four ways that pitiable 
and fearful deeds may be handled: the character must 
either 1) do the deed or 2) not do it, and the deed must 
be done 3) with full knowledge or 4) mistakenly in 
ignorance. Aristotle states that the least acceptable of 
these four alternatives arises when the protagonist 
possesses full knowledge of what he/she is about to do but 
then fails to act. A more suitable situation occurs when 
the deed is actually done in full knowledge, such as in 
the case of Medea killing her children, because at least 
some form of pathos has occurred; an even better example 
of the tragic act takes place when the deed is done in 
ignorance and the truth is revealed after the fact, as 
with Oedipus' slaying of Laius. But, rather surprisingly 
at this point, Aristotle concludes that the best tragic
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situation of all involves the character who is intent on 
doing the terrible deed in ignorance, but recognizes the 
truth in time to avert the misfortune.
Aristotle's determination that the most satisfying of 
the four tragic situations he describes in chapter 
fourteen entails the prevention of misfortune seems to 
directly contradict his earlier assertion (in chapter 
thirteen) that the reversal from prosperity to misery most 
appropriately suits tragedy. According to Sheila 
Murnaghan, this apparent contradiction actually reinforces 
tragedy's tendency to present pathos and simultaneously 
distance these same events of misfortune and suffering; 
the Greek practice of locating acts of violence off-stage 
also illustrates this tendency. Murnaghan states that 
even though the shocking or horrible incident is averted 
because of recognition in Aristotle’s ideal plot, the 
perception of the tragic pathos still exists in the minds 
of the spectators; in other words, they have already 
imagined the terrible deed and have benefitted, not only 
from a cathartic exposure to the understood act, but also 
by learning that such deeds may be prevented (763).
Murnaghan's explanation of the apparent contradiction 
between Aristotle's ideal plot and his assertion that 
tragedy requires a central act of pathos conforms well 
with Golden's interpretation of the catharsis clause. By 
fearing for the individuals involved in the intended act 
of pathos and by pitying the protagonist's potential
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suffering upon recognition of the truth after the act has 
been committed in ignorance, the audience experiences the 
proper tragic emotions. By learning that such acts may be 
averted, even in the face of a character's hamartia, the 
audience experiences the cognitive pleasure that, 
according to Golden's arguments, Aristotle associates with 
catharsis. Perhaps most importantly, however, Murnaghan 
places the process involving the initiation of these 
tragic pleasures directly in the minds of the audience, 
which supports Golden's statement that the catharsis may 
sometimes be produced by the audience, rather than in the 
text alone. Furthermore, even the formal function of 
catharsis in the plot relies upon the imagination of the 
audience; without the mind of a reader or spectator for 
assistance, no tragic pathos would occur in Aristotle's 
ideal plot.
In addition to an effective pathos, Aristotle's ideal 
plot must also contain a striking anagnorisis 
(recognition). He therefore discusses the various kinds 
of recognition scenes, determining that the most effective 
are those that derive from the incidents of action; the 
ideal discovery should consist of a startling recognition 
that results from the probable events of the plot. Here 
again Aristotle commingles the startling, or 
unpredictable, with the probable, or deterministic, in a 
manner that parallels chaos theory. One departure from 
chaos theory, however, may be observed in Aristotle's
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insistence that the discovery arise directly from the 
incidents of the plot, which emphasizes causality; this 
causality, however, would not necessarily be linear if the 
result appears unexpected, as Aristotle prefers. 
Aristotle's predilection for unpredictable discoveries may 
even be observed in his least favorite type of 
anagnorisis, that which relies upon visual signs or 
tokens, for he states that this sort of discovery works 
best when the recognition of the sign or token appears 
unexpectedly. His more preferred discoveries, those which 
occur through the reasoning of a character, at first 
appears to support Aristotle's penchant for linearity, 
particularly in light of the Western association of reason 
with linear thought processes. From a point of view of 
chaos theory, however, the moment of recognition may be 
perceived as a process of self-organization, for there is 
an instant in which the order of understanding suddenly 
arises from the disorder of confusion in the brain of the 
reasoner, as Koestler describes in his theories of 
problem-solving and creativity. Under Koestler's model 
(enhanced through chaos theory by Briggs and Peat), 
instances of insight occur when the mind of the reasoner 
enters a non-equilibrium state through concerted effort 
and frustration. Some occurance outside of the trapped 
thought patterns of the reasoner then sets the mind in a 
new pattern of thought or a new plane of reference wherein 
lies the discovery.
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Koestler's theories also apply to the advice 
Aristotle lays out for the tragic playwright in chapter 
seventeen of the Poetics. beginning with the pronouncement 
that the playwright must "keep the scene before his eyes" 
as much as possible when composing plots and the kind of 
speech to go with them (54). This guideline seems to 
evoke hints of both order and disorder as Aristotle 
elaborates upon it. For example, he states that if the 
poet can see the events of the plot clearly, as though an 
eyewitness, then the plot will be most likely to present 
what is appropriate and least likely to contain 
inconsistencies; such a statement might linearize the role 
of the playwright, particularly if a restrictive 
interpretation of the word "appropriate" is employed. On 
the other hand, Aristotle later states that playwrights 
should make the gestures appropriate to the words they 
ascribe to their characters, for those who can make 
themselves actually "feel" the emotions of the play will 
be the most convincing. To this point, Aristotle is 
invoking a more nonlinear state of mind as an appropriate 
approach to the creation of tragic poetry; he most likely 
recognized that the degrees of appropriateness and 
consistency of the events of the play are much easier to 
quantify than the degree of emotional truth in a 
character's speech. Ultimately, Aristotle argues in this 
section that playwrights should write as though they are 
both simultaneously witnessing (with the implications of
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an objective observer) and experiencing (subjectively) the 
incidents of action they compose; thus he concludes that 
"poetry is the product either of a man of great natural 
ability or of one not wholly sane; the one is highly 
responsive, the other possessed."
In this latter statement, Aristotle seems to set up a 
dichotomy between order and disorder: ability vs. 
inspiration. But he uses the words "natural" ability, 
rather than "technical" ability, which, on the other hand, 
might imply that formal skills alone will not produce a 
great play. A playwright with "natural" ability would 
create emotional truth from an instinctual source, rather 
than through a lapse of sanity;8 for this reason,
Aristotle describes such a playwright as "highly 
responsive," rather than "technically brilliant" (55).
This depiction resonates with Koestler's theory that 
moments of inspiration derive from shifts in the 
individual reference planes of (in this case) the 
playwright. When he employs the words "natural ability," 
therefore, Aristotle seems to be describing a creative 
genius who is "highly responsive" to the planes of 
reference from which he/she derives inspiration. 
Furthermore, since such a playwright would simultaneously 
maintain the faculties necessary for sustaining 
appropriateness and consistency within the incidents of 
action, Aristotle seems to most strongly advocate a 
balance and even interplay between order and disorder in
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the form of the cognitive and emotional states of mind 
necessary to the creation of tragic poetry.9
According to Aristotle, therefore, both cognitive and 
emotional processes must operate in both the creation and 
experience of tragedy. The playwright should not only 
"feel" the emotions of the characters when composing the 
play, but should also witness the events as though an 
objective observer; likewise, the audience will feel the 
emotions of pity and fear, as well as experience a 
cognitive pleasure through learning about what Aristotle 
considers to be the universal human experience. In each 
case, the emotional and cognitive facets of tragedy 
parallel the continuous, interactive view of disorder and 
order supported by chaos theory.
Chaos theory's relationship between order and 
disorder may also be observed in both the creative and 
experiential aspects of tragedy with regards to its formal 
and more intangible components. The playwright, for 
example, must follow the ordered rules Aristotle lays out 
for the construction of the most effective tragic plot in 
order to achieve the more intangible end of catharsis; 
furthermore, Aristotle believes that this ideal plot was 
derived over time through instinct, improvisation, 
inspiration, and trial and error. At the same time, 
catharsis clarifies both the structure of the play 
(mimesis) and the emotional and cognitive responses of the 
audience. In other words, the ordered plot of the tragedy
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interacts with the more chaotic process of catharsis; the 
two feed into one another, forming a chaotic system that 
reaches from the creation of the play to its ultimate 
recepti o n .
In addition, chaos theory's relationship between 
order and disorder is also reflected through Aristotle's 
description of the hamartia, which requires that the 
tragic protagonist display both good and bad qualities.
The same may be said for the relationship of the universal 
and particular in the creation of the tragic character, as 
well as in the relationship of part and whole in the 
tragic plot.
Finally, Aristotle's emphasis on "probability" and 
"necessity" throughout the P o etics, while simultaneously 
holding high regard for the unexpected, presents an 
aesthetic similar to the indeterminate determinism 
supported by chaos theory, as illustrated through the 
process of self-organization (the butterfly effect).
Self-organization also plays an important role in both the 
creative and experiential aspects of tragedy, especially 
with respect to Koestler's theories of inspiration and 
creativity.
All of the above-mentioned elements are tied together 
by Aristotle's concept of catharsis, as interpreted by 
Leon Golden. Catharsis supplies the chaotic moment in the 
otherwise linearly formal structure of tragedy that not 
only makes sense of the plot, but also provides the
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pleasurable experiences of cognition and emotion for the 
audience. In this manner, catharsis functions quite 
analogously to Koestler's theories and the butterfly 
effect, spontaneously generating its effects through the 
incidents of action, as well as in the minds of the 
audience. Aristotle, of course, had none of this in mind 
while composing the Poetics; however, by including 
ambiguous concepts such as catharsis, which he himself 
could not--or chose not to--entirely explain, he 
acknowledged an appreciation of the more ineffable, 
chaotic aspects of theatrical art, which has made his 
criticism so valuable throughout Western history.
End Notes
1 The catharsis controversy itself illustrates that 
even in criticism, which supposedly lies firmly within the 
realm of linear reductionist thought, the mind may not be 
objectively removed from the object of study. Information 
theory states that when an organism capable of functioning 
on various levels, such as the human brain, encounters 
ambiguous or "noisy" input, the organism self-organizes 
its own structure to make ordered information out of the 
noise (Paulson 40). Furthermore, the notion of a 
sensitive dependence on initial conditions dictates that 
the noisier the input, the more likely the final 
information will vary from organism to organism. Since 
Aristotle has provided interpreters with a particularly 
noisy message in his catharsis clause, the initial 
conditions (philosophical, literary, and cultural biases) 
of the interpreters virtually guarantee diverse analyses.
7Aristotle stresses each of these three points 
repeatedly in the Poetics.
3"Instincts" is, of course, a culturally loaded term. 
From Aristotle's point of view, the instincts of the Greek 
playwrights were primal and "natural," but from a modern 
point of view, such instincts were decidedly "Greek." 
Taking chaos theory's emphasis upon evolution and 
adaptability into account, however, terms such as 
"instinct" and "nature" work because "culture," rather
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than being the single, dictatorial determinant, becomes 
just one more source of input in the creative maelstrom.
4This analogy works only from a structural point of 
view concerning an architect's duties. An architect may, 
of course, employ instinct, intuition, or artistic genius 
in the creation of aesthetic effect.
5Plato asserts the same in much greater detail in the 
Republic.
6One could, of course, argue that character is also 
linear in the context employed by Aristotle by pointing 
out that the creation of character in tragedy occurs 
through the pen of the playwright. Although the 
playwright certainly employs instinctual and nonlinear 
thought processes in the creation of character, the 
playwright's mind must also operate in the linear realm to 
some extent. In the fictional universe of the play, 
however, character resides more instinctual 1y in the 
person represented; Aristotle is making the same 
distinctions between character and thought for fictional 
beings that he makes for real people in works such as his 
Politics and Nichomachean E t hics.
7 Although Descartes separated the mind of the 
observer (in a scientific or analytic sense) from the 
object of study, and Aristotle refers to the thought of 
the audience, rather than the critic/theorist, clearly the 
tragic critic must experience the play (and the tragic 
emotions) before he/she could credibly comment on it. The 
Cartesian separation breaks down because participation in 
the tragic experience destroys objectivity.
8Perhaps Aristotle is referring to the difference 
between feeling the emotions of the character and 
believing one's self to be (or be possessed by) the 
character?
9Perhaps the "insane" playwright that Aristotle only 
briefly mentions, apparently in humour, maintains more 
consistent, even permanent, contact with his/her 
inspirational planes of reference.
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Chapter Three: Dryden's "Essay of Dramatic Poesy" and the
Labyrinth of Design
John Dryden wrote his most famous work of dramatic 
criticism, "An Essay of Dramatic Poesy," relatively early 
in his literary career. First published in 1668, the 
essay was actually composed earlier (1665-1666?) (Hume 7), 
only a few years after the onset of the Restoration. The 
work is significant for several reasons. First, it 
explores the nature of English drama in the years 
following the Commonwealth and its disruption.
Furthermore, because of its early date of composition, the 
essay may be regarded as a reflection of the embryonic 
stages of the evolution of Dryden's own critical thought. 
This work's greatest significance, however, may lie in its 
contribution to English criticism as a whole; it does what 
the dearth of significant English dramatic criticism 
before Dryden fails to accomplish: establish a truly 
English mode of critical thought. This achievement often 
encourages scholars to treat Dryden's essay as the English 
equivalent to Aristotle's Poetics.
Such comparisons with Aristotle have traditionally 
led to a perception of Dryden ("the father of English 
criticism," as Dryden scholar Hoyt Trowbridge would have 
it [1]) as an arbiter of the rules of English dramatic 
literature. But according to Robert D. Hume, Dryden does 
not employ absolute standards in his criticism; rather, he 
seems to favor broader, more general rules that allow him 
to explore the nature of drama from several points of
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view. Because the Commonwealth's restrictions on 
theatrical performance had brought playwriting to a 
virtual halt as well, Dryden did not have an established 
tradition of English drama to draw from, leaving only the 
Ancients and the French as measuring sticks with which to 
compare the English plays of the Restoration.
Furthermore, Hume speculates that Dryden would have had 
few preconceived notions about playwriting during the 
early period of his career in which he wrote "An Essay of 
Dramatic Poesy." For these reasons, Hume refers to the 
nature of Dryden's criticism as speculative rather than 
prescriptive; instead of attempting to derive a rigid 
formal aesthetic, Dryden simply asks the question--"how 
should the English be writing plays?"--and examines the 
possibilities (Hume 2-7).
From a perspective of chaos theory, at least some of 
the possibilities that Dryden examines should involve an 
ineffable, chaotic moment related to the creation and/or 
experience of drama. This chapter will therefore examine 
"An Essay of Dramatic Poesy" through a framework of chaos 
theory, searching for such a moment in and in between the 
arguments that Dryden ascribes to the four disputants that 
make up the dialogue form of the piece. Beginning with 
the definition of a play provided by one of Dryden's 
characters near the start of the essay, this chapter will 
then explore the following issues: 1) Dryden's view of
nature and human nature, 2) his terms "just" and "lively,"
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3) the "general" and the "particular" in the essay, 4) 
self-similar patterns in both the form and content of the 
essay, 5) the notion of an indeterminate determinism, 6) 
self-organization, and 7) the term "changes of fortune" in 
the definition of a play.
Because Dryden wrote "An Essay of Dramatic Poesy" in 
dialogue form, a brief sketch of the characters involved 
in the dialogue and their positions will be helpful to the 
following discussion. The four characters are named 
Crites, Eugenius, Lisideius, and Neander; their discussion 
occurs as they ride together in a boat on the Thames. 
Essentially, three debates take place concerning relative 
approaches to playwriting. First, Crites espouses the 
merits of the plays of the Ancients over those of the 
Moderns (Dryden's contemporaries); Eugenius responds to 
Crites arguments, defending the Moderns. Secondly, 
Lisideius champions the French approach to drama relative 
to the English; Neander answers with a defense of the 
English playwrights. In the final debate, Crites and 
Neander respectively argue against and for the employment 
of rhyme in tragedy.
Hume's explanation of Dryden's purposes for writing 
"An Essay of Dramatic Poesy," (discussed earlier) provides 
the clearest justification for the dialogue form of the 
work. By employing four different speakers to advocate 
the respective dramatic approaches of the Ancients, 
Moderns, French, and English, Dryden discretely explores
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each argument in a manner that presents itself as unbiased 
at face value. Although scholars have traditionally 
presumed that Dryden subordinates certain points of view 
in favor of others, even identifying himself with one or 
more of the participants of the dialogue,1 Hume rejects 
this notion, instead asserting that Dryden is actually 
concerned with discovering some sort of "essence" of 
drama, particularly with respect to the nature of its more 
ineffable, pleasure-giving aspects. Dryden, according to 
Hume, employs the four characters and their respective 
opinions because he is, in fact, confused about the 
relative significance of the most essential elements of 
drama; the dialogue, therefore, provides a forum for an 
exploration that utilizes various points of view, rather 
than merely serving as a vindication of contemporary 
English playwriting.2
Unfortunately, however, Dryden never quite succeeds 
in pinpointing a definition of the subject of his 
exploration: the elusive, ineffable essence of drama that, 
according to chaos theory, may be described as lying on 
the liminal border between order and disorder, or more 
simply, in the "chaotic moment." Dryden's inability to 
formulate his own ideas concerning this matter is 
displayed in the vagueness that appears at various points 
throughout the essay. One of his most obvious moments of 
ambiguity arises in the very definition of a play provided
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by Lisideius--but which Dryden admits is his own as well3 - 
-near the beginning of the dialogue: "a just and lively 
image of human nature, representing its passions and 
humours, and the changes of fortune to which it is 
subject, for the delight and instruction of mankind." 
Clearly, this definition could easily apply to any form of 
literature, a point which Dryden acknowledges when Crites 
objects that Lisideius' definition is merely "a genre et 
fine" (ll).4 The vagueness, therefore, may suggest that 
Dryden himself mistrusts genre restrictions; after all, 
such a distrust is alluded to several times throughout the 
essay. However, other ambiguities may also be recognized 
in confusing terms such as "human nature" and 
"representing," which Dryden employs in the definition but 
never adequately defines in the essay.
The term "human nature" appears vague in Dryden's 
definition of a play because he fails to employ a 
consistent vision of nature throughout the essay. The 
crux of this inconsistency lies in the difference between 
the realistic and exaggerated (or imaginative) 
"representations" (the other nebulous term--the two are 
intricately connected) of nature in art. For example, 
Frank Harper Moore states that, although Dryden accepts 
Aristotle's idea that audiences are "naturally" delighted 
by realistic imitations of nature, Dryden complicates 
Aristotle's view of audience pleasure by introducing the
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term "variety"--employed frequently throughout the essay-- 
as another source of spectator delight. Moore identifies 
two types of "variety," as employed by Dryden: 1) the 
presence of "diverse elements" within a play, such as 
multiple plots, and 2) novelty (the familiarity of the 
Greek stories, for example, destroys novelty) (29).
From one point of view, Dryden's appeal to variety 
merely broadens the category of imitations that may 
"naturally" cause spectator delight. But on another 
level, one could claim that Dryden has amended or, from a 
neoclassical perspective, "exaggerated" the Aristotelian 
view of nature itself.5 One reference to the notion of a 
changing perspective of nature appears in the debate 
between Crites (defending the Ancients) and Eugenius 
(defending the Moderns); Crites comments on recent 
advances in science and philosophy by asking 
(sarcastically?): "Is it not evident in these last hundred
years . . . that almost a new nature has been revealed to
us?" (11-12). Eugenius later responds to this remark by 
asserting that the Moderns simply improved on the original 
vision of nature established by the Ancients: "We draw not 
therefore after their lines, but those of nature; and 
having life before us, besides the experience of all they 
knew, it is no wonder if we hit some airs and features 
which they have missed" (17). Certainly some of the "airs 
and features" that Eugenius cites must derive from 
"diverse elements" or "novelty" within drama; such
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improvements upon the Ancients' view of nature would 
therefore fall under Dryden's category of "variety." One 
such example arises in Neander's (defender of the 
contemporary English) discussion of verse, in which he 
states that the best plays incorporate a variety of 
cadences; this variety helps the actor to sound "natural" 
and helps keep the audience from becoming bored (60).
Through Eugenius' statement (quoted above), Dryden 
seems to suggest that nature itself does not change 
through the ages, but rather, human perceptions of nature 
become more acute. Both Crites and Eugenius, therefore, 
appear to advocate "realistic" views of nature; they 
differ only at what they define as "realistic." Eugenius, 
for example, acknowledges that the Ancient Romans copied 
nature when they created dramatic characters but states 
that their characterizations were shallow, "as if they had 
imitated only an eye or an hand," rather than an entire 
person (20). This criticism demonstrates that Eugenius 
agrees with Crites concerning the necessity for a literal 
sort of realism in drama but faults the accuracy of the 
Romans' realism--which Crites-the-classicist admires. But 
Eugenius also seems to speak of realism when he addresses 
the subject of passion, remarking that "nature is dumb" 
during occasions of passion, such as in the unexpected 
meeting of lovers: "to make [nature] speak would be to 
represent her unlike herself" (26). In this case,
Eugenius refers to a more heightened or exaggerated form
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of realism that relies more upon feeling than thought or 
observation.
Eugenius' reliance upon both realistic (true-to-life) 
and exaggerated (artistically heightened) presentations of 
nature in the above examples provides a hint of Dryden's 
own confusion concerning this matter, but the issue also 
arises on a greater scale. Each of the four debaters in 
Dryden's essay, for example, recognize the value of the 
neoclassical precepts on some level; Dryden must therefore 
have believed--at least in part--that an adherence to such 
formal rules as the unities of time, place, and action 
ensures a realistic presentation of nature, seemingly 
represented by the term "just" in his definition of a 
play. On the other hand, Dryden often implies a 
preference, particularly through the character Neander, 
for a larger-than-life presentation of nature in drama, a 
"nature wrought up to an higher pitch" (63). Such a 
presentation of nature certainly conveys a sense of the 
more essential elements of drama that Dryden searches for 
in the essay. Hume, for example, points out that the 
representation of Dryden's "higher pitch" of nature makes 
art more stimulating, which in turn makes it more 
effective; Kume even refers to the artist's ability to 
heighten nature as the most essential aspect of the 
process of artistic creation, generating the so-called 
"power" of art from Dryden's theoretical point of view 
(27-29)
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If Dryden's employment of the word "just" in his 
definition of a play refers to the realistic, or true-to- 
life, depiction of nature in art, then the term "lively" 
must relate to the heightening of nature--as discussed 
above--through the skill or genius of the artist. Not 
surprisingly, Dryden scholar Edward Pechter finds reason 
to designate the term "variety" as one type of liveliness 
("richness" being another type) (50). One would assume, 
therefore, that Dryden's employment of the phrase "a just 
and lively image" implies that each of these two elements 
must be present in a good play; the formal regularity of 
the French appears "cold" without the liveliness and 
variety of the English, while English playwriting may be 
best epitomized in the work of Ben Jonson, who most 
closely followed the neoclassical rules (Dryden 40-41,
49) .
Although Dryden generally advocates a balance between 
justness and liveliness, he personally seems to prefer the 
latter element of his definition when Neander poses the 
question: "what . . .  is more easy than to write a regular 
French play, or more difficult than to write an irregular 
English one, like those of Fletcher or of Shakespeare?" 
(45). A predilection for a lively, heightened 
presentation of reality in drama appears throughout the 
essay in the arguments of Neander and--as mentioned 
earlier--Eugenius. If Dryden himself does not intend to 
indicate an overall preference for liveliness as well,
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then at least he acknowledges the critical need to account 
for the emotions of the spectator. Such an approach was 
revolutionary because the neoclassical criticism of the 
time gave little quarter to nonrational responses in the 
audience. Trowbridge demonstrates the unique implications 
of the term "lively," in comparison to "just," by pointing 
out that "liveliness" lies beyond the bounds of reasoned 
argument; as employed by Dryden, liveliness may only be 
measured through perception, imagination, or feeling (48). 
Similarly, Pechter asserts that Neander's arguments seem 
to indicate that the "the vital substance of poetry"--the 
essence--!ies outside the boundaries of the neoclassical 
rules, or "in values for which the rules are insufficient 
guides" (50). The same applies when Neander compares the 
plays of Jonson and Shakespeare: "I admire [Jonson], but I 
love Shakespeare" (49); Neander admires Jonson for his 
dedication to the neoclassical precepts but loves 
Shakespeare for an instinctive genius that could not be 
accounted for through neoclassicism: learning through 
intuition rather than study, writing by luck rather than 
labor, and particularly because "when he describes 
anything, you more than see it, you feel it too" (47).
Dryden's employment of the term "lively" in his 
definition of a play therefore refers to an ineffable 
essence of drama which, from the point of view of chaos 
theory, also relates to a chaotic moment of emotional 
and/or creative emergence, a phenomenon somewhat
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comparable to Aristotle's catharsis. Like Aristotle, 
Dryden gropes for a concept that he does not quite 
understand; but unlike Aristotle, Dryden had an 
established tradition of criticism in neoclassicism to 
draw upon, even if the formal rules of the French and 
Italians6 did not adequately serve the authentic 
experience of English plays. One of the most obvious 
examples of neoclassicism's limitations arises when 
Lisideius (champion of French drama) censures 
Shakespeare's history plays for disobeying the 
neoclassical unity of time. According to Lisideius, 
Shakespeare's history plays, which compress decades into 
hours, create an effect of "which is not to imitate or 
paint nature, but rather to draw her in miniature . . .  to 
look upon her through the wrong end of a perspective,"7 a 
device that makes a play "ridiculous" rather than 
"delightful" (30). Dryden's recognition of the general 
failure of English playwrights to know about and/or obey 
the neoclassical precepts, combined with his inclusion of 
the term "just" in his definition of a play, signifies a 
respect for neoclassicism. This respect, compounded by 
neoclassicism's emphasis upon instruction, makes up for 
the cognitive aspects of catharsis that his term "lively" 
lacks by itself.
The balance implied by the combination of the terms 
"just" and "lively" reflects a balance between rational 
and nonrational forces both in the experience and creation
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of drama. From the creative perspective, rational forces 
are exemplified by the formal, plot-oriented precepts 
advocated by French neoclassicism; such an approach might 
be represented by the "changes of fortune" Dryden cites in 
his definition of a play. However, nonrational forces are 
more likely to govern the depiction of "passions and 
humours," which the English find more essential to drama 
than do the French. From the experiential point of view, 
a similar duality may be observed in the pairing of the 
Horatian concepts of "delight" and "instruction" at the 
end of the definition; French neoclassicism dictates that 
drama should instruct its audience, particularly with 
respect to issues such as decorum and poetic justice, 
while the English, at least according to Dryden's four 
disputants, prefer to be delighted in the theatre.
The terms "just," "changes of fortune," and 
"instruction" that appear in Dryden's definition of a 
play, therefore, each refers in its own way to the 
neoclassical precepts--the more rational, orderly approach 
to drama. However, the three matching terms--"lively," 
"passions and humours," and "delight"--each represent the 
more irrational, chaotic English approach, which relies 
more upon intuition and genius than rules. In each of the 
three pairings that Dryden employs, he emphasizes both 
sides of what were clearly viewed as dichotomies-- 
particularly amongst the strict neoclassicists--thus 
advocating a more continuous relationship between the
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formal (orderly) and the intangible (chaotic) aspects of 
dramatic a r t .
A specific example of how Dryden presents a 
continuous view of the formal justness of the French 
neoclassicists and the intangible liveliness of the 
English arises in his discussion of stage violence in the 
debate between Lisideius and Neander. Lisideius defends 
the French habit of narrating violence, rather than 
representing it directly onstage, by calling to task the 
believabi1ity of onstage deaths and battles. Neander, on 
the other hand, points out that some violent scenes might 
be depicted onstage because the imagination may "suffer 
itself to be deluded," as when actors are accepted as 
kings in the mind of the spectator. Neander subsequently 
declares that if the English show too much of the action 
onstage, then the French show too little; he concludes 
that the ideal playwright should find a mean between the 
two extremes. Although the concept of the mean does not 
itself parallel the continuous, interactive relationship 
of order and disorder advocated by chaos theory, Dryden 
nevertheless calls for the playwright to engage the 
imagination of the audience while simultaneously keeping 
the most incredible actions offstage. This necessitates 
that the "just" and the "lively" must work together, 
rather than simply balance one another or, even worse, 
cancel one another o u t .
89
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
This perspective concerning the relationship of the 
just and the lively may be observed in each of the four 
characters of Dryden's essay, as they agree that a play 
must reflect both naturalness (justness) and elevation 
(liveliness), but they disagree concerning which aspect 
should be emphasized more in an ideal drama. Neander, for 
example, defends English drama by comparing the beauties 
of French plays to those of a statue, rather than a real 
individual, because the French plays lack the passions and 
humours that constitute the "soul of poesy" (38). Later 
in the essay, however, when Neander defends rhyme over 
blank verse, he again employs the statue analogy--but in 
reverse--as he states that the statue (rhyme) may be made 
to look better than real life (blank verse).
Nevertheless, Neander's opposite applications of the 
statue analogy actually serve the same purpose: to 
emphasize the importance of a heightened or "lively" image 
over that of an accurate, or "just" one.
Pechter summarizes Neander's position: "the closer 
the imitation seems to be to the audience, the more 
pleasing it will be" (55). The more conservative Crites, 
however, holds that an imitation must be objectively close 
to real life to bring pleasure to an audience. Since 
Dryden seems to emphasize the significance of both sides 
cf this debate, Pechter concludes that objective and 
psychological truths are not antagonistic in the essay but 
instead interact, each contributing to the effectiveness
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of the other. Essentially, the dramatist may cause the 
imitation to appear more lifelike through the artistic 
heightening of the imitation--as Dryden states through his 
character Neander: "A play . . . to be like nature, is to
be set above it" (65); nevertheless, the dramatist 
simultaneously employs the lifelike aspects of the 
imitation so as to conceal the heightening (Pechter 55- 
56) .
Seemingly, therefore, Dryden's vision of the greatest 
audience pleasure emerges in a manner akin to self­
organization through the interaction of the just 
(objective truth) and the lively (psychological truth).8 
At the very least, Dryden presents these two versions of 
truth in the same continuous, interactive manner he 
ascribes to the relationship of the just and the lively, 
which has already displayed hints of a parallel with the 
order/disorder continuum advocated by chaos theory. This 
parallel will continue to develop as the interconnections 
within Dryden's essay continue to unfold.
Dryden, for example, also takes a continuous approach 
to another traditionally dichotomous relationship, that of 
the "general" and the "particular," in at least two clear 
instances in the essay. One such example arises in his 
discussion of comedy. According to Moore, Dryden shares 
Aristotle's notion that abnormality produces laughter.
The laughter provoked by "humours" characters,9 for 
example, results from "deviations from common customs"
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which produce that "malicious pleasure in the audience 
which is testified by laughter" (Dryden 51). These 
"deviations," of course, represent the particular in 
humours characters. Dryden further states through his 
character Neander that humours characters also produce an 
audience pleasure that derives from the "naturalness" of 
the character; such "naturalness" would represent the more 
general character traits according to neoclassicism. 
Humours characters must therefore display a "natural" sort 
of "extravagance" that Moore refers to as a "plausible 
abnormality" (32).10
In the essay, Neander compares humours comedies to 
Greek old and new comedy, concluding that old comedy 
contains extravagance without naturalness, while new 
comedy displays naturalness without the particular of 
extravagance. Comedies of humours are therefore the best 
of the three types because they contain both the general 
naturalness of new comedy and the particular extravagance 
of old comedy (51). The significance of Dryden's 
preference for humours comedy, therefore, lies in his 
predilection for comedies that contain both the general 
and the particular. Furthermore, the notion of a 
"plausible abnormality" indicates that Dryden perceives 
the relationship of the general and the particular--at 
least in humours comedies--as continuous and interactive 
in much the same manner as the relationship of the general 
and the particular advocated by chaos theory. Dryden's
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view of the general and the particular also parallels his 
own theoretical continuum of the "just" and the "lively" 
found in his definition of a play. The general, which 
relates to naturalness of a character, certainly 
represents the "just" aspect of Dryden's definition, while 
the extravagance of the particular pertains to the 
artistic heightening implied in Dryden's term "lively."
The second instance in which Dryden presents a 
continuous view of the general and the particular arises 
in his discussion of subplots. Neander, defending English 
drama against that of the French, admits the value of the 
"regularity" of French plays; of course, this reference to 
regularity means that the plays follow the neoclassical 
precepts of decorum and the unities of time, place, and 
action. Such regularity makes the plays more "natural," 
or "just." Neander, however, complains that he finds the 
French plays "barren" compared to the "variety" of English 
drama. Ke primarily refers to the neoclassical unity of 
action dictating a single plot; the "variety" of the 
English alludes, in this instance, to their often numerous 
subplots. Although Neander remarks that poorly integrated 
subplots impede the effectiveness of drama by disrupting 
the unity of action, a play contains enough unity to 
provide pleasure if the subplots agree with the "main 
design" of the play. Here, Neander refers to subplots 
that contribute to or directly relate to the main plot 
(40). Once again, an interaction of the orderly French
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"just" with the chaotic English "lively" is encouraged as 
Dryden advocates a combination of naturalness and variety 
in plotting. As mentioned earlier, this balance is 
perhaps best epitomized in the example of Ben Jonson, whom 
Neander considers to be the ideal playwright, because, of 
the English dramatists, he most closely follows the 
neoclassical rules but nevertheless infuses his plays with 
a "copiousness and wel1-knitting of the intrigues" (46).
Similarly, Neander defends English tragicomedy by not 
only contending that tragedy and comedy can coexist and 
even cooperate (much like order and disorder) in the same 
p!ay--"Does not the eye pass from an unpleasant object to 
a pleasant in a much shorter time than is required to 
this? and does not the unpleasantness of the first commend 
the beauty of the latter?" (39)--but also by displaying 
how the particular variety of the comic and tragic plots 
may contribute to, rather than detract from, the general 
unity cf the play. According to Pechter, Neander counters 
Lisideius' claim that English tragicomedy is unnatural by 
simply enlarging the scope of the natural, presenting 
"variety and unity as mutually sustaining rather than 
mutually exclusive concepts" (51). Neander, therefore, 
sums up his own arguments concerning tragicomedy and 
multiple plots when he succinctly states: "our variety, if 
well ordered, will afford a greater pleasure to the 
audience" (40). Eugenius employs the same adapted view of 
nature/neoclassicism when he criticizes the Ancient Greeks
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for having only a "general indigested notion of a play," 
lacking the "particular graces" of the moderns (18-19).11
Pechter reveals how even the very form of Dryden's 
essay reflects his penchant for an interactive balance 
between unity (the general) and variety (the particular). 
For example, although Dryden introduces several new ideas 
(such as English "liveliness") to dramatic criticism, he 
nevertheless takes full advantage of the old ones, thus 
melding the variety of old and new into an overall unity. 
He also brings foreign traditions to his native culture, 
infusing them with the already established English 
traditions; according to Pechter: "He successfully 
Gallicized English taste . . . because he could Anglicize
French thought" (6). Thus Dryden deliberately wrote his 
essay with a loose structure because such an approach 
allowed him to present the various ideas--old and new, 
foreign and native--in a unified manner without 
contradiction, while still acknowledging their 
differences.
At this point, similarities related to Dryden's 
preferred relation of the general to the particular may be 
identified on several levels within the essay. From a 
perspective of chaos theory, such similarities may be 
described as "self-similarities," for similar patterns may 
be observed on various scales within the same system.
These patterns provide one of the bases of unity for chaos 
theory's overall emphasis on holism, while at the same
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time exhibiting the particular differences found, for 
example, in fractal geometry.
In Dryden's essay, the similar "patterns" of behavior 
may be observed in the relationship of the general and the 
particular in Dryden's specific discussions of humours 
characters and subplots, his overall conception of unity 
and variety (which is also reflected in his references to 
the "just" and the "lively"), as well as in the overall 
structure of the essay itself. This same self-similarity 
actually provides much of the motive for viewing the 
loosely-constructed essay as a unified product of critical 
thought; the self-similar patterns that arise on the 
various levels of Dryden's essay may all be shown to 
relate directly to Dryden's recommended guidelines for an 
interactive balance between a "just" adherence to realism 
and a "lively" artistic heightening in drama.
In fact, the very notion of self-similar patterns 
plays an even more directly significant role in Dryden's 
criticism. For example, Charles H. Kinnant illustrates 
how the "underplots" and "byconcernments" advocated by 
Neander not only add variety to a play but must by 
necessity create atemporal and metaphoric actions with 
respect to the main action if the plot is to contain any 
unity at all (163). From this point of view, the subplots 
of what Dryden considers to be a skillfully-crafted play 
exhibit patterns of action and thought that are self­
similar to the main action. This perspective offers a
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sharp contrast to Crites' arguments for " la liaison des 
scenes." which allows for only one overarching, temporal, 
causal, and--according to Hinnant--Aristotelian action in 
the plot of a play; Dryden, therefore, clearly brings a 
complexity (bearing affinities with chaos theory) to the 
critical issue of plotting that neoclassicism lacked.12
Dryden also employs the concept of patterns in his 
discussions of the development of drama. According to 
Hume, Dryden believes that the literature of each country 
or age develops according to similar patterns, from crude 
beginnings to a final refined form (75). Crites, for 
example, uses a biological metaphor when describing the 
evolution of Greek drama: "Dramatic poesy had time enough, 
reckoning from Thespis (who first invented it) to 
Aristophanes, to be born, to grow up, and to flourish in 
maturity" (11). Although one must not assume that Dryden 
views biological development as the complex, chaotic 
process dictated by chaos theory--Hume, in fact, asserts 
that Dryden perceives the progression of literary 
development as a linear process--at least Dryden 
recognizes the existence of similar qualitative patterns 
in the emergence of the literary forms of vastly different 
cultures.13
From a perspective informed by chaos theory, however, 
the most engaging theoretical, as well as aesthetic, 
example of a reference to patterns in Dryden's essay 
occurs when Neander challenges Lisideius' assertion that a
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play should contain only one significant character.
According to Neander, multiple characters may add variety
to the plot, not only through the individual "quality" of
each character, but through each character's significant
actions as well. Neander then describes the potential
effects (upon a spectator) of a plot enhanced by the
variety of multiple significant characters:
If then the parts are managed so regularly that 
the beauty of the whole be kept entire, and that 
the variety become not a perplexed and confused 
mass of accidents, you will find it infinitely 
pleasing to be led in a labyrinth of design, 
where you see some of your way before you, yet 
discern not the end till you arrive at it. (42)
In this statement, Neander seems to invoke chaos theory
directly as he advocates an interdependent balance between
the parts and the whole of the play's plot. He also calls
for a balance between order and disorder, for the manner
in which the parts are ordered (managed) should yield
variety, but not complete disorder (a perplexed and
confused mass of accidents). This same balance between
order and disorder also requires a sort of indeterminate
determinism, as the parts are "managed" deterministical 1 y
by the playwright so that the spectator does not perceive
the incidents of action as "accidents," yet the pleasure
of the play derives from the inability of the spectator to
predict the end before it occurs.
Nevertheless, perhaps the most aesthetically pleasing 
parallel with chaos theory occurs when Dryden refers to
the plot of a well-crafted play as a "labyrinth of
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design." Here, Dryden not only alludes indirectly to the 
"patterns" within the construction of his ideal play but 
also calls to mind the 1abyrinth-1 ike qualitative 
patterns/designs of chaos theory, such as fractals and 
strange attractors. From chaos theory's point of view, 
the significance of the visual patterns of fractals and 
strange attractors lies in their repetition of an overall 
pattern on several levels, with particular differences on 
each individual level; the unpredictable paths of the 
strange attractor never repeat exactly, yet still conform 
to an overall deterministic pattern. In fact, the pattern 
of design for the sorts of plots Dryden favors even seems 
to function with the indeterminate determinism of a 
strange attractor, generally pulling in or "attracting" 
those plays with the correct ingredients (justness and 
liveliness, variety and unity, passions and humours, 
delight and instruction), without predicting the 
particular details of the final product.
Not surprisingly, chaos theory's notion of an 
indeterminate determinism helps to illuminate another 
example of Dryden's predilection for an interactive 
balance between the orderly "just" and the chaotic 
"lively" in the essay. For example, Lisideius, who values 
"just" imitations, believes that the events of a drama 
will appear more "natural" if cause and effect 
relationships are made so clear that "that which appears 
chance in the play, will seem so reasonable to you that
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you will there find it almost necessary" (37). Eugenius, 
proponent of the "lively," however, values qualities such 
as surprise, or "novelty," which he finds lacking in the 
plays of the Ancient Romans, stating that their plots are 
"built after the Italian mode of houses: you see through 
them all at once" (19-20).
Similarly, Pechter points out that while Crites 
demands an adherence in drama to probability and necessity 
according to his own view of nature, Eugenius merely 
values what the audience will perceive as probable or 
necessary (44-45). This difference in perspective 
illustrates the distinction between the two sharply 
contrasting world views depicted in the essay: one based 
on a strictly predictable determinism and the other 
predictable only so far as audience taste may be 
predicted--as Neander states, the opinions of the masses 
"arc sometimes in the right, sometimes in the wrong; their 
judgment is a mere lottery" (63). Although Dryden often 
seems to favor the latter of these views, he never gives 
up on determinism, for even Eugenius frequently accepts 
Crites' basic theoretical principles. In fact, Dryden 
seems to be most interested in the overlap between Crites' 
and Eugenius' perspectives, where objectively "just" 
imitations are the most subjectively pleasing; of course, 
from an English point of view, the most pleasing 
imitations would also appear to be the most "lively."
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Apparently, Dryden intended to temper the rather 
severe neoclassical critical approach that was dominant on 
the continent--and quite prevalent in his own country-- 
with a few ingredients that simply "worked" on the English 
stage (liveliness, variety, passions, humours). In fact, 
Pechter at one point describes the conflict in the essay 
in terms of the "mimetic" versus the "pragmatic," 
ultimately deciding that the two are "too interdependent 
for . . . rigorous separation" (45). Of course, this
perspective merely provides another means of viewing the 
relationship of the just and the lively as continuous and 
interactive in the essay. Neander, the champion of 
English drama, even quotes the neoclassical French 
playwright/critic Corneille to support his own arguments 
for moderating the mimetic (just) critical approach of the 
needa s s i c i s t s  with the more pragmatic (lively) style of 
the English.1,1 Neander points out that in Corneille's 
"Discourse of the Three Unities," the playwright complains 
that if critics had to write plays, they would be more 
lenient concerning the neoclassical unities, for they 
would learn how playwrights "are bound up and constrained 
by" the unities "and how many beauties of the stage they 
banished from it" (qtd. in Dryden 44). Neander, 
therefore, suggests that even a respected French 
neoclassical playwright would prefer the latitude to 
include more liveliness and variety in his work than would 
be permitted under strict neoclassicism, for as Neander
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later proclaims: "How many beautiful accidents might 
naturally happen in two or three days, which cannot arrive 
with any probability in the compass of twenty-four hours?" 
(44) .
Neander, of course, would assert that the "beautiful
accidents" he mentions in the above quote contribute
substantially to the pleasure-giving aspects of drama,
just as Eugenius values unpredictability, novelty, and
surprise in plotting. In fact, while discussing the four
parts of the dramatic plot, Eugenius suddenly waxes
poetic, metaphorically describing the unpredictability
inherent in the third part, which he refers to as:
the catastasis, or counterturn, which destroys 
that expectation, imbroils the action in new 
difficulties, and leaves you far distant from 
that hope in which it found you; as you may have 
observed in a violent stream resisted by a 
narrow passage: it runs round to an eddy, and 
carries back the waters with more swiftness than 
it brought them on. (18)
Here, Eugenius not only defines the catastasis as an
inherently unpredictable moment in the plot of a play but
compares this moment to phenomena--turbulent water and
eddies--often employed by proponents of chaos theory as
examples of the new scientific paradigm at work in nature:
a violent stream displays unpredictable, chaotic behavior
that gives rise to eddies--pockets of order which emerge
out of the chaos of the turbulence. Similarly, the order
of the fourth part of the plot of a play, the catastrophe
or denouement, arises from the chaotic unpredictability of
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the catastasis, thus ending the play "with that 
resemblance of truth and nature that the audience are 
satisfied with the conduct of it" (Dryden 18). Eugenius, 
therefore, prefers to view the ordering of the events of 
the plot of a play as a process of self-organization, both 
from the perspectives of the audience, as well as the 
characters in the play.
Hinnant also discovers an emergent quality in 
Dryden's view of plot, beginning with the phrase "changes 
of fortune" in Dryden's definition of a play. According 
to Hinnant, the term "changes of fortune" exists as a 
singularity--the only term in the definition that is not 
part of a set of binary opposites (i.e., just and lively, 
passions and humours, delight and instruction).15 Hinnant 
asserts that this singularity makes Dryden's definition of 
a play dynamic rather than static because the term 
"changes of fortune" refers to specific events within the 
action of the play, instead of the play as a whole.
Hinnant further states that these specific events produce 
"disruptions" that bring about changes from one state of 
affairs to another. On the level of the play as a whole, 
these disruptions are part of a larger pattern, the 
"labyrinth of design" discussed earlier, which offers the 
spectator both delight and instruction. But from the 
perspective of the characters in the play, the disruptions 
are unstable and unpredictable (Hinnant 162).
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Hinnant's emphasis on "changes of fortune" in 
Dryden's definition of a play resonates with chaos theory 
on several levels, almost as though Hinnant were writing 
specifically about chaos theory. For example, the 
"disruptions" that bring about the changes in plot 
resemble miniature versions of Eugenius' catastasis, which 
brings about the plot's overall resolution. These 
disruptions, therefore, may be described as small pockets 
of chaos from which arises the order of the new state of 
affairs following a change of fortune. But although they 
represent particular moments in the plot, these 
disruptions are also part of the overall "labyrinth of 
design"; thus, both the general and the particular reside 
in Dryden's "changes of fortune." The "labyrinth of 
design" may also be viewed as an overall formal order that 
determines the structure of the play; yet the individual 
disruptions are chaotic and uncertain from the point of 
view of the play's characters as well as the audience. 
Hinnant's perception of Dryden's theory, therefore, 
displays both the formal and the spontaneous, the 
determinate and the indeterminate, the orderly and the 
chaotic.
Apparently, Dryden had these same issues in mind 
during the composition of "An Essay of Dramatic Poesy" 
v.’hen he attempted to answer the question: "How should the 
English be writing plays?" For Dryden, such issues were 
couched in debates between the relative merits of the
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Ancient, Modern, French, and English dramatic writing 
styles. These debates featured concepts such as the 
"mimetic" and the "pragmatic" and the "general" and the 
"particular," and employed such terms such as "justness" 
and "liveliness," and "instruction" and "delight." In 
fact, Dryden seemingly discovered his most suitable 
variations on his own personal vision of the very 
"essence" of drama in the liminal, chaotic moments that 
lie in the complex, interactive borders between each of 
the binary pairs listed above.
The debates, therefore, serve as a proving ground for 
each of the arguments presented in the essay. Even though 
the four debaters agree that Eugenius and Neander present 
the best discussions for their respective subjects, Dryden 
does not intend to send the message that contemporary 
English drama has more merit than that of the Ancients or 
the French. Instead, Dryden merely seeks to augment the 
contemporary neoclassical theory (supposedly derived 
by/from the Ancients and employed by the French) with what 
he perceives as "working" on the English stage: 
liveliness, variety, passions, humours, delight.
In the process, he employs several fundamental ideas 
and metaphoric images that display affinities with chaos 
theory. The clearest of these ideas/images may obviously 
be found in his encouragement of a continuous, interactive 
relationship between the orderly "just" approach of the 
neoclassicists and the chaotic "lively" aesthetic
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prevalent in English drama. But as a result of his 
construction of this integrated theory, he calls for an 
indeterminate determinism that, through the interaction of 
the "just" and the "lively," produces a process akin to 
self-organization from which emerges his version of a 
perfect theatrical moment, found in the self-similar 
patterns he refers to in the essay as the "labyrinth of 
design." The critical significance of Dryden's essay, 
therefore, lies not so much in the individual arguments of 
the four debaters as in Dryden's melding of their ideas as 
they strive to make concessions and find common ground.
From a perspective informed by chaos theory, the 
significance of the essay may be observed in Dryden's 
critical recognition of the effectiveness of English 
playwriting in the face of neoclassicism. His flexibility 
in this respect allowed him to perceive "chaotic moments" 
that could not be accounted for under the stricter 
neoclassical precepts. Finally, even though Dryden 
himself struggled to describe such moments in words, he at 
least recognized alternative perspectives to the 
neoclassical views of nature and art; even more 
importantly, he strove to explain these alternative 
perspectives in his theory and criticism.
End Notes
1Dryden scholars have traditionally tended to 
speculate that each of the four figures in Dryden's 
dialogue represents an actual contemporary of Dryden's. 
Typically, Crites is conceived to be Sir Robert Howard, 
Eugenius to be Sir Charles Sackville (Lord Buckhurst to
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whom the work is dedicated), Lisideius to be Sir Charles 
Sedley, and Neander to be Dryden himself (Reverand 379- 
380). This approach appears significant only if one 
assumes that Dryden's primary purpose for writing the 
essay was, in fact, to exalt the approaches of English 
playwrights over those of the Ancients and French.
2 Evidence that Dryden did, in fact, intend for his 
essay to espouse the virtues of English writers over the 
French lies in his dedicatory preface, "To the Reader," in 
which he states: "The drift of the ensuing discourse was 
chiefly to vindicate the honor of our English writers from 
the censure of those who unjustly prefer the French before 
them" (4). Frank Harper Moore, however, asserts that 
Dryden was merely being patriotic in his preface and 
agrees with Hume that Dryden's real purpose in writing the 
essay was to explain to the English audience what makes a 
good English play; according to Moore, the dialogue form 
is a mere device "used to add interest to the discussion 
and to avoid the imputation of vanity, presumption, and 
dogmatism" (38-40). Furthermore, Dryden's own dedicatory 
letter to his friend Lord Buckhurst (typically not 
published with the essay) displays no preference for the 
English as Dryden states his desire for Buckhurst to make 
up his own mind concerning which of the essay's arguments 
are the strongest (Tyson 72-73).
3Dryden later acknowledged that he claimed Lisideius’ 
definition of a play as his own (Hume 26).
4 This expression means that the definition makes no 
distinction between drama and other forms of literature.
5This latter perspective functions best within the 
framework of the neoclassical interpretations of 
Aristotle, as the neoclassicists interpolated (by 
inferring ideas that are not, in fact, present [such as 
the unities of time and place]) and extrapolated (by 
creating new concepts and terms, or by drawing them from 
other classical works [as with the case of Horace's 
"decorum"]) Aristotle's criticism to derive concepts such 
as the three unities, verisimilitude, and decorum, thus 
constructing a precise view of how nature should be 
represented realistically in drama. Essentially, the 
neoclassicists combined and augmented the writings of the 
various classical critics and then claimed that all works 
of classical criticism conformed to this one overarching 
(and quite restrictive) system. Aristotle, of course, 
fails to present a coherent view of nature, or how nature 
should be depicted in drama, in the Poetics.
Nevertheless, the neoclassicists took their own 
interpretations of Aristotle as fact, and Dryden's 
perspective of a so-called "classical" view of nature 
appears to derive more from neoclassicism than Aristotle.
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6Dryden must have been familiar with the critical 
works of the Italians prior to the French neoclassicists, 
for the writings of critics such as Castelvetro and other 
Renaissance Italians had been introduced into England long 
before the ideas of the French neoclassicists (Hume 178). 
Unfortunately, however, Dryden does not refer to the 
Italians in the essay.
7Dryden's employment of the word "perspective" means 
"telescope" in this instance (Kirsch 30).
8Hume employs the more aesthetically oriented terms 
"literal" (also "representational") and "ideal" (also 
"imaginative") rather than referring to objective and 
psychological truths. Hume assumes that, for Dryden, the 
essence of drama lies not in literal representation, but 
in ideal passions and feelings--human nature (the ideal) 
rather than nature itself (the literal). Hume therefore 
identifies what he believes to be an inherent 
contradiction in Dryden's criticism due to the difficulty 
of representing the ideal visually; Dryden must recognize 
by necessity, therefore, the more literal, 
representational aspects of drama, particularly when he 
states that tragedy surpasses epic because of its ability 
to visually represent actions (Hume 205-206). Hume 
consequently depicts Dryden as confused concerning the 
difference between the literal and the ideal, as well as 
the exact process by which the audience is affected by 
drama (i.e., pleasure). Hume also illustrates how the 
"literal" and the "ideal" may parallel emphases upon 
"plot" and "character" in drama. The passions and humours 
of Dryden's definition of a play relate to
characterization, while literal imitations--especial1y of 
an action--pertain more to plot-centered views of drama. 
Although Hume successfully shifts the interpretive 
emphasis of Dryden's essay from "Ancients versus Moderns" 
and "French versus English" to "literal versus ideal," he 
nevertheless continues the tradition of assuming that 
Dryden sides with Neander and Eugenius in the essay, thus 
representing the literal and ideal as dichotomous and 
antagonistic, rather than continuous and interactive.
9 "Humours" characters are identified by personality 
eccentricities distinctly related to a physiological 
imbalance--according to contemporary medicine--in their 
four bodily humours: blood, phlegm, choler, and black 
bile. Ben Jonson was/is particularly noted for his 
"humours comedies.”
10Neander refers to Shakespeare's character,
Falstaff, as a "miscellany of humours" because he may be 
described as "old, fat, merry, cowardly, drunken, amorous, 
vain, and lying," but "he is singular in his wit." But
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Neander seems to imply that Falstaff is not actually a 
"humours character," the reasons for which are unclear in 
the essay; Neander defines "humour" as "the ridiculous 
extravagance of conversation, wherein one man differs from 
all others" (50). Moore states that Dryden disqualifies 
Falstaff as a humours character--either because of his 
multiple humours, or because Dryden does not consider wit 
to be a humour; Moore suggests the former reason. At any 
rate, Moore reports that Dryden changed his mind later in 
his career, ultimately accepting Falstaff as a humours 
character (34).
11 Eugenius is referring to the modern particulars of 
the neoclassical precepts as well, as he points out 
several examples (most notably, the division of the action 
into five acts) of how the Greeks did not follow the 
severe rules attributed to them (somewhat incorrectly) by 
the neoclassicists.
12 Thin difference between the neoclassical precept 
requiring a single dramatic action and Dryden's acceptance 
of subplots exemplifies Hinnant's structuralist analysis 
of Dryden's definition of a play in "An Essay of Dramatic 
Poesy." Hinnant focuses on Dryden's shift from the 
syntagmatic perspective of the neoclassicists to the more 
paradigmatic perspective evident in the essay. For 
example, neoclassicism's insistence upon a "just" 
(realistic) imitation requires the unities of time, place, 
and action, which in turn requires a plot consisting of a 
metonymical 1y - 1 inked, syntagmatic chain of events. 
Following this line of logic, Dryden's admission of 
subplots into his critical system has already been 
described as metaphoric (because the lesser actions of the 
subplots mirror, and thus comment upon, the incidents of 
the main plot), and therefore paradigmatic as well.
Hinnant, however, finds that the shift from a syntagmatic 
to a paradigmatic point of view runs much deeper in 
Dryden's dramatic criticism than mere plotting concerns 
might indicate. Dryden also brought a paradigmatic 
perspective to the very essence of theatrical experience-- 
mimesis and audience pleasure. For example, Hinnant 
states that a syntagmatic approach to performance requires 
a greater commitment to belief in the dramatic illusion, 
while a paradigmatic perspective allows more recognition 
of the theatricality of the events happening on the stage. 
The argument concerning onstage violence between Lisideius 
and Neander illustrates the difference between these two 
points of view. Lisideius, of course, contends that the 
spectator must find fault with unrealistic
representations, stating that "dying especially is a thing 
which none but a Roman gladiator could naturally perform 
on the stage, when he did not imitate or represent, but 
naturally do it" (33). Neander, however, asserts that 
spectators recognize onstage actions as representations
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and therefore don't have to believe the actions are real. 
The benefit of Neander's perspective lies in the 
spectator's freedom to believe that the actors are only 
actors, but nevertheless suspend disbelief enough to enjoy 
the performance. Hinnant, therefore, aligns the 
syntagmatic, neoclassical approach to performance with 
"presence" and the paradigmatic, Dryden-altered 
perspective with "absence," referring to the presence or 
absence of "real" events on the stage; under Dryden's 
theory, the real event must be absent for the stage event 
to be regarded as a representation. Hinnant also 
describes the relationship between the syntagmatic and the 
paradigmatic as the difference between a bare imitation 
and a heightened image (163-165).
13Crites provides a vague description of this 
process: "every age has a kind of universal genius, which 
inclines those that live in it to some particular studies: 
the work then being pushed on by many hands, must of 
necessity go forward" (11). This image of many 
individuals coming together to produce a literature 
certainly evokes comparisons to chaos theory's process of 
self-organization, but according to Hume, Dryden had 
little concept of the individual viewpoint, which would 
instead imply that he viewed culture as one great 
harmonious unit, rather than a complex mass of independent 
monads (S O ).
14Crites and Lisideius also cite Corneille to support 
their arguments for neoclassicism, but as R. V. LeClercq 
asserts, they actually take Corneille's view of the three 
unities further than he intended. Eugenius and Neander 
recognize Corneille as a playwright as well as a critic 
and mere clearly perceive his scepticism, therefore, 
concerning an absolute adherence to the unities (LeClercq
j .
15Rdmittedly, Hinnant's organization of Dryden's 
definition of a play into binaries differs from that 
employed near the beginning of this chapter, where 
"changes of fortune" was paired with "passions and 
humours," rather than being considered a singularity.
110
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Four: Coleridge's Theory of the Imagination in His 
Aesthetic Theory and Criticism
In chapter thirteen of his Bioaraphia Literaria,
Samuel Taylor Coleridge sets forth his much-interpreted 
definition of the imagination and its distinction from the 
related creative faculty of fancy. Much-interpreted 
because of its ambiguity, the definition merely provides 
"the main result" of Coleridge's thought concerning 
imagination and fancy, rather than fully expounding upon 
the philosophical arguments which informed it. Referring 
to the Biographia as "unread and largely unreadable"
(125),1 Coleridge scholar J. A. Appleyard recommends that 
Coleridge's fragmented spectrum of literary theory and 
criticism be taken as a whole in order to fully comprehend 
the significance of Coleridge's thought. Observing 
Appleyard's advice, this chapter will not focus upon any 
one of Coleridge's works of theory/criticism, but will 
instead employ each and all that prove necessary to 
gaining an understanding of Coleridge's theory of the 
imagination, his views concerning poetry, drama, and 
theatre in general, and how these theories and views may 
be regarded from a perspective informed by chaos theory.
This chapter will therefore begin with a discussion 
of Coleridge's theory of the imagination, choosing the 
definition in the Biographia as the most logical starting 
point. A framework of chaos theory will then be employed 
to examine the most significant elements of Coleridge's 
definition of the imagination: the reconciliation of
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opposites and organic unity. The following topics will 
then be explored in the light of the philosophical
implications of chaos theory: 1) Coleridge's perception of
the relationship of part to whole in art and nature, 2)
the relationship of the spiritual to art and nature, 3)
Coleridge's notion of a chaotic moment, 4) 
unpredictability and spontaneity, 5) self-similar 
patterns, and 6) the role of the audience in Coleridge's 
theoretical system. This chapter will conclude with a 
discussion of the application of Coleridge's theories as 
evidenced in his Shakespearean criticism and the 
significance of this criticism from a perspective of chaos 
theory.
Coleridge clearly considered the imagination to be
the most significant mental faculty involved in the
process of the creation of art; a discussion of
Coleridge's theories will therefore begin with a
examination of this concept. The vagueness of the
definition of the imagination that Coleridge provides in
the Biographia Literaria suggests a level of importance
approaching the order of the spiritual if not the godly in
the singular significance of the imagination as the agency
responsible for the creative process:
The IMAGINATION then I consider either as 
primary, or secondary. The primary IMAGINATION 
I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of 
all human Perception, and as a repetition in the 
finite mind of the eternal act of creation in 
the infinite I AM. The secondary I consider as 
an echo of the former, co-existing with the
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conscious will, yet still as identical with the 
primary in the kind of its agency, and differing 
only in degree, and in the mode of its 
operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, 
in order to re-create; or where this process is 
rendered impossible, yet still at all events it 
struggles to idealize and to unify. It is 
essentially v i t a l , even as all objects (as 
objects) are essentially fixed and dead.
(I: 304)
Coleridge's primary imagination has been interpreted by 
many as the faculty of mind capable of accessing an ideal, 
transcendental level at least somewhat equivalent to the 
romantic notion of the supersensuous.2 Coleridge believed 
that this level could be tapped by humans through the 
unconscious mind, sometimes by means of the "Communicative 
Intelligence" of God, which--according to Coleridge-- 
allows humans to occasionally glimpse God's absolute 
knowledge. In contrast, the secondary imagination 
requires conscious as well as unconscious activity within 
the mind. Human creativity requires the will of the 
artist to inaugurate the creative process, and for 
Coleridge, the secondary imagination accounts for 
conscious human initiative. The secondary imagination, 
therefore, serves as the most common means by which the 
artist taps into the more mystical primary imagination; 
when Coleridge generically refers only to the 
"imagination" in his theoretical and critical writings, he 
is typically referring to the secondary imagination.
Coleridge never clearly explains the relationship 
between the primary imagination, the secondary 
imagination, and the Communicative Intelligence. However,
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he seems to imply that the secondary imagination performs 
the conscious functions necessary to make sense of the 
unconscious input provided by the primary imagination. If 
this seems unclear, then the link with the Communicative 
Intelligence appears even more nebulous. Of the three, 
only the Communicative Intelligence appears to exist 
outside the human mind. The Communicative Intelligence 
allows the individual mind some sort of access to the 
realm of the spiritual, a pure essence of "nature," God's 
plan, or even God's own imagination. Seemingly, this 
access occurs through the primary imagination; the 
secondary imagination's job must be to make meaning out of 
the raw material provided through/by the primary 
imagination.
Ey dividing the imagination into two distinct 
components, the primary and the secondary, Coleridge 
effectively accommodates the romantic movement's 
philosophical model of the relationship of the spiritual 
to the material. Whether expressed in the terms of body 
and s o u l , natural and ideal, or sensuous and 
supersensuous, the metaphysical foundations of romanticism 
consistently serve Coleridge well--primarily because many 
of Coleridge's own philosophical influences derive from 
German idealist philosophers such as Kant, Schelling, and 
Schlegel. For example, Coleridge's secondary imagination 
and its ability to modify ideas, images, and sensory 
impressions relates to Kant's notion of an active mind
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that creates experience by synthesizing external 
(objective) and internal (subjective) impressions.
Similar concepts, of course, may be found in Schelling, 
with a more direct application to the relationship of art, 
mind, and "nature." According to Schelling, art emerges 
as the product of the artist's ability to recreate the 
actual supersensuous "essence" of nature, rather than the 
mere representation of the artist's own subjective view of 
nature. Furthermore, Coleridge's employment of an organic 
metaphor for art has often been traced to Schlegel, who 
states that the work of art begins as a "seed" in the 
artist's imagination and should be allowed to flourish 
"naturally," thus reflecting the human dualism of the 
animalistic (material/body) and the transcendental 
(spiritual/soul).3
Two of the most significant functions of the 
imagination under Coleridge's theory may be traced to the 
influence of German idealism: the reconciliation of 
opposites and the attainment of organic unity. Each of 
these fundamentals of Coleridge's aesthetic theory are 
evident in the final sentence of chapter fourteen of the 
Biocraphia Literaria: "Finally, GOOD SENSE
(Understanding) is the BODY of poetic genius, FANCY its 
DRAPERY, MOTION its LIFE, and IMAGINATION the SOUL that is 
every where, and in each; and forms all into one graceful 
and intelligent whole" (II: 18). In this statement,
Coleridge appears to be advocating a reconciliation of the
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material and spiritual, as well as the intellectual and 
intuitive aspects of the creation of poetry. Clearly, a 
reconciliation of opposites contributes also to the 
achievement of organic unity--"one graceful and 
intelligent whole" in this case. Each of these elements 
of the imagination resound throughout Coleridge's theory 
and criticism; likewise, they each display affinities with 
the fundamental philosophical concerns inherent in chaos 
theory. Such significance demands that each receive 
appropriate attention respectively, beginning with the 
reconciliation of opposites.
Chaos theory, of course, promotes the notion of a 
reconciliation of the traditionally dichotomous opposites 
of order and disorder into a more interactive and 
harmonious continuum. Chaos may be discovered lurking 
within seemingly ordered processes, and new levels of 
order arise spontaneously from/within phenomena that 
previously appeared to display only chaotic behavior. 
Coleridge relates his aesthetic preference for poetry that 
contains a balance of order and disorder when he states: 
"In poetry it is the blending of passion with order that 
constitutes perfection" (Shakespearean II: 107).* For the 
romantics in general (Coleridge included), the dichotomy 
of the spiritual (order) and material (chaos) that 
formerly existed under neoclassical thought was similarly 
broken down into a more continuous and interactive 
relationship. This breakdown was accomplished through the
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medium of art, which allows humans limited glimpses of the 
ideal realm of the spirit. Artists, therefore, were 
granted roles as privileged intermediaries between the 
real (chaos) and the ideal (order); perceived as 
possessing superior powers of creativity, artists were 
likewise presumed to hold a heightened ability to view 
elements of the spiritual hidden within the material.
From a perspective of chaos theory, one might assert that 
the romantic artist exhibits a skill for intuiting the 
order that underlies the chaos of the material world, or 
even the universe.
For Coleridge, the artist's key to unlocking the 
supersensuous aspects of the material world lies in the 
imagination. As mentioned earlier, the secondary 
imagination serves as the conduit of access to the primary 
imagination, the latter of which Coleridge more directly 
links to the realm of the spiritual. Furthermore, 
Coleridge's intense interest in the conscious and 
unconscious aspects of the human mind further inspires his 
description of the means through which the imagination 
contributes to the creative process. For Coleridge, the 
creative essence of the imagination resides in the 
unconscious mind, with the more spiritual primary 
imagination operating entirely in this domain. Coleridge, 
in fact, directly links the spiritual and the unconscious 
when he describes the "spiritual in man" as "of that which 
lies on the other side of our natural consciousness"
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(Bioqraphia I: 243). The secondary imagination also
employs the unconscious portions of the mind, but does so
while "cc-existing with the conscious will," as Coleridge
asserts in the definition of the imagination that he
provides in the Bioqraphia Literaria. Coleridge clearly
states that these two aspects of the mind must function
interactively in his essay, "On Poesy or Art":
In every work of art there is a reconcilement of 
the external with the internal; the conscious is 
so impressed on the unconscious as to appear in 
it . . . .  He who combines the two is the man of 
genius; and for that reason he must partake of 
both. Hence there is in genius itself an 
unconscious activity; nay, that is the genius in 
the man of genius. (Miscel1anies 47)
Although Coleridge does not directly speak of the
imagination in this statement, his association of the
unconscious and the conscious with the imagination in the
Bioqraphia Literaria demands a similar "reconcilement" of
the conscious and the unconscious, as well as the
spiritual and material, in his theory of both the
imagination and genius.5
Coleridge also associates the traditional dichotomy 
of feeling6 and thought with his description of the roles 
of the unconscious and conscious in the creative process. 
In fact, Coleridge often seems to advocate the use of the 
uncontrolled aspects of the human mind in a fit of passion 
for the purposes of releasing the creative treasures of 
the unconscious. In such instances, the conscious mind 
provides the "order" necessary to keep the passion in
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check; Coleridge often describes this order-keeping facet 
of his theory as a "wakefulness of mind" (qtd. in Jackson 
106). J. R. de J. Jackson points out that Coleridge 
believes the activities of the mind to be only semi­
conscious while under the influence of passion, but at the 
same time consciously fostered by the artist. Jackson 
describes this as an "unusual state of mind" that is never 
adequately explained by Coleridge, but which appears to 
maintain a significant association with the Communicative 
Intelligence, thus providing a spiritual aspect as well. 
Although unable to articulate exactly how this process 
works, Jackson clearly aligns the effects of passion upon 
the mind with the unconscious and the spiritual in the 
creation of poetry (106-107). It would seem, therefore, 
that Coleridge seeks the reconciliation of feeling and 
thought in his theory of creativity and the imagination 
along with the spiritual and the material and the 
unconscious and the conscious.
Coleridge's distinction between imagination and fancy
is often viewed by interpreters as another attempt to
reconcile opposites. The definition of fancy, immediately
following that of the imagination, in the Bioqraphia
Literaria reads as follows:
FANCY, on the contrary, has no other counters to 
play with, but fixities and definites. The 
Fancy is indeed no other than a mode of Memory 
emancipated from the order of time and space; 
and blended with, and modified by that empirical 
phenomenon of the will, which we express by the 
word CHOICE. But equally with the ordinary
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memory it must receive all its materials ready 
made from the law of association. (I: 305)
Fancy, therefore, applies to the "fixities and definites"
of sense perception. Coleridge's employment of the phrase
"law of association" refers to David Hartley's theory of
the operation of human mind as a mechanical linking of
senses and ideas through the process of association.
Although Hartley's medical, psychological, and
metaphysical theories significantly influenced the early
stages of the development of Coleridge's aesthetic theory,
Coleridge radically changed course when his thought fell
under the sway of the German metaphysicians. But even
though Hartley's more linearly logical view of the
workings of the human mind found no place in Coleridge's
theory of the imagination, Coleridge retained many of the
fundamental concepts of Hartley's theory, applying them in
modified, more romantically-friendly forms to the lesser
creative faculties of his overall theory. Fancy, of
course, was one such lesser faculty. A hierarchical
schematization of Coleridge's perspective of the links
between the mental faculties discussed in this study
should appear as follows (in decreasing order): primary
imagination--secondary imagination--fancy.
Coleridge modified Hartley's notion of association 
when he "emancipated" it "from the order of time and 
space"; essentially, Coleridge added the governing power 
of the will to a process Hartley had described as 
mechanical, even automatic in its contemporaneity.
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Jackson points out that fancy is linked to the imagination 
through this same conscious power of the will, the very 
"wakefulness of mind" that Coleridge proposes as the 
limiting factor of passion. According to Jackson, one of 
the chief distinctions between fancy and imagination 
concerns the two different kinds of understanding that 
result from the employment of this wakefulness of mind 
(120).
Employing Jackson's description of these two discrete 
types of understanding, the understanding which 
contributes to fancy may be viewed as that which arises 
from the sensual perception of nature, the world external 
to the intellect. Likewise, the imagination benefits from 
an understanding which arises from the perception of the 
interior of the mind--the ideas and images that are 
crafted in the "mind's eye," so to speak; as mentioned 
earlier, these ideas and images might convey glimpses of 
the transcendental through the primary imagination's 
unconscious link with the spiritual. The creation of 
poetry requires the reconciliation of these opposite 
varieties of understanding, just as romantic theory in 
general calls for a reconciliation of the sensuous and the 
supersensuous. Of course, this directly implies a 
reconciliation of the fancy and imagination as well. 
Jackson asserts, however, that in Coleridge's ideal model 
of poetic creation, the imagination must, to some extent, 
predominate over the fancy (121).
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Coleridge's specified reconciliation of associative 
fancy and creative imagination, therefore, mirrors the 
interactive, continuous relationship of order and disorder 
posited by chaos theory in much the same manner as the 
similar reconciliations of the material and the spiritual, 
the conscious and the unconscious, and thought and 
passion. By turning attention to the respective 
philosophical influences that informed Coleridge's 
derivation of and distinction between the definitions of 
the creative faculties of fancy and the imagination, one 
observes that Hartley's theory of association is 
essentially linear and mechanical, while the philosophies 
of the German metaphysicians, such as Kant, Schelling, and 
Schlegel, present more nonlinear and organic views of the 
operation of the human mind. The creative or aesthetic 
distinction between fancy and imagination, therefore, may 
be discerned as the difference between a mechanical form, 
which is impressed upon the work of art from the outside, 
and an organic form, which develops from within the work 
of art itself. Appleyard metaphorically models this 
distinction through the symbols of the machine and the 
living organism (131-132). This model effectively serves 
the purposes of comparing the relationship of fancy and 
the imagination to that of order and disorder under chaos 
theory, because scientific advocates of chaos theory often 
use this very model to illustrate the distinction between 
the traditional Newtonian paradigm for the operation of
122
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the universe and the relatively new paradigm based on 
chaos theory.
The second of the two significant elements of 
Coleridge's definition of the imagination, organic unity, 
exists when the whole of the work of art displays the 
sense of organic form, meaning that each individual part 
not only develops from within the work of art, but also 
contributes to the overall effectiveness of the whole.7 
The similarity of the relationship of part and whole under 
Coleridge's conception of organic unity to the 
relationship of part and whole advocated by chaos theory 
should appear quite obvious. Chaos theory emphasizes a 
nonlinear, interactive relationship of part to whole, 
where each part not only contributes to the effectiveness 
of the whole, but also interacts with and significantly 
influences numerous other parts, often simultaneously. 
Often, each individual part also reflects the totality of 
the whole in the same manner that each part of a living 
organism carries the genetic information for the complete 
organism. Finally, a nonlinear relationship of part to 
whole implies that the function/effect of the whole does 
not necessarily depend on the absolute existence of each 
and every part. An organic life-form does not necessarily 
die after losing a single limb, but the linear operation 
of a mechanical clock will stop with the removal of any 
individual gear. In other words, chaos theory asserts
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that the whole is, in fact, greater than the mere sum of 
its p a r t s .
Coleridge displays a strikingly comparable holistic 
view of the relationship of part and whole in his 
aesthetic theory and criticism; essentially, Coleridge's 
very definition of beauty involves a balance of part-ness 
and wholeness: "The sense of beauty subsists in 
simultaneous intuitive of the relation of parts, each to 
each, and of all to a whole" (Miscellanies 26).8 
Similarly, when Coleridge distinguishes poetry from other 
artforms in the Bioqraphia Literaria, he emphasizes that a 
poem provides "such delight from the whole, as is 
compatible with a distinct gratification from each 
component part" (II: 13).9 Although this particular 
statement seems to run counter to chaos theory because the 
sum of the parts of Coleridge's ideal poem would in fact 
be greater than the whole (rather than vice versa), the 
notion that each part may be, in its own way, equal to the 
whole also indicates a nonlinear relationship of part to 
whole. But even so, in other discussions Coleridge 
clearly stresses the importance of unity and the whole, 
which indicates that Coleridge's thought concerning the 
relative significance of part and whole oscillated over 
the course of his lifetime, or perhaps he simply wanted 
the best of both worlds: a whole that is greater than the 
sum of its parts with each individual part equal to the 
whole. At any rate, the greatest significance of
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Coleridge's view of the relationship of part to whole from 
a perspective of chaos theory concerns Coleridge's 
repeated insistence upon a balance and interaction between 
the whole and its parts, as well as between the individual 
parts.
Perhaps Coleridge best sums up his conception of an 
ideal aesthetic relation of part to whole in the phrase, 
"Multeity in Unity," which he employs in his essay, "On 
the Principles of Sound Criticism Concerning the Fine 
P.rts . " To illustrate "Multeity in Unity," Coleridge 
provides the example of a discarded wagon wheel: even 
though it is "disfigured with tar and dirt," one might 
nevertheless observe that "many different images are 
distinctly comprehended at one glance, as forming one 
whole, and each part in some harmonious relation to each 
and to all" (Miscellanies 19-20). In another example from 
the same essay, one might imagine that Coleridge took his 
inspiration directly from chaos theory: "The frost on a 
window-pane has by accident crystallized into a striking 
resemblance of a tree or a seaweed. With what pleasure we 
trace the parts, and their relations to each other, and to 
the whole!" (19-20). Nature inspired Coleridge to find 
similar examples of "Multeity in Unity" in the colors and 
shapes of a view of the sea and the sounds of the wind in 
a forest of pine trees (Anima 100; Miscellanies 190).10
Coleridge's appreciation of nature, in addition to 
being a vogue in his day, certainly derives from his
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preference for the organic forms and organic unity that he
observed in the nature around him, as the above quotes and
references testify. He therefore believed that the
artistic ability to produce organic unity could only come
from nature as well; according to Coleridge, some skills
are born in the artist, rather than learned, such as,
that gift of true Imagination, that capability 
of reducing a multitude into unity of effect, or 
by strong passion to modify series of thoughts 
into one predominant thought or feeling--those 
were faculties which might be cultivated and 
improved, but could not be acquired. Only such
a man as possessed them deserved the title of
poeta who nascitur non fit--he was that child of 
Nature, and not the creature of his own efforts. 
(Shakespearean II: 63)
Coleridge, of course, refers to the secondary imagination
when he speaks of "that true gift of Imagination" which
(as explained above) applies to the artist's ability to
access the primary imagination, or unconscious, and
therefore catch glimpses of the natural/spiritua1 truths
that the Communicative Intelligence (God) allows the
artist to see. Coleridge and most other romantics in
general believed that the material aspects of nature
viewed by humans on a day-to-day basis was far too
multitudinous for the average human mind to perceive the
spiritual unity lying beneath the surface; after all, only
God could fully comprehend the nature that He had created.
The "child of Nature" that Coleridge refers to in the
above quote, therefore, enjoys an extraordinarily
developed secondary imagination.
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In much the same manner that it allows individuals 
access to the spiritual realm under Coleridge’s theory of 
the imagination, art also acts as "the mediatress between, 
and reconciler of, nature and man" (Miscellanies 42). But 
one must not make the mistake of assuming that Coleridge 
completely equates nature with the spiritual; he perceives 
the spiritual in_ nature, rather than regarding al 1 of 
nature as existing in the realm of the spiritual. In 
other words, the true artist does not merely copy the 
sensuous, external aspects of nature, but instead 
communicates the supersensuous essence of nature. The 
imagination, of course, is employed for the purposes of 
gaining glimpses of this essence.11
When Coleridge speaks of relating an "essence" of 
nature through the imagination's ability to access the 
spiritual realm, he is attempting to account for a 
"chaotic moment" that serves as the spark of artistic 
creation, the same moment that Aristotle links to 
catharsis and Dryden connects with liveliness. Like both 
Aristotle and Dryden, Coleridge struggles to adequately 
explain the particulars of this moment because he does not 
fully understand it himself, Appleyard suggests that the 
wide scope of Coleridge's artistic/scholarly career-- 
encompassing the roles of poet, critic, philosopher, 
theologian, and even political economist--encouraged 
Coleridge to try to account for too many factors in his 
theories of literary creativity to feel entirely confident
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about his explanations (123-124). Again like Aristotle 
and Dryden, Coleridge was simply attempting to create a 
coherent system of theory/criticism that matched his own 
personal experience.
In Coleridge's experience, the chaotic moment that
ignites the imagination often originates in, or at least
derives from, the unconscious. In fact, Coleridge claims
that he benefitted from just such a personal experience
during the composition of his poem "Kubla Khan." In the
preface to this poem, Coleridge states:
The Author continued for about three hours in a 
profound sleep, at least of the external senses, 
during which time he has the most vivid 
confidence, that he could not have composed less 
than from two to three hundred lines; if that 
indeed can be called composition in which all 
the images rose up before him as things, with a 
parallel production of the correspondent 
expressions, without any sensation or 
consciousness of effort, (gtd. in Baker 157-158)
Coleridge successfully locates the source of inspiration
for his poem in the unconscious, but this very fact
probably raises more questions than it answers concerning
the process of creation. What role, for example, did the
more logical, intellectual portion of his mind play as he
attempted to construct order out of the chaotic flood of
images? Clearly, Coleridge's repeated emphases upon the
importance of the limiting contributions of the more
orderly conscious creative faculties imply that the poem
did not write itself, but his mystical treatment of the
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process indicates that he does not himself understand the 
the creative act in all of its dimensions.
In addition to the unconscious, Coleridge finds 
evidence of the creative/chaotic moment in extreme 
passion, asserting that "in many instances the 
predominance of some mighty Passion takes the place of the 
guiding Thought, and the result presents the method of 
Nature, rather than the habit of the Individual" (Friend 
I: 456). Again, Coleridge mystically implies that the 
marrow of the creative process derives from someplace 
other than the artist--this time from nature, rather than 
the unconscious.12 But one must also remember that the 
combination of passion and order, the unconscious and the 
conscious provides the best aesthetic results according to 
Coleridge's theory. The significance of the above quotes 
concerning the unconscious and passion lies in Coleridge's 
reliance upon these "chaotic moments" as instigators 
and/or guiding forces for creativity, rather than as 
actuators of the total artistic product.
From a perspective of chaos theory, the chaotic 
moments that Coleridge attributes to the unconscious or to 
the influence of passion appear to correspond to the same 
sorts of moments that occur when a system operates on the 
boundaries of order and disorder. In such instances, 
unstable, aperiodic behavior typically causes an extreme 
sensitivity to initial conditions, which in turn often 
leads to unpredictability concerning the future state of
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the system. In the case of a self-organizing system, 
entirely new levels of order may emerge from the initial 
chaotic moment--order that was hidden beneath the chaos 
all along.
Under Coleridge's theory of creativity, the initial 
chaotic moments that trigger the imagination also set into 
motion a process of ordering the images and ideas that 
make up the final work of art. As mentioned earlier, both 
the conscious and unconscious, or linear and nonlinear, 
portions of the mind contribute to this process, which for 
this reason may be said to occur on the boundaries of 
order and disorder. Not surprisingly, the aesthetic 
priority Coleridge places upon organicism also plays a 
significant role in the process of organization; Coleridge 
ever, employs an organic metaphor as he attempts to 
describe the kinds of inherent rules that guide poetic 
creation:
Could a rule be given from w i t h o u t , poetry would 
cease to be poetry, and sink into a mechanical 
art . . . .  The rules of the IMAGINATION are 
themselves the very powers of growth and 
production. The words, to which they are 
reducible, present only the outlines and 
external appearances of the fruit. A deceptive 
counterfeit of the superficial form and colors 
•may be elaborated; but the marble peach feels 
cold and heavy, and children only put it to 
their mouths. (Bioqraphia II: 83-84)
Clearly, Coleridge states that the rules of the
imagination are organic, so organic that they may not be
expressed completely in words. With respect to
Coleridge's references to the method of organic form and
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organic unity, Appleyard has difficulty reconciling what 
he views as determinism in the organic process of, for 
example, the growth of a plant with the more unpredictable 
modifying functions of the imagination. For this reason, 
among others, Appleyard asserts that Coleridge never 
adequately conveys the ultimate process of creativity in 
terms of organic unity and the imagination (132, 140).
Appleyard is certainly correct when he proclaims 
Coleridge's theory deficient in its description of the 
details of the creative process; after all, Coleridge 
himself admits in the above quote that the operation of 
the imagination may not be described fully in words. But 
according to chaos theory, Appleyard errs in his depiction 
of the growth of a plant as a predictably deterministic 
process, for even though the "tree-ness" of the acorn is 
preprogrammed in its genetic code, even DNA may alter 
itself unpredictably through genetic mutation; complex 
environmental factors will also force the tree to adapt 
during its growth cycle. Appleyard, of course, may not be 
faulted for such an error, because he only reflects the 
dominant essentialist vein that Coleridge displays in most 
of his writings. But on occasion, Coleridge seems to 
intuit the influence of the supersensuous realm upon the 
imagination as providing more unpredictability and 
spontaneity than his frequent Platonic references to unity 
imply at face value.
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At this point, Coleridge's admitted inability to 
describe the imagination in words, combined with the 
vagueness of the definition in the Bioqraphia Literaria 
and the fact that he felt compelled to divide this 
important mental faculty into two distinct parts, 
indicates that Coleridge himself does not understand the 
imagination in exact terms. When one attempts to 
interpolate and extrapolate from Coleridge's comments 
concerning the imagination, however, an overall picture of 
this faculty may be derived. First of all, the 
imagination is the seat of creativity in the human mind. 
The primary imagination apparently serves as a sort of 
unconscious generator of internal ideas and images 
inspired by the realm of the supersensuous. The skill of 
the artist lies in the secondary imagination's ability to 
tap into, modify, and effectively craft the raw material 
provided by the primary imagination into a unified work of 
art. Fcr his reason, Coleridge's overall view of the 
imagination is often referred to as a "modifying" faculty 
of the mind.
Another way to approach Coleridge's theory of the 
imagination arises in chapter five of the Bioqraphia 
Literaria when he describes the psychological make-up of 
the mind as containing three main classes: the passive,
the voluntary, and the spontaneous (I: 90). Coleridge 
defines the passive portion of the mind as that which 
receives sensory impressions, as well as involuntary
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thoughts and emotions. In contrast, the voluntary portion 
of the mind originates thoughts and ideas, thus being the 
most highly conscious component of the mind and the seat 
of the free will and reason. A binary system composed of 
only the passive and voluntary portions of the mind would 
bear the markings of a typical Coleridgean theoretical 
construction; the addition of the third section, the 
spontaneous, therefore makes this particular system at 
least somewhat unique. Coleridge describes the 
spontaneous part of the mind as the mediating agent 
between the active and passive portions. Because of its 
reconciling function, this component also serves as the 
residence of the imagination; one might even think of the 
most spontaneous portion of the mind as existing in the 
overlapping region between the more passive primary 
imagination and the more active secondary imagination.
Coleridge's theoretical model of the psychological 
make-up of the human mind appears obviously outdated by 
today's standards, but his notion that spontaneity lies 
between activity and passivity, the conscious and the 
unconscious--in essence, order and disorder--very much 
parallels the most recent explanations of spontaneity 
based on chaos theory. After all, a mind with thought 
patterns behaving according to a sensitive dependence on 
initial conditions would most likely appear to experience 
new ideas spontaneously and unpredictably through the 
emergence of self-organization, rather than carefully
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crafting the thoughts through a linear method based solely 
in causality and reductionism. Furthermore, Coleridge's 
establishment of the spontaneous portion of the mind as 
the seat of the imagination encourages a comparison of 
Coleridge's theory of the imagination with self­
organization, which also serves a creative as well as 
reconciling function as a source of new levels of order in 
unstable, aperiodic systems.
Such a comparison also links Coleridge's theory of 
the imagination with Koestler's theory of problem-solving 
and creativity. For Koestler, creative genius enjoys the 
heightened ability to shift between planes of reference 
within the mind, resulting in the discovery of concepts 
that could not be attained through simple logic/reason. 
Coleridge's notion of genius, by exercising the talent for 
accessing the supersensuous, also effectively shifts 
planes of reference, although on a greater scale. The 
difference, therefore, lies in Koestler's emphasis upon a 
creative spark internal to the human mind, while for 
Coleridge, the new idea originates in the spiritual 
realm;13 but regardless of where the inspiration derives 
from, the mind gains access to it in a remarkably similar 
manner in both theories.14
Coleridge and Koestler also present similar 
respective descriptions of the identifying marks, or 
effects, of heightened creativity. For Koestler, the 
shift of reference planes enhances creativity by
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encouraging the artist to view the work of art (or 
possibly the subject of the work?) in a strange new light. 
Coleridge makes a quite similar statement when he 
describes the power of the imagination to modify images as 
being mostly a power to cultivate mood or atmosphere, 
introducing "the sudden charm, which accidents of light 
and shade, which moonlight or sun-set diffused over a 
known and familiar 1andscape"--quite literally a strange 
new light (Biographia II: 5). Not coincidentally, 
Coleridge scholar James Volant Baker refers to Coleridge's 
emphasis upon atmosphere as "a spiritual meteorology or 
'inner weather'" (124). The weather in general has also 
proven a fertile and quite literal metaphor for chaos 
theory, most evident in the highly publicized popular 
example of a sensitive dependence on initial conditions, 
"the butterfly effect."
The artists and theorists of the romantic movement 
developed a fascination for the weather because of the 
indeterminacy and magnificent, dramatic effects displayed 
by the weather, such as those generated during a 
thunderstorm. Coleridge, in fact, provides a description 
of clouds that easily could have been written for a 
modern book about chaos theory: ". . . the number and
variety of (the clouds') effects baffle our powers of 
calculation: and that the sky is clear or obscured at any 
particular time, we speak of, in common language, as a 
matter of accident" (Friend I: 529). According to Arden
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Reed, the romantic appreciation of the weather represented 
a sharp break from neoclassicism; the exactness of 
scientific experimentation that developed during the 
enlightenment excluded or ignored factors such as the 
weather, which could not be controlled, effectively moving 
science indoors (4). The romantic movement, therefore, 
exemplified a shift to the outdoors, an appreciation of a 
complexity in nature that may not be described by 
Euclidean geometry or duplicated under the controlled 
conditions of the scientific laboratory.
Coleridge called for a similar shift in the way that 
writers and critics view and approach literature--a shift 
from the linear laboratory conditions of neoclassicism 
(with its rigid precepts) to the naturally complex, 
spiritual realm of the imagination, which Coleridge 
describes as: "The completing power which unites clearness 
with depth, the plenitude of the sense with the 
comprehensibility of the understanding . . . impregnated
with which the understanding itself becomes intuitive, and 
a living power" (qtd. in Baker 206). From a formal point 
of view, the last line of the above quote carries the most 
substance, for the "living power" of an understanding 
impregnated with imagination enhances the ability of the 
artist to endow the work of art with a living, organic 
form, referred to by Baker as a "living design" (138) and 
by Coleridge as the "surview" of the work. This "surview"
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enables a man to foresee the whole of what he is 
to convey, appertaining at any one point; and by 
this means to subordinate and arrange the 
different parts according to their relative 
importance, as to convey it at once, and as an 
organized whole. (Bioqraphia II: 58)
At face value, this passage appears to be just another of
Coleridge's statements in support of organic unity, but
upon closer inspection, Coleridge seems to encourage the
artist to follow a kind of pattern, or rather to keep the
"surview" in mind so that the artist may align the overall
pattern of the form of the work of art with the "living
design" mentioned by Baker. As a set-up to the above
quote, Coleridge points out that the poet should not only
have a knowledge of the words typically employed by a
particular class of people, but should also be familiar
with the order in which the words are employed by that
class. In other words, he is interested in the way people
use words as much as the words that they use. Coleridge's
"surview," therefore, refers to the signature patterns--the
way that the individual parts are interconnected with the
whole and with one another--as much as the mere emphasis of
both part and whole aesthetically.
Eut the notion of signature patterns does not appear 
only in Coleridge's discussions of the relationship of 
part and whole; he often suggests that the artist should 
draw inspiration from the patterns that exist in nature. 
Coleridge refers directly to such patterns in a discussion 
of the reconciliation of emotion and thought: "A Poet's 
Heart and Intel 1ect should be combined. intimatelv
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combined and unified, with the great appearances in 
Kature--and not merely held in solution and loose mixture 
with them, in the shape of forced similes" (Letters II: 
864). The emphasis here lies, of course, in Coleridge's 
concern for the reconciliation of opposites, but his 
employment of the phrase "great appearances" implies that 
seme essence exists in nature that must be tapped by the 
poet in order to create quality poetry. Furthermore, 
Coleridge seems to bestow a sort of universal quality to 
this essence when he remarks on his observations of unity 
in nature, even among otherwise apparently disparate 
entities, as when he goes beyond a mere comparison between 
the shapes of frost and trees to state that: "The 
arborescent forms on a frosty morning, to be seen on the 
window and pavement, must have some relation to the more 
perfect forms developed in the vegetable world"
{Mi s c c 1 Ian ies 383). One need not leap too far logically 
to associate this connection that Coleridge perceives in 
the frost and plants of nature with the natural, 
supersensuous essence that serves as inspiration for the 
creative artist.
Briggs and Peat point out that the similarities 
between frost crystals and trees derive from their shared 
bond as examples of fractal patterns that exist in nature. 
Similar patterns may also be observed in the branching of 
rivers, the structures of galaxies, fractures in metal, 
and human respiratory and bronchial systems. But Briggs
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and Peat are willing to take the notion of self-similar 
patterns beyond the level of the mere visual; as mentioned 
in the introductory chapter to this study, they cite 
research indicating that the way the brain decides which 
neurons will respond to a stimulus is similar to the way 
the immune system chooses cells to respond to a disease. 
This recalls Coleridge's concern for the poetic depiction 
of the way people talk as well as the words they use. 
Indeed, Coleridge's emphasis upon the supersensuous 
essence and "great appearances" in nature certainly 
anticipates chaos theory’s discovery of similar patterns, 
not only in the physical form of nature, but also in the 
various wavs that nature operates.
According to Coleridge, artists may best communicate 
the "great appearances" of nature through the employment 
of symbols; for Coleridge, symbols unify the signifier and 
the signified, thus conveying a transcendental meaning 
sometimes seemingly ideal to a Platonic extreme.
Coleridge believes that symbols carry the essence of the
nature within the thing that is represented. Symbols,
therefore, seem to function as a shorthand for the deeper 
patterns of nature, or the spiritual realm: "The artist 
must imitate that which is within the thing, that which is
active through form and figure, and discourses to us by
symbols--the Natur-geist. or spirit of nature"
(Miscel1anies 48). For Coleridge, therefore, a symbol 
illuminates the supersensuous within the work of art; a
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symbol "is characterized by a translucence of the Special 
in the Individual or of the General in the Especial or of 
the Universal in the General. Above all by the 
translucence of the Eternal through and in the Temporal"
(Statesman's 30).
Turning now from the creation of art to the reception 
of the work of art by an audience, Coleridge's theory 
seems to imply that an audience may perceive the symbolic 
illumination of the supersensuous essence within the work 
of art, but not as directly as the artist experiences the 
essence during the process of creation. Jackson contends 
that Coleridge was uncomfortable with this barrier between 
the minds of the audience and the spiritual core of the 
art--the insight relayed from the Communicative 
Intelligence. After all, Coleridge's own experience as a 
reader and playgoer testified that those who are exposed 
to the work of art are, in fact, able to play a more 
active role than his theory allows at face value; one 
example of such an observation arises in a discussion of 
French tragedy, in which he states that the tragedies 
"excite the minds of the spectators to active thought, to 
a striving after ideal excellence" (Bioqraphia II: 184).
In order to accommodate this activity of the mind as he 
perceived it in the spectator, Coleridge tried to derive 
less obvious theoretical means to explain how the audience 
might more closely perceive what the artist experiences 
during the act of creation (Jackson 131).
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Not surprisingly, the ideal state of mind that 
Coleridge recommends for viewing works of art resembles 
the state of mind he advocates for the creation of art: a 
sort of dream state ruled at least partially by the 
unconscious, but nevertheless guided by conscious thought, 
or the will. He describes this psychological mode for 
experiencing art as "a middle state of mind more strictly 
appropriate to the imagination than any other, when it is, 
as it were, hovering between images." This statement 
resonates with chaos theory's assertion that creativity 
occurs on the boundaries in between absolute order and 
disorder. Coleridge continues, proclaiming that "As soon 
as (the state of mind) is fixed on one image, it becomes 
understanding; but while it is unfixed and wavering 
between them, attaching itself permanently to none, it is 
imagination" (Shakespearean II: 103). This latter 
observation not only corresponds with Coleridge's notion 
of the reconciliation of the conscious and unconscious in 
the creative operation of the imagination, but also 
appeals to general common sense and experience; most 
persons would agree that understanding requires a focused 
state of mind, while imagination seems to function best in 
the nonlinear realm when the mind is between images or 
ideas.
Most significantly for the purposes of this chapter, 
however, Coleridge employs his explanation of the dream
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state in the development of his theory of dramatic
illusion. He first describes dreams by stating:
It is not strictly accurate to say that we 
believe our dreams to be actual while we are 
dreaming. We neither believe it or disbelieve 
it--with the will the comparing power is 
suspended, and without the comparing power any 
act of Judgement, whether affirmation or denial, 
is impossible. (Letters IV: 641)
By first setting up the idea that the power of comparison 
resides within the will, therefore establishing that his 
assertion concerning the absence of the will in dreams 
likewise removes the ability to compare reality with 
dream, Coleridge is able to make his most famous 
contention concerning the believabi1ity/reality of onstage 
events :
Add to [the argument in the previous quote] a 
voluntary Lending of the Will to this suspension 
of one of it's own operations (i.e. that of 
comparison & consequent decision concerning the 
reality of any sensuous Impression) and you have 
the True Theory of Stage Illusion . . ."
(Letters IV: 642)
Coleridge, of course, is stating that the spectator
participates in a "willing suspension of disbelief,"
literally exercising the will so much as to cancel one of
its own functions.
The upshot cf Coleridge's discussion of the "willing 
suspension of disbelief" lies in the similarities between 
what happens in the mind of the spectator as a result of 
the experience of the work of art and what happens in the 
mind of the artist during the creative process.
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Ultimately, such similarities may be said to result from 
the combination of conscious and unconscious mental 
activities. For the artist, the unconscious must be 
tapped in order to gain inspiration from the realm of the 
supersensuous, yet the conscious will is necessary to 
guide and shape the product. The audience employs the 
will in order to suspend disbelief just enough to allow a 
dream-like state to occur in which the mind wavers between 
images and ideas. Most significantly, in both cases the 
imagination is evoked by the oscillation between conscious 
and unconscious mental states (Jackson 134).
As a result of having their imaginations stimulated 
through witnessing the work of art, Coleridge believed the 
audience would benefit from a profound cognitive 
experience as well. Even though Coleridge distinguishes 
poetry from science "by proposing for (poetry's) immediate 
object pleasure, not truth" (Bioqraphia II: 13), the 
pleasure that arises in the audience does so in response 
to what the artist represents and how the artist's 
imagination operates upon what is represented (Appleyard 
133). Since for Coleridge, the poet enjoys "a more than 
ordinary sensibility," which results in "a more than 
ordinary sympathy" in the audience for the objects, 
persons, and situations represented, then the audience 
benefits from "a more than ordinary activity of the mind 
in general," particularly with respect to the imagination. 
Coleridge's ultimate goal for poetry, therefore, is quite
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similar to that shared by Aristotle and Dryden: 
"intellectual pleasure" (Shakespearean II: 50-51).
For Coleridge, the poet who inspires the greatest 
degree of intellectual pleasure is Shakespeare, for his 
plays create in the reader and spectator the kind of 
active mental mode that Coleridge advocates. According to 
Coleridge: "You feel (Shakespeare) to be a poet, inasmuch 
as, for a time, he has made you one— an active creative 
being" (Shakespearean II: 65).15 Shakespeare, in fact, 
serves as Coleridge's ideal example of an artist blessed 
with a true gift of imagination; more than any other 
literary figure Coleridge discusses in his criticism, 
Shakespeare best conforms to the artistic standards 
Coleridge establishes in his theory.
For example, Coleridge sets forth the reconciliation 
of opposites and organic unity as two of the most 
significant elements of his theory of the imagination, and 
one may likewise find corresponding critical passages 
praising the contributions of these same ingredients in 
Shakespeare's works. One example of such a passage arises 
in an essay entitled, "Shakespeare's Judgement Equal to 
His Genius," in which Coleridge defends Shakespeare by 
attempting to prove that "the judgement of Shakespeare is 
commensurate with his genius, nay, that his genius reveals 
itself in his judgment, as in its most exalted form"
(Literary 183). Here, Coleridge challenges the long- 
accepted belief that Shakespeare's works were products of
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pure instinct, or--so to speak--pure genius, with no 
foundation in the orderly rules of dramatic literature; 
from Coleridge's perspective, this traditional view of 
Shakespeare's work implies that Shakespeare's creative 
process was ruled entirely by the unconscious, without the 
guiding force of the more linear conscious mind to keep 
the product orderly. Essentially, Coleridge responds by 
pointing out that Shakespeare wrote according to his own 
rules which, at least according to Coleridge's aesthetics, 
were indeed far superior to the "accepted" rules (such as 
neoclassicism) that Shakespeare appeared to ignore. Thus 
for Coleridge, Shakespeare's plays accomplish the
reconciliation of the opposites of thought and instinct,
the conscious and the unconscious, philosophy and poetry,
even the real and the ideal.
Ac stressed repeatedly in this chapter, the 
reconciliation of opposites contributes to the 
establishment of organic unity, which arises repeatedly in 
Shakespeare's plays. After all, Coleridge states that the 
alternative rules that guided Shakespeare's creativity 
were the rules of nature, organicism itself. Thus 
Shakespeare's genius was not wild, as was often claimed by 
Coleridge's critical predecessors, but orderly in an 
organic, rather than mechanical, way; Coleridge 
consistently stresses the manner in which the individual 
parts of each of Shakespeare's plays serve the whole, yet 
maintain their own particular beauty. Shakespeare's
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command of organic form therefore accounts for the reason 
that Coleridge perceives the speeches of Shakespeare's 
characters, just to cite one example, as arising naturally 
out of his characterizations instead of out of the pen of 
the playwright (Criticism 158-159).
Coleridge, of course, maintains that Shakespeare's
ability to write plays that contain such an ideal organic
unity derives from the extraordinarily high development of
Shakespeare's secondary imagination. Coleridge believes,
therefore, that Shakespeare's plays contain truths higher
even than true-to-1ife; such truth and universality must
come much mere directly from the supersensuous nature, and
thus the Communicative Intelligence, than from
Shakespeare’s own consciousness--even though the latter
plays a significant role in shaping the former. Coleridge
therefore refers to Shakespeare as "a nature humanized, a
genial understanding directing self-consciously a power
and an implicit wisdom deeper than consciousness"
(Shakespearean I: 198). In addition to defending
Shakespeare's judgement, Coleridge believes that
Shakespeare's instinct should also be admired, rather than
dismissed as untrained:
If Shakespeare be the wonder of the ignorant, he 
is, and ought to be, much more the wonder of the 
learned: not only from profundity of thought, bu 
from his astonishing and intuitive knowledge of 
what man must be at all times, and under all 
circumstances, he is rather to be looked upon as 
a prophet than as a poet. (Shakespearean II:
140) .
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Clearly, from the above quote, Coleridge feels that an 
audience may learn much from the insight of Shakespeare’s 
plays. Because of his highly developed imagination, 
Shakespeare likewise stimulates the imagination of the 
audience, igniting in them the intellectual sort of 
pleasure that Coleridge values in his theory. It was for 
this reason that Coleridge was so critical of the 
Shakespearean productions of his own day (as well as all 
other staged theatrical productions); he felt that 
elaborate stage spectacle diverted the audience's 
attention, thus interfering with the excitation of the 
imagination. He therefore believed that plays were better 
read than seen--at least in his own day.16 Coleridge, 
therefore, pined for the days of the Elizabethans, when 
"the stage, indeed, had nothing but curtains for its 
scenes, but this fact compelled the actor, as well as the 
author, to appeal to the imaginations, and not to the 
senses of the audience" (Shakespearean II: 123).
Coleridge's criticism of Shakespeare, therefore, 
conforms well to his theory of the imagination, from both 
the creative and experiential perspectives. Each of the 
mutual elements between Coleridge's theory and criticism 
are likewise significant when viewed through a framework 
based on chaos theory. But most importantly, Coleridge 
observed each of these elements of his theory of the 
imagination as operating "naturally" in the processes of 
creativity as well as in the reception of art by an
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audience. He tried to explain each of these observations 
even if he did not have a vocabulary or scientific basis 
for the concepts derived from the philosophical 
implications of chaos theory. Clearly, however, when 
Coleridge crafted his theory of the imagination as the 
ultimate impetus for creativity and his most perfect 
theatrical/1iterary/artistic moment, he instinctively 
understood that the most interesting types of creativity 
and experience occur in the chaotic moment that lies in 
the liminal nether-region between order and disorder.
End Notes
’Appleyard was, of course, referring to the sum of 
the problems inherent in the Bioqraphia Literaria when he 
offered his complaints concerning the difficulty of the 
work. According to Appleyard, Coleridge himself regarded 
the book as "immethodical miscellany" (125).
2 See Appleyard, Jackson, T a k .
3 Several Coleridge scholars have traced both the 
German and English roots of Coleridge's philosophical 
influences. See Emmet, Hamilton, Modiano, Shaffer, Hume.
4 The word "passion" alone does not necessarily imply 
chaos, but as with Dryden, Coleridge perceived the state 
of the human mind as illogical and disordered when ruled 
by passion. Also like Dryden, Coleridge considered 
passion to be a positive influence in the creation of 
poetry, as well as in the experience of reading 
poetry/drama or attending the theatre.
50ne must be careful not to confuse Coleridge's 
notion of the unconscious with Freud's. Although there 
are personal (subjective) aspects in Coleridge's 
understanding of the unconsciousness of the artist, the 
unconscious also allow the artist to tap into and thus 
communicate universal truths gleaned from the realm of th 
spiritual .
6 For the purposes of this chapter, the word "feeling 
will refer to emotion, pleasure, intuition, and other
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ineffable responses, as opposed to the phenomenological 
interpretation relating to the sense of touch.
7Without performing a systematic examination of the 
sum of Coleridge's criticism concerning this topic, it 
appears that he (as well as most commentators on his 
critical works) tends to use the terms "organic form” and 
"organic unity" interchangeably. If he does make a 
distinction, then he seems to apply the term "organic 
form" when referring to the germination and growth of the 
work of art within the artist, while "organic unity" 
appears to be used more often in instances regarding the 
relationship of part and whole within the work of art. 
Admittedly, the former term does imply the latter and more 
often than not vise versa, but nevertheless, this minor 
distinction has been made for the purposes of this study.
8Coleridge claims to be paraphrasing Pythagoras when 
he provides this definition in his essay, "On the 
Principles of Sound Criticism Concerning the Fine Arts."
9Coleridge makes a similar statement in one of his
lectures on Shakespeare when he defines poetry as:
an art (or whatever better term our language may 
afford) of representing, in words, external 
nature and human thoughts and affections, both 
relatively to human affections, by the
production of as much immediate pleasure in
parts, as is compatible with the largest sum of 
pleasure in the whole" (Shakespearean II: 41).
10 Coleridge does not actually employ the phrase
"Multeity in Unity" in either of these examples, but does 
refer to the unity of the color and shapes of the sea and
the unity of sound of the trees.
11Appleyard points out that Coleridge derived this 
view of the imagination from Schelling, but eventually 
became distrustful of the extreme power Schelling ascribed 
to the imagination and its connection with nature. 
Apparently, Schelling's views resembled pantheism too 
closely for Coleridge's personal taste. Appleyard claims 
that this problem completely undermines Coleridge's 
distinction between the primary and secondary imagination 
in chapter thirteen of the Bioqraphia Literaria (137-138). 
If, however, one simply views the essence of nature as 
being connected with the spiritual, rather than the 
entiretv of nature, Coleridge's borrowing of Schelling 
still appears to fit with his overall theory of creativity 
and aesthetics.
12 It is difficult to discern whether Coleridge 
intended for there to be any significant difference 
between his employment of both the unconscious and nature
149
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
as sources of creativity. He probably used the two 
interchangeably, since the realm of the supersensuous is 
supposed to be a place of complete unity. Tapping into 
the spiritual through "natural" passion, therefore, should 
be essentially the same as accessing the spiritual through 
the unconscious, which should also be just as "natural."
13 Depending on how one interprets the rather vague 
spiritual aspects of Coleridge’s theory of the 
imagination, one need not necessarily exclude the realm of 
the spiritual--and thus the trigger of creativity--from 
the internal human mind. This is a difficult question, 
for even though Coleridge often implies that the spiritual 
permeates all (which must include the individual human 
mind), he also gives the impression that creative genius 
lies in the artist's ability to access something outside 
of his/her own being. Again, the vagueness reflects 
Coleridge's own uncertainty about how to describe a 
creative/chaotic moment that he himself does not fully 
understand.
14 James Volant Baker employs a quote from Henry James 
to illustrate the interaction between Coleridge's 
secondary and primary imaginations in a manner that 
reinforces the connection with Koestler's theory of 
creativity:
I dropped it (my idea) for the time into the 
deep well of unconscious cerebration: not 
without the hope, doubtless, that it might 
eventually emerge from that reservoir, as one 
had already known the buried treasure to come to 
light, with a firm iridescent surface and a 
notable increase of weight. (122)
15Most likely, Coleridge means that the spectator 
experiences what Shakespeare experienced as he created the 
play, as opposed to implying that the spectator becomes a 
full co-creator of the dramatic work.
16 See Janet Ruth Heller 33-94.
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Chapter Five: Artaud's The Theatre and Its Double and the
Patterns of Cruelty
In his collection of essays entitled The Theatre and 
Its Double, Antonin Artaud sets forth the theoretical 
principles for the formulation of a new theatre, his 
influential (yet practically difficult--perhaps 
impossible)1 "Theatre of Cruelty." According to Artaud, 
the necessity for a new theatre stems from the Western 
theatre's "terrible lack of imagination," a condition 
resulting from a preoccupation with the dramatic text, 
psychological conflict, and social and moral didacticism 
(116). These aesthetic "problems" arose when humanity 
separated art from life; the Theatre of Cruelty would not 
only heal such a perceived separation, but would also heal 
the psychic ills brought about by this gulf, this rift 
that disengages humanity from the very essence of life 
itself. Artaud, therefore, proposes to restore theatre to 
its most primitive, essential, magical roots. His ideal 
theatre would not be the double of life; rather, life 
would be the double of his theatre.
The mystical nature of Artaud's theory inherently 
displays affinities for chaos theory's notion of a chaotic 
moment; this chapter will therefore begin with an 
examination of the sort of chaotic moment Artaud advocates 
as part of the experience of his theatre. The following 
issues will then be addressed respectively through a 
framework of chaos theory: 1) the relationship between 
order and chaos in Artaud's theoretical theatre,
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2) Artaud's perception of the relationships between the 
spiritual and the material, and between life and culture,
3) the notion of a universal unity and Artaud's 
theoretical relationship of part to whole, 4) archetypal 
patterns, 5) Artaud's suggestions for a new stage 
language, 6) creative chaos and self-organization, 7) 
A r t a u d ’s "catharsis," 8) the cognitive aspects of Artaud's 
theatre, 9) Koestler's theories in relation to Artaud's, 
and 10) an indeterminate determinism.
Chaos theory's notion of a chaotic moment appears to 
be the most logical place to begin an examination of 
Artaud's theories because of the central status Artaud 
gives the more ineffable qualities of his theoretical 
vision of the universe. Attempting to trace the 
philosophical and intellectual influences that informed 
this vision appears problematic because, in the final 
analysis, Artaud claims to reject philosophy and 
intellectual thought in his own essays. His brief 
association with the surrealists in the mid-1920s must 
have at least strengthened the ideas he claimed to have 
already developed independently concerning dreams and the 
rejection of a conventional notion of literature. Rather 
ironically, the significance Artaud placed upon the 
spiritual aspects of art--which had been informed by the 
above-mentioned surrealist tenets--contributed to his 
being expelled from the surrealist group when they decided 
to endorse communism. Certainly the most
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essential/spiritual aspects of Artaud's thought and 
theoretical theatre derived  ̂ from his studies of mysticism, 
particularly Cabala, and his interest in Eastern religions 
and theatre.
Because of its essential/spiritual quality, Peter
Brook categorizes Artaud's Theatre of Cruelty as "Holy
Theatre" but states that it could also be referred to as
"Theatre of the Invisible-Made-Visible." The "invisible"
and its impact upon an audience, in fact, characterize the
ultimate goals Artaud proposes for his theoretical
theatre. Artaud, therefore, would agree with Brook's
description of the theatre as:
the last forum where idealism is still an open 
question: many audiences all over the world will 
answer positively from their own experience that 
they have seen the face of the invisible through 
an experience on the stage that transcended 
their experience in life. (42)
Artaud, however, would take this experience of the
invisible--which he perceives as being the underlying
unity of the spiritual realm--to its most extreme
conclusion; emphasizing its power to operate directly upon
what Artaud calls the "unconscious" of the spectator,
Artaud intends for the invisible experiences of his
theatre to eventually bring about a favorable change in
individual, as well as community, psyches.
From a perspective based on chaos theory, Artaud 
clearly attempts to describe a "chaotic moment" when he 
locates the most powerful aspects of his theatre within
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the realms of the invisible and the "unconscious." Like 
Aristotle, Artaud expresses the ultimate end of his 
theatre in terms of a cathartic process; like Coleridge, 
he discovers the most essential elements of his theatre in 
the realm of the spiritual. But unlike any of the other 
figures discussed in this dissertation, Artaud does not 
value any form of "intellectual pleasure." Artaud, in 
fact, believes that the theatrical event should engage 
only the irrational portions of the spectator's being: 
emotions, intuition, instinct--hence the difficulty of 
Artaud's theories. These same sorts of ineffable 
qualities also inform Artaud's notion of the unconscious; 
Artaud would most likely define the unconscious as an 
unstructured, primitive portion of the mind closely 
associated with an ideal, universal realm of the spirit.2 
If one were to criticize Artaud by stating that such a 
definition is too mystical, Artaud would counter by 
asserting that the true, spiritual reality may not be 
defined in exact terms; if one were to challenge the 
existence of a universal experience, Artaud would proclaim 
that absolute subjectivity is a false construction of 
Western civilization and culture, which are themselves 
barriers to spiritual unity because of their emphases upon 
intel 1 ectualism and rational thought. According to his 
friend and contemporary, Arthur Adamov: "Artaud's
theoretical work was completely inspirational. There was 
something evanescent about his dramatic ideas, and when
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one approached them, when one thought he had grasped them, 
they vanished" (qtd. in Sellin 101). Artaud, of course, 
delights in the evanescent and mysterious and berates the 
drama of psychological conflict for "relentlessly" 
reducing "the unknown to the known, to the quotidian and 
the ordinary" (77).
Bettina L. Knapp posits that Artaud's fascination 
with the ineffable and nonlinear facets of the human mind 
derives from his own inability to think rationally as a 
result of his lifelong bouts with mental illness (78). 
Because he views the world through an irrational gaze, 
Artaud tends to perceive the problems of the world as a 
consequence of the human race's general lack of communion 
with the instincts he himself is attuned to so finely and 
which, he believes, provide access to the invisible 
essence of life itself.
Artaud, recognizing conventional theatre's inability 
to produce such visceral responses in the spectator, seeks 
to strip the theatre of all logic and verisimilitude in 
order to convince the audience that they are witnessing 
the most essential aspects of their own being. Thus for 
Artaud, life is merely a "double" of the greater truth 
portrayed on the stage, a view similar to Jarry's concept 
of the "mirror-play" through which the audience recognizes 
themselves as monsters.3 Because a Western audience would 
not easily abandon the comforts of linear thought or 
realistic stage illusion and certainly would not willingly
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peer into the darkest recesses of their own beings, Artaud 
feels that he must force the involvement of the spectator 
through shock and psychic assault. Before a production 
may be judged a success, the spectator must first react 
emotionally to the performance in the most extreme manner 
possible. Artaud's chaotic moment, therefore, lies in the 
audience's reactions to the emotional instability created 
by the shocking of their psyches.
For Artaud, the most efficient means of instigating 
the chaotic moment that results from dragging the 
unwilling spectator into the depths of his/her own psyche 
may be found in the theatrical presentation of myths. 
Artaud believes that myths relate the deepest qualities of 
human experience and therefore contain what he believes to 
be a universality capable of awakening any individual 
human unconsciousness. But not just any myth will touch 
the spectator in a manner appropriate to Artaud's theory; 
even the myths of the Greeks, Shakespeare, and the Bible 
are sorely inadequate in this respect. Only the most 
modern, up-to-date myths can truly express the conditions 
of contemporary human experience, and in Artaud's opinion, 
modern Western culture has failed to produce such m y ths .* 
New myths must therefore be created, and rapidly, because 
their lack of existence contributes to the Western schism 
between humanity and nature, individuals and their 
respective selves.
156
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
These new myths should not, however, be expressed in 
the form of dramatic texts or written words of any kind. 
Artaud believes that poetry has power only in the moment 
it is created and therefore loses its essential nature 
when written down--hence the message of his aptly-titled 
essay, "No More Masterpieces." Language has lost its 
power as well for Artaud because of the gulf that has 
developed between the word and the real material/spiritual 
object it represents, essentially the separation between 
the signifier and the signified.5 Artaud asserts that 
form is an empty shell if it does not carry with it an 
essence, "call it thought-energy, the life force, the 
determinism of change, lunar menses, or anything you like. 
Beneath the poetry of the texts, there is the actual 
poetry, without form and without text" (78).
Artaud's appropriation of live theatre as the most 
ideal artistic expression of his theories therefore 
derives in part from performance's evanescent qualities, 
permitting "the action of what is gesticulated and 
pronounced, and which is never made the same way twice" 
(78). Here a contradiction seems to arise in A r t a u d ’s 
theories, for he appears to appreciate the aleatory 
elements of live performance, yet often calls for a 
precise language of the stage containing no ambiguity of 
the sign. Perhaps Artaud recognizes that the affective 
experience he values derives from a sort of chaotic 
moment, but one which may be aroused in the spectator
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through two very different methods: one based in a total 
ordering of stage events that precisely communicates the 
intentions of the director and another that emerges from 
aleatory moments of disorder. For example, Artaud 
advocates humour as a technique appropriate to his Theatr 
of Cruelty because of comedy's anarchic qualities, which 
disrupt the sensibilities of the audience and reverse the 
expected order of things.6 But even though such a 
predilection appears out of place among his other 
carefully prescribed instructions for staging, the 
effect/affect is the same; as Philip Auslander points out 
Artaud's proposed theatre was intended to be causal, 
rather than meaningful (22).
Artaud's assessment of the experience of the 
theatrical event, therefore, resonates profoundly with 
chaos theory's notion of the chaotic moment. The psychic 
shock which Artaud proposes to inflict upon the spectator 
would certainly create an instability in the individual 
being similar to the chaotic moment which, according to 
chaos theory, occurs in the interactive boundary region 
between order and disorder. If such a shock may be 
considered a form of extreme chaos in the mind/being of 
the spectator, then this shock is certainly aroused by a 
form of extreme order in the performance onstage.
Although some scholars discover a contradiction between 
the notions of a tightly controlled theatrical event and 
the releasing of subconscious repressions in the
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audience,7 Artaud would assert that these extremes of 
order and disorder interact in a religious sense--in the 
same manner that the precise order of a religious ritual 
may be employed to summon chaotic feelings of ecstasy, 
ultimately resulting in the desired contact with the realm 
of the spiritual. Artaud would also state that true art 
is "anarchic" because, through the illumination of 
"natural" order (i.e., the "tree-ness" of the tree), it 
calls into question the human preoccupations with language 
and rational thought (42-43).
For Artaud, therefore, theatre creates a medium for 
interaction between the material and the spiritual, 
between humanity and nature, between the real and the 
ideal; theatre "reforges the chain between what is and 
what is not, between the virtuality of the possible and 
what already exists in materialized nature" (27). The 
necessity for such union and interaction derives from the 
separation of art and culture from everyday life, "as if 
there were culture on one side and life on the other, as 
if true culture were not a refined means of understanding 
and exercising life" (10).8 As mentioned earlier, this 
separation has contributed to the decadence of modern 
European society and the psychic ills Artaud wishes to 
cure. Essentially, Artaud intended for his theatre to 
break down the dichotomy between culture/art and life, 
just as the traditional dichotomy of order and disorder 
dissolves under a world view informed by chaos theory.
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In order for his theoretical theatre to achieve this
dismantling of the dichotomy between culture and life,
Artaud places all of his faith in the stimulation of the
instincts, intuitions, and emotions of the spectators,
rather than an appeal to their rational, linear modes of
thought. Artaud states, therefore, that his Theatre of
Cruelty may not be analyzed philosophically, but:
only poetically and by seizing upon what is 
communicative and magnetic in the principles of 
all the arts can we, by shapes, sounds, music, 
and volumes, evoke, passing by way of all 
natural resemblances of images and affinities to 
each other not the primordial directions of the 
mind, which our excessive logical 
intel1ectualism would reduce to merely useless 
schemata, but states of an acuteness so intense 
and so absolute that we sense, beyond the 
tremors of all music and form, the underlying 
menace of a chaos as decisive as it is 
dangerous. (50-51).
Of course, the "dangerous" aspect of the chaos 
(chaotic moment) that Artaud refers to lies in its ability 
to shatter the barrier between the true, spiritual reality 
and the artificial constructs of Western civilization. 
Artaud believes that the human body holds mysterious 
"natural" powers--repressed and forgotton by the conscious 
mind--that must be re-awakened, both in the actor and the 
audience, before either individual or collective psyches 
may be reached in the manner necessary to achieve the 
illumination of the spiritual reality. Artaud therefore 
intends for the actors of his theatre, through primarily 
physical means, to summon the supersensuous images and 
emotions capable of affecting the entire being--the
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physical bodies as well as the psyches--of the spectators, 
thus bringing the audience closer to themselves, each 
other, and even the secrets of life itself. As Artaud 
states in his first manifesto on the Theatre of Cruelty: 
"In our present state of degeneration it is through the 
skin that metaphysics must be made to re-enter our minds" 
(99) .
Since the images and emotions that the actors 
physically/psychically communicate to the audience during 
a Theatre of Cruelty performance derive from the modern 
myths that Artaud stipulates as the source material for 
his theatre, these myths must be universal to the extent 
that the theatre become "the equal of life . . . the sort
of liberated life which sweeps away human individuality 
and in which man is only a reflection" (116). The 
universal constant that Artaud's theatre strives to attain 
lies in this essence of life that "sweeps away human 
individuality," that connects not only every living thing, 
but every thing as well. This universal constant lies in 
the perfect, original state of unconscious unity with the 
universal life force, which Artaud seems sometimes to 
associate with Eastern notions of spiritual unity (a 
subject that will be explored in more detail later); 
Artaud, at least, does clearly state that Western 
civilization has alienated the individual from such unity. 
Artaud's theatre must therefore be considered "cruel" 
because the performance forces the spectator to recognize
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his/her own separation from this perfect, blissful unity. 
At the same time, however, Artaud considers his Theatre of 
Cruelty to be a saving grace, because once an individual 
understands the interactive connection between the 
material and spiritual worlds, he/she will be at peace 
with the destructive forces in his/her own psyche; once 
enough individuals find this inner peace through the 
experience of Artaud's theatre, war and violence will seem 
pointless (if all is one, then why fight with oneself?) 
and eventually cease to exist. As in Coleridge's theory 
of the imagination, therefore, artists are given a 
privileged position in Artaud's theoretical universe, 
because only they may save humanity from its current 
miserable existence and almost certain destruction.
Artaud's notion of a universal unity to which every 
person and every thing is connected parallels the 
description of the relationship of part to whole, and thus 
the very description of the universe, according to chaos 
theory. For example, scientist David Bohm theorizes that 
the universe is fundamentally indivisible, and that the 
parts are just abstractions of the whole, rather than 
autonomous units subject to reductionist analysis. John 
Briggs and F. David Peat even state that "Bohm's ideas 
give a scientific shape to the ancient belief that 'the 
universe is one'" (29). Artaud's proposed theatre also 
resonates with chaos theory's notion of an interactive 
relationship of part to whole on the microcosmic level of
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the theatre house on any given night. Artaud states that 
the Theatre of Cruelty should not only impact the 
individual psyches of the spectators, but the collective 
or community psyche of the audience as a whole as well. 
This holistic view of the theatre experience results in a 
total audience that certainly may not be described as the 
sum of its parts.
The relationship of part to whole in Artaud's 
theoretical theatre also coincides with that of chaos 
theory from the perspective of the stage and staging. 
Artaud relies on many different theatrical elements to 
create his desired affect upon the sensibilities of the 
audience: cries, groans, apparitions, surprises, costumes, 
lighting, music, colors, rhythm, movement, masks, puppets, 
and others. All of these disparate elements must be 
brought together to create the new theatrical language 
necessary for directly assaulting the human unconscious. 
The director’s job entails the creation of unity from the 
disunity of the theatrical raw material; Artaud refers to 
the director as a "unique Creator," "a kind of demiurge," 
comparing his role to that of a magician, priest, and even 
god (94, 114-115). But even though the director unifies 
the various aspects of the production, he/she should not 
tie together the individual parts of the performance in a 
rational manner. In order to produce an irrational effect 
in the mind of the spectator, the play should not provide 
images that may be linearly ordered in any fashion. Cause
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and effect, suspense, and depth of character should not, 
therefore, be evident in Artaud's theatre. As in the 
relationship of part and whole advocated by chaos theory, 
the impact of the individual fragments of the production 
should be treated as significantly as the totality of the 
w o r k .
Chaos theory posits that one of the principal reasons 
for the pervasive unity that results from a nonlinear, 
interactive relationship between part and whole may be 
discovered in natural phenomena containing similar and 
self-similar "patterns"--behavioral as well as geometric. 
Artaud's theories also display affinities for repetitive 
patterns, which on one level appear in the myths he 
advocates as source material for his theatre; the 
universal aspects of these myths exhibit patterns that 
trigger reactions in the audience, many of which are self­
similar (from a point of view of the total theatre event) 
with the individual experience of the spectator. Artaud, 
in fact, asserts that "The true purpose of the theater is 
to create Myths, to express life in its immense, universal 
aspect, and from that life to extract images in which we 
find pleasure in discovering ourselves" (116).
Artaud's rather Jungian employment of the archetypal 
quality of myths for their impact upon the human psyche 
emerges on a more detailed level in Artaud's descriptions 
of the stage language necessary to effect the 
communication of these myths. As Artaud states in his
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essay entitled "The Theater and the Plague": The theatre 
"recovers the notion of symbols and archetypes which act 
like silent blows . . . inflammatory images thrust into
our abruptly wakened heads. The theater restores us all 
our dormant conflicts and all their powers" (27). For 
example, the individual gestures and utterances of the 
actor are intended by Artaud to express symbolic, 
archetypal patterns that touch and wound the core of the 
spectator, as opposed to communicating rational ideas and 
meanings. The rhythmic patterns of the actor's voice and 
body shall serve a communicative function as well in a 
manner that, Artaud suggests, should be inspired by 
hieroglyphic characters, a notion that proves too mystica 
for many of Artaud's critics, but has been explored with 
varying (and debatable) degrees of success by theatre 
artists such as Peter Brook and Jerzy Grotowski.9
In addition to the hieroglyphic communication of the 
actor's voice and body, Artaud asserts that every 
individual aspect of the theatrical production should 
convey a symbolic significance deeper than the obvious 
surface message; as Artaud states with respect to the 
desired "interpretation" of his Theatre of Cruelty: "The
spectacle will be calculated from one end to the other, 
like a code. Thus there will be no lost movements, all 
movements will obey a rhythm" (98). This notion was at 
least partially influenced by Artaud's attendance of a 
Balinese theatre production in 1931 (Esslin 35).
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As an example of how individual production elements 
may convey symbolic significance, Artaud states that 
lighting may be employed for the purposes of reaching the 
unconscious minds of the audience through "luminous 
vibration"; Artaud further stipulates that a manipulation 
of the patterns of vibration would determine the precise 
nature of the emotional impact upon the audience (95).10 
Costumes as well may be given an air of the mystical by 
treating them as hieroglyphic works of art (as in the 
Eastern theatre), thus making stage garments more than 
mere indicators of character or fashion. Musical 
instruments used during a performance should be given a 
double role as symbolic stage props. Masks and props may 
be made to play a significant role in Artaud's new 
theatrical language through their appearance on the stage 
in the forms of strange, unrealistic sizes, shapes, 
colors, etc. Artaud even refers to giant puppets as means 
of symbolically depicting actions or objects; for example, 
Artaud mentions "manikins ten feet high representing the 
beard of King Lear in the storm" (97-98).
As evidenced by the examples given above, Artaud 
refers to two types of patterns when describing the 
practical aspects of his Theatre of Cruelty: rhythmic 
patterns and symbolic or hieroglyphic patterns. The power 
of each of these patterns lies in their ability to bypass 
the rational portions of the mind, thus creating emotional 
responses that speak directly to the instincts of the
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individual. The patterns employed in Artaud's theatre,
therefore, should not be linearly analyzable or reducible
to "lucid language" because "All true feeling is in
reality untranslatable" (71). Peter Brook articulates the
significance of patterns as means for expressing the
ineffable facets of human experience in his discussion of
"Holy Theatre":
We are all aware that most of life escapees our 
senses: a most powerful explanation of the 
various arts is that they talk of patterns which 
we can only begin to recognize when they 
manifest themselves as rhythms or shapes. We 
observe that the behavior of people, of crowds, 
of history, obeys such recurrent patterns. (42)
An individual informed by a perspective based on chaos
theory would agree that patterns hold the potential for
communicating the "untranslatable" which "escapes our
senses." The specific examples Artaud provides for the
individual elements of his proposed stage language appear
foe simplistic, however, to account for the complexity
inherent in the self-similar patterns illuminated by chaos
theory. Certainly Artaud's more general comments
concerning his theoretical stage language are more
valuable to theatre practitioners than the particular
examples he occasionally supplies.
Even though Artaud favors a stage language based in 
the patterns of rhythms and symbols over one that 
emphasizes spoken dialogue and the dramatic text, he does 
suggest that words should not be vanquished from his 
theatre altogether. The spoken word should be utilized,
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but accorded no more weight than any other element of the
production- In a typically mystical fashion, he states
that words should be given a significance similar to their
appearance in dreams; Artaud must mean that words should
be employed on the stage abstractly, with an emphasis on
communicating raw emotion, rather than semantics, for he
refers to a supersensuous power of the word found in
ancient hymns and prayers, but lost to modern Western
culture. Words must be destroyed before such magical,
primitive qualities may be returned to them and recreated
in a form closer to hieroglyphs. The rhythmic properties
of words should be exploited as well, as Artaud states in
his Fourth Letter on Language:
Rhythmic repetitions of syllables and particular 
modulations of the voice, swathing the precise 
sense of words, arouse swarms of images in the 
brain, producing a more or less hallucinatory 
state and impelling the sensibility and mind 
alike to a kind of organic alteration which 
helps to strip from the written poetry the 
gratuitousness that commonly characterizes it. 
(120-121)
Artaud proposes that, in order to gain a mastery of the 
appropriate rhythmic patterns for the voice, the actor 
should study and perfect breathing techniques found in the 
Cabala. According to Artaud, the actor can stimulate 
specific emotional responses in the spectator through the 
employment of the proper "breaths," which coincide with 
precise physical locations in the body of the spectator 
corresponding to the correct emotions; Artaud proposes to 
build an emotional language of the body by integrating the
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six different combinations of breath found in the Cabala
with the 380 Chinese acupuncture locations.11 In his
essay entitled "An Affective Athleticism," therefore,
Artaud refers to the actor as "an athlete of the heart,"
for he/she must be physically trained to the extent that
the body presents no physical resistance to the
manifestation of the emotions and instinctual impulses
that must be conveyed through the breath, the voice, and
gestures (133). This system of acting is rooted in
Artaud's assertion that emotions are materially and
organically related to the body in a manner that
contemporary actors have failed to comprehend directly:
The gifted actor finds by instinct how to tap 
and radiate certain powers; but he would be 
astonished indeed if it were revealed to him 
that these powers, which have their material 
trajectory by and in the organs. actually exist, 
for he has never realized they could actually 
exist. (134)
When Artaud describes the essential patterns that may be 
summoned by the physical body of the actor, he is actual 1 
tapping into patterns of mythology found on a greater, 
more ancient level. As Knapp points out, Artaud's notion 
cf an essential element within the human breath is 
paralleled in both Western and Eastern mythological 
theories of creation. In the Bible, for example, God 
"breathes" life into Adam, and Buddhists believe in an 
"al1-pervading Breath," from which all life emerges and 
into which all life eventually redissolves (Knapp 85).
The breath, therefore, carries essential, spiritual
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connotations in at least two vastly separate ancient 
religions. Artaud was relying on this essential power of 
the breath (emphasized in the Cabala as well) when he 
began speculating on its employment as a technique for 
acting. Artaudian scholar Timothy J. Wiles apparently 
overlooks Artaud's assumption of the spiritual, even 
magical power of the breath with respect to the essential 
life force when he criticizes Artaud's suggestion of 
complicated breathing patterns as an element of his stage 
language, for Wiles dismisses Artaud's idea as merely one 
form of semiotics propped up in the place of another (the 
latter being the traditional spoken word and dramatic 
text) (125). One may, of course, criticize Artaud's 
system for its lack of practicality and even for its lack 
of proven success, but one must grant Artaud his own fait 
that his system, if applied correctly, would unify the 
sign by incorporating the pure spiritual essence of what 
is to be conveyed within the carrying device, thus 
creating a pure, perfectly efficient language that defies 
semiotics.
To summarize, or at least attempt to put together 
seme of the most coherent pieces of the puzzle, Artaud 
believes that human emotions, instincts, intuition, 
dreams, unconsciousness, etc., provide conduits to the 
sapersensuous essence of life. He proposes that these 
ineffable aspects of the human mind/being may be accessed 
materially/physically through the appropriate "patterns"
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of the stimulation of the senses through light, sound, 
movement, and the essential breathing and knowledge of the 
physical location of emotions in the body. These patterns 
make up a language of the stage that bypasses the logical 
mind and speaks directly to the above-mentioned ineffable 
aspects cf the individual; the essential truth of the 
patterns shocks the individual into a chaotic moment that 
allows him/her to perceive the hidden spiritual unity of 
the universe. In one statement, Artaud employs the words 
"Creation, Becoming, and Chaos" to describe the spiritual 
truths which may operate upon or at least be made manifest 
to an audience through Theatre of Cruelty. According to 
Artaud, Creation, Becoming, and Chaos "are able to create 
a kind of passionate equation between Man, Society,
Nature, and Objects" (90).
For Artaud, the link between the terms "creation," 
"becoming," and "chaos" most likely derives from the 
ancient association of creativity with a chaotic entity or 
phenomenon often referred to as a void or vortex. Under 
chaos theory, however, creation and becoming may be 
described as processes that occur when new patterns of 
order arise cut of chaos through "se1f-organisation" or 
"emergence." Artaud's actor draws upon the
creativc/chaotic essence of nature in order to contact the 
primal emotions and impulses that must be spontaneous 1y 
produced during a performance; the director/demiurge tells 
the actor which patterns of rhythms and symbols to employ
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during the rehearsal process. Ultimately, the patterns 
communicated by the actor must relate directly to 
invisible feelings deriving from the essential life force. 
From the spectator's point of view, the ordered rhythms 
and symbols communicated by the performance react with the 
physical bodies of the audience to produce the same 
appropriate emotions and impulses; these feelings produce 
a shock in the spectator that helps him/her reconnect with 
the spiritual realm, thus healing the psychic ills of the 
audience, and ultimately, society. From both the creative 
and experiential perspectives of Artaud's theatre, 
therefore, chaos may be discovered underlying order, and 
order may be observed "emerging" out of chaos.
Artaud describes the self-organization of his ideal 
theatre event as one which involves both the transcendence 
of normal experience and the emergence of a unified--even 
to the extent cf hoiism--performance product. The 
precisely ordered stage language he proposes operates 
according to a chaotic, underlying human "nervous 
magnetism" that permits "the transgression of the ordinary 
limits cf art and speech, in order to realize actively, 
that is to say magically, in real t e rms, a kind of total 
creation in which man must reassume his place between 
dreams and events" (93). Auslander presents Artaud's 
"nervous magnetism" as a sort of cathartic "frenzy" that 
begins in the actor and spreads to the audience "like an 
epidemic." The actor, according to Auslander, is the key
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tc uniting the spectator with the intangible (23). The 
overall pattern of a characteristic performance of 
Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty might be outlined therefore as 
one of order--chaos--order: the order of the carefully 
planned and executed performance summons the underlying 
essential chaos, which is transferred directly to the 
audience, resulting finally in the self-organization of a 
new level of order in the mind/being of the spectator.
The final step in this process is often compared with 
Aristotle's concept of catharsis, or at least, a 
generalized notion of catharsis deriving from Aristotle. 
Recalling the discussion of Aristotle's catharsis clause 
in the second chapter of this study, the conclusion that 
catharsis functions--according to Golden's interpretation- 
-as a process of intellectual clarification does not serve 
.Artaud's purposes at all. Artaud, in fact, often seems to 
go out of his way to exclude intellectual thought 
processes from the experience of his theatre. However, 
Aristotle's emphasis upon the revelation of universal 
human experience through the theatre clearly parallels 
Artaud's theories. Furthermore, the idea of 
"clarification" alone (without intellectual references) 
arises repeatedly in Artaud's descriptions of the power of 
his ideal theatre. For example, in Artaud's essay 
comparing the theatre to the plague, he states that the 
theatre:
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is beneficial, for, impelling men to see 
themselves as they are, it causes the mask to 
fall, reveals the lie, the slackness, baseness, 
and hypocrisy of our world; it shakes off the 
asphyxiating inertia of matter which invades 
even the clearest testimony of the senses; and 
in revealing to collectivities of men their dark 
power, their hidden force, it invites them to 
take, in the face of destiny, a superior and 
heroic attitude they would never have assumed 
without it. (31-32)
Certainly from this perspective, one might presume to
define Artaud's notion of catharsis as one of spiritual or
psychic clarification.
With respect to the self-organizing aspects of his 
variety of catharsis, Artaud states that through the 
psychic shock the audience receives as a result of 
experiencing the theatre event, they will gain an 
awareness cf certain dominant powers and overarching ideas 
(which may also be considered powers, because "ideas, when 
they are effective, carry their energy with them").12 The 
psychic clarification of these newly discovered--or 
rediscovered--powers and ideas render the audience 
"capable of recovering within [them]selves those energies 
which ultimately create order and increase the value of 
life." The "order" Artaud refers to here lies in the 
human ability to rise above "disorder, famine, blood, war, 
and epidemics" (80).
In addition to the notion of a recovered order that 
emerges from the application of newly discovered ineffable 
powers springing from the chaotic opening of the 
spectator's unconscious psyche, Artaud also emphasizes the
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value of "ideas" in the above statement, thus admitting at 
least some sort of cognitive aspect to his theoretical 
process of catharsis. This seems to contradict what so 
many scholars have interpreted as a homeopathic foundation 
to Artaud's catharsis. True, Artaud refers to a 
conquering of the violent and evil impulses in the 
spectator through the experience of the stage events, but 
not through purgation; rather, "the theater teaches 
precisely the uselessness of the action which, once done, 
is not to be done" (82).13 The element of teaching alone 
negates indications of a homeopathic purgation. The 
spectator does not "spend" dangerous impulses by living 
them on some meta-level in the theatre; instead, the 
audience learns more about these impulses and how such 
impulses separate the audience from the spiritual realm 
and from themselves through experiencing a life on the 
stage that is even more real than their own. The theatre, 
therefore, is not a safe place to spend dangerous 
energies, but a dangerous place where such energies are 
illuminated for what they truly are. The danger of this 
theatre lies in a performance that does not just present 
these energies but actively engages the entire being of 
the audience with images that "crush and hypnotize the 
sensibility of the spectator seized by the theater as by a 
whirlwind of higher forces" (Artaud 83). Ultimately, 
Artaud wants this aggressive aspect of his theatre "not to 
define thoughts but to cause thinking" and "entice the
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mind to take profound and efficacious attitudes toward it 
from its own point of view" (69). Because he wants the 
audience to 1 earn and theatre to cause thinking, Artaud 
betrays his own arguments against intel1ectualism in order 
to serve his plans for theatre to cognitively effect the 
audience, thus revolutionizing the social order and 
ultimately saving the human race from itself.
The mention of this cognitive aspect of Artaud's
ideal theatrical experience, ignored by most scholars, is
not to deny the emotional and unconscious experiences that
Artaud favors above all. In fact, the very exercises in
cognition that Artaud advocates as a result of the
experience of his theatre involve the realization and
understanding of the repressed emotions and elements of
the unconscious psyche. Martin Esslin skillfully
describes the purpose of Artaud's theatre in terms of
audience experience from the emotional perspective as well
as the ultimate cognitive and even, as Esslin asserts,
social perspectives:
[Artaud's] theatre [is] defined as an assembly 
of human beings striving to establish contact 
with the profound mainsprings of their own 
being, the dark forces of physical emotion which 
lie beyond the trivialities of their everyday 
existence. The theatre enables them to 
experience the full reality of these emotions 
without involving them in irreversible real life 
situations in which alone experiences of such 
shattering power could otherwise be lived 
through. And by making the full force of a full 
emotional life, the whole gamut of human 
suffering and joy again active in multitudes of 
human beings, the theatre could change their 
basic attitude to life and institutions, their
17 6
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ways of thinking, their entire consciousness and 
thus transform society and the world. (83)
Esslin's depiction of Artaud's model cathartic experience
resonates with chaos theory not only in respect to his
dual emphasis on the more orderly cognitive aspects of the
spectator's mind as well as the more chaotic emotional
facets, but also through his portrayal of the
reorganization (self-organization?) of the "entire
consciousness" of the audience as a result of the chaos of
the psychic shock associated with witnessing the theatre
event. Eut of course, the changes in individual thoughts
and attitudes are small potatoes compared to the ultimate
transformation of the whole of society and even the world.
As Artaud himself proclaims, "I am not one of those who
believe that civilization has to change in order for the
theater to change; but I do believe that the theater . . .
has the power to influence the aspect and formation of
things" (79). The notion that theatre may change the
world especially suggests the influence of chaos theory's
process of self-organization, as the resulting new social
order would emerge from the interaction of the individual
consciousnesses altered by the theatrical experience.
Returning to the level of the individual 
consciousness and the cognitive as well as psychic effect 
upon the spectator, one may observe Koestler's theories of 
problem-solving and creativity within the self- 
organization of recognition and understanding as a result 
of the theatre's affective attacks upon the individual.
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For example, the effect of the psychic shock upon an 
audience member, as advocated by Artaud, would certainly 
qualify as a shift in frames of reference, as described by 
Koestler. Koestler asserts that the solution to a problem 
or source of creative inspiration may lie outside the 
particular plane of reference within which an individual 
is trapped,14 thus requiring removal from the problem or 
project in order to shift to another reference plane, 
hopefully one in which a solution may be found. Artaud's 
psychic shock would provide such a removal, but in this 
case, the shift in reference planes would entail a shift 
from the conscious mind to the unconscious psychic 
mind/spirit (Artaud uses the word esprit, meaning both 
mind and spirit and having, of course, no English 
equivalent). The solution to be discovered by the 
spectator would involve the recovery of lost spirituality 
and feelings of cosmic unity, which for Artaud provides a 
basis for the solution of virtually all of the problems of 
Western civilization as well.
Although when Koestler employs the notion of shifting 
frames of reference in problem-solving, he is mainly 
referring to the advantages of the potentially fresh 
perspective that may be brought about by changes in 
situation or environment, he also mentions the ability of 
the artist to cast ordinary objects or events in a strange 
new light through a similar process. Of course, this 
latter aspect of Koestler's theories equally applies to
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the hypothetical effects of Artaud's theatre. One of the 
manners through which Artaud advocates casting the 
experience cf the spectator in a strange new light may be 
observed in his frequent allusions to the power of dreams 
to impact reality, as when he states: "In the same way 
that our dreams have an effect upon us and reality has an 
effect upon our dreams, so we believe that the images of 
thought can be identified with a dream" (85-86).
This interactive description of the realms of dreams 
and reality conjures an impression of feedback loops 
reiterating images and ideas until they take on a 
significance that otherwise could not be found in 
conscious thought. The concept of feedback loops was 
certainly not alien to Artaud, for he proposes that the 
various elements of a Theatre of Cruelty production should 
act and react with one another and with the audience until 
an overall unity emerges, but on an emotional level, 
rather than one of meaning or message. Knapp produces a 
similar interpretation of Artaud's theory when she states 
that the performative events elicit psychological 
projections from the audience that become amplified 
through onstage tension that in turn causes tension in the 
audience as well. Once this tension reaches a certain 
intensity, the spectator comes to view his/her problems 
from a different perspective and the fragments of the 
spectator's psyche are returned with an added unity and 
verve (81). The key to this model, of course, lies in the
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breaking point of the tension, which not only corresponds 
to Koestler's shift in planes of reference, but also 
involves Artaud's endorsement of the beneficial powers of 
cruelty involved in the shock of recognition and eventual 
closure of the gap between the individual and the 
spiritual s e l f .
Artaud associates cruelty with the theatre because
"everything that acts is a cruelty" (85). He also links
cruelty with creation and consequently, chaos. Artaud
states that he employs
the word cruelty in the sense of an appetite for 
life, a cosmic rigor and implacable necessity, 
in the gnostic sense of a living whirlwind that 
devours the darkness, in the sense of that pain 
apart from whose ineluctable necessity life 
could not continue . . . .  When the hidden god 
creates, he obeys the cruel necessity of 
creation which has been imposed on himself by 
himself, and he cannot not create, hence not 
admit into the center of the self-willed 
whirlwind a kernel of evil ever more condensed, 
and ever more consumed. And theater in the 
sense of continuous creation, a wholly magical 
action, obeys this necessity. (102-103)
Having established that cruelty, for Artaud, pertains to
action, creation, and chaos, one must note that these
phenomena are related also through a kind of determinism
evident in Artaud's employment of the word "necessity"
repeatedly in the above quote. In fact, at the risk of
overstating the case, Artaud elsewhere refers to cruelty
as "a kind of rigid control and submission to necessity"
(102).
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Artaud's determinism informs the very definition of 
his Theatre of Cruelty, particularly when he feels, as he 
often does, that he must defend his choice of the word 
"cruelty" by understating its more violent and bloody 
connotations.15 Artaud emphasizes that the "cruelty" of 
the title of his proposed theatre does not refer to 
physical violence, such as "hacking at each other's 
bodies," but to something much more "terrible and 
necessary": "We are not free. And the sky can still fall 
on our heads. And the theater has been created to teach 
us that first of all" (79). Naomi Greene points out that 
Artaud's desire to liberate the audience from their bodies 
so that they may learn to harmonize with the spiritual 
realm stems from this same determinism (136-138).16 
Apparently, one of the central problems Artaud observes in 
Western culture lies in its over-emphasis on self- 
determination; a key realization that the spectator of a 
Theatre of Cruelty production may achieve, therefore, 
involves insight into the ability to close the gap between 
the self and the spiritual by submitting to the universal 
forces of destiny. A parallel may be observed in the 
creation and performance of Artaud's theatre, as the 
strict control of the director/god releases the actor--and 
through association, the audience--from the responsibility 
of free wi11.
At this point, one might perceive an inconsistency 
between Artaud’s determinism and his emphasis upon the
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creative powers of chaos. One need only recall, however, 
that for Artaud, the universal forces that govern fate 
also constitute the "living whirlwind" that guides 
creation. This connection also appears in a quote 
employed earlier in this chapter with respect to the 
ineffable essence of poetry, in which Artaud equates the 
"life force" with a "determinism of change" (78). Change, 
of course, implies action and creation; Artaud might as 
well have employed the phrase "determinism of chaos."
Such a view of determinism should only seem inconsistent, 
however, from a modern Western perspective rooted in 
predestination. As mentioned earlier, ancient and Eastern 
religions have tended to incorporate the notions of chaos 
and unpredictability into their explanations of the 
spiritual. Artaud, of course, favored ancient and Eastern 
cultures, religions, and metaphysics highly over those of 
contemporary Western civilization. The idea of a chaotic 
sort of determinism also does not appear inconsistent from 
a perspective informed by chaos theory, which suggests a 
model for predictability based on an "indeterminate 
determinism." Essentially, the same phenomena that 
produce the butterfly effect dictate that even relatively 
simple, solvable sets of differential equations, through 
reiteration, defy predictability in practical 
app 1 ications.
Science writers such as Briggs and Peat and Fritjof 
Capra illuminate the parallels between the world view
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advocated by the new sciences such as chaos theory, 
quantum mechanics, and relativity and the spiritual 
perspectives encouraged by the Eastern and ancient 
religions from which Artaud draws his conception of an 
indeterminate determinism. In the final analysis, the 
significance of A r t a u d ’s theories from a point of view 
acquainted with chaos theory owes much to the influence of 
ancient and Eastern mysticism upon Artaud's thought. 
Artaud's perspective of part and whole, for example, not 
only parallels that of chaos theory but also reflects the 
emphasis upon a universal oneness displayed in Eastern 
religions, such as Taoism and Buddhism. Similarly, the 
chaotic moment of psychic upheaval, recognition, and 
renewal that Artaud proposes as the result of the 
experience of his theatre mirrors the more chaotic forces 
of creation found in both Eastern and ancient 
religions/mythologies--referred to above as the "living 
whirlwind"--in addition to resonating with chaos theory's 
notions of order out of chaos and self-organization or 
emergence. But finally and most significantly, Artaud's 
assertion that the spiritual facets of the material world 
may be summoned through the employment of archetypal 
patterns, and that such patterns may touch the deepest and 
most essential aspects of the individual spectator, not 
only displays affinities with the importance of patterns 
in ancient and Eastern religions,17 but also with chaos
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theory's attention to the patterns of growth and behavior 
that make up the operation of the universe.
Even though Artaud may have placed a greater priority 
upon the strict control of the director in the creation of 
the theatre event for an aficionado of chaos theory to 
accept completely, the patterns of rhythm and symbol that 
make up Artaud's stage language, the method through which 
this language is communicated, and the manner in which it 
effects/affects the spectator and possibly even changes 
the world all resonate with the philosophical implications 
of chaos theory. For the purposes of this study, however, 
Artaud's notion of a chaotic moment appears even more 
significant. Although perhaps too mystical to be 
practical, Artaud's theory of awakening higher levels of 
both emotional and cognitive understanding in the 
spectator through psychic shock at least acknowledges the 
creative power of chaos that Artaud perceived in ancient 
and Eastern religions and that chaos theory recognizes as 
scientific fact today.
End Notes
1 Peter Erook states that "Artaud applied is Artaud 
betrayed" because one may only exercise a portion of his 
theories at a time, and because it is much easier to train 
a troupe of actqrs in Artaud's beliefs than the entire 
audience that might attend a performance on any given 
night (54). Artaud would respond by asserting that his 
theoretical theatre is so essentially universal that, if 
employed in its totality, the audience could not help but 
be affected. On the contrary, Artaud also seemed to 
acknowledge this problem when, given the opportunity to 
describe his ideal audience, he stated: "First of all this 
theater must exist" (76).
184
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7A.rtaud would probably prefer not to define the 
unconscious at all--except in terms of his view of a 
collective unconscious--for he denied the validity of 
psychology and psychiatry (Barber 8-9). His view of the 
unconscious must, however, owe something to Freud because 
of his association with the surrealists. As Esslin 
states:
A great deal of Surrealist ideology was based on 
Freudian concepts and Artaud was clearly 
influenced by Freud, in particular the 
Interpretation of Dreams. It was Freud who had 
indicated how language in dream is transposed 
into images which can then be read like picture- 
writing, hieroglyphs. (80-81)
3Eric Sellin describes Artaud's "double" as a 
combination of Jarry's "mirror-play" and Plato's shadows- 
in-the-cavern analogy (94).
4Artaud states that Western culture's failure to 
produce new myths results from advances in science, which 
have robbed nature of its mysteries, and the inability of 
Western religion to adapt to cultural change.
5 Artaud was apparently unaware of the work of 
Saussure (Kayman 80), which was certainly fortunate for 
Artaud, as the two advocated precisely opposite 
relationships between signified and signifier. Saussure 
emphasized the subjectivity of the sign, while Artaud 
called for a return to a primitive form of language where 
the sign was not only objective, but was the thing it 
represented--at both poles of the signified-signifier 
relationship. Artaud distrusted abstract thought, and 
therefore wanted to remove the "meta" quality from 
language; in Artaud's ideal language, the word "chair" 
would not be recognized as a "word," but as an actual 
chair.
6 Artaud includes a short essay on the Marx Brothers 
near the end of The Theater and Its Double to illustrate 
his ideas concerning the anarchic qualities of comedy.
7 See Day 148.
8 Artaud blames "Shakespeare and his imitators" for 
establishing the dichotomy between art and life. By 
playing an essential, even seminal, role in the 
development of psychological drama, which deals with the 
personal problems (such as love or money) of the 
characters rather than universal ideas and images, Artaud 
believes that Shakespeare sapped the stage of its 
essential power to shake the spectator to the very core of 
his/her own being (76-77).
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9 See Esslin 91-93
1°Rrtaud calls for new technologies in lighting to 
produce this effect, as well as new lighting instruments 
capable of "spreading the light in waves, in sheets, in 
fusillades of fiery arrows" (95).
11Martin Esslin states that Jean-Louis Barrault could 
demonstrate this technique and lauds the results as 
"spectacular" (87).
1 2 In another translation: "ideas, when they are 
effective, generate their own energy" (Works 60-61). This 
implies that the "power" of the idea may also emerge in a 
manner akin to self-organization.
13Alternate translation: "theatre teaches us just how 
useless action is since once it is done it is over" (Works 
63). In either translation, the emphasis is on learning 
the uselessness of the action.
14 As Briggs and Peat point out, the trapped thought 
patterns may be described as behaving like limit cycles 
around a point attractor.
15Admittedly, one may question the appropriateness of 
the employment of the word "understating" in this 
instance, for Artaud repeatedly stresses the more 
universal, nonviolent sense with which he employs the word 
"cruelty." On the other hand, however, one must also 
admit Artaud's frequent references to acts of bloody 
violence as a means of shocking the psychic senses of the 
spectator as evidence that his deemphasis of the more 
violent connotations of the word "cruelty" is actually a 
campaign to divert the criticism of those who find stage 
violence repulsive. Support of this latter view of 
.Artaud's employment of the word "cruelty" may be found in 
his appreciation of bloody plays, such as Ford's 'Tis Pity 
She's a Whore and Buchner's Woyzeck.
1 A c c o r d i n g  to Greene, Artaud's mistrust of and 
feelings of helplessness in the face of his own free will 
(despite a professed desire for self-determination) 
contributed to a personal need to relinquish control of 
his fate to universal forces (136-137).
17Briggs and Peat find self-similar patterns in:
the convoluted and interwoven figures of Bronze 
Age Celtic art, the complex designs of a Shang 
ritual vessel, visual motifs from the West Coast 
American Indians, myths of mazes and labyrinths, 
the iterative language games of children or the 
chant patterns of so-called "primitive" peoples.
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Briggs and Peat then make a comment that would certainly 
draw Artaud's sympathies: "The regular harmonies of 
classical Western art become almost an aberration set 
beside these forms" (110).
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Chapter Six: Conclusions and Implications
The respective theoretical writings of the four 
figures discussed thus far in this study each displays 
attempts to describe some sort of an ineffable, chaotic 
moment involving theatrical experience and/or creativity. 
This point alone brings no new insight to the works of 
these theorists. When examined through a framework of 
chaos theory, however, such emphasis on these moments 
reveals the significant--even central--roles they play in 
the theorists' accounts of the creation and experience of 
the theatre event. In this light, the traditional 
distinctions between the theories of these four 
individuals collapse, revealing underlying commonalities 
in their analyses of both the processes and effects of 
theatrical art.
Of course, the most prominent commonality lies in the 
appeal to the intangible, the indication of the ineffable 
exhibited in the works of each of the theorists. This 
study has described the intangible and ineffable in each 
of the works examined in terms of a "chaotic moment," an 
instance of creative chaos from which a new level of order 
emerges. In Aristotle's P o e t i c s , this chaotic moment 
manifests itself in his term "catharsis," which clarifies 
the pitiful and fearful incidents of the action of the 
drama, both in the text itself as well as in the 
consciousness of the reader/spectator. The impact of 
Aristotle's catharsis upon the text and the audience
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contributes to a cognitive "eureka" effect concerning the 
mimesis. without diminishing the emotional effectiveness 
of the pathos.
John Dryden appeals to an ineffable chaotic moment in 
his "Essay of Dramatic Poesy" through the inclusion of the 
descriptive term "lively" in his definition of a play.
For Dryden, this term describes a wide range of pleasure- 
giving advantages that may be found in modern (relative to 
Dryden) English plays, but which Ancient and French plays 
generally lack. This range includes simple, concrete 
notions such as "variety," as well as more subjective, 
intangible concepts such as "passion." The unifying 
element of the term "lively" works in opposition to the 
(somewhat) equally significant term "just," which Dryden 
uses to describe the aesthetics of French neoclassicism. 
Dryden, therefore, finds his chaotic moment in the complex 
and often numerous consequences of breaking the "rules."
The other two theorists discussed in this study, 
Coleridge and Artaud, do not "appeal" to the ineffable in 
their theoretical writings; rather, they include it as an 
obviously central aspect of their theories. Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, for example, includes the direct participation 
of the spiritual realm in his creative/aesthetic theory. 
For Coleridge, "truth" lies in the supersensuous essence 
of the material world. For an artist to represent 
anything truthfully, therefore, he/she must possess a 
heightened ability to perceive this essence; Coleridge
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employs the term "imagination" in reference to this 
ability. Coleridge believes that the unconscious mind 
offers the least resistance to the imagination's reception 
of spiritual reality. Coleridge's chaotic moment thus 
lies in the spontaneous operations of the human 
imagination during states of relative mental passivity, 
the latter of which Coleridge describes as ranging from 
the effects of passion to literal dream states.
Antonin Artaud also highlights the spiritual realm as 
a central element of his appeal to an intangible, chaotic 
moment in his work, The Theater and Its Double. For 
Artaud, the unconscious likewise plays a crucial role in 
accessing the supersensuous, but through forced activity, 
rather than voluntary passivity. Artaud posits that the 
proper theatre experience should shock the unconscious 
psyche of the spectator into an awareness (more emotional 
than intellectual, but nevertheless cognitive) of the 
individual's separation from ideal spiritual unity with 
the cosmos. Artaud's chaotic moment, therefore, lies in 
the instant of disturbance in the spectator's mind as a 
result of this psychic assault.
Although the common notion of an ineffable, chaotic 
moment central to their theories of theatrical creativity 
and/or experience is described differently by each of the 
four theorists, their explanations share several 
meaningful similarities. For example, according to chaos 
theory, the sorts of chaotic moments detailed in this
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study arise in the continuous, interactive boundary 
regions between order and disorder. The chaotic moments 
discovered in each of the four creative/aesthetic theories 
examined also involve the interaction of order and 
disorder. Through a framework of chaos theory,
Aristotle’s catharsis may be seen to emerge within the 
tragedy as a result of the interaction of the more 
chaotic, emotional pathos and the more orderly, 
intellectual arrangement/progression of the mimesis. 
Similarly, Dryden states that the best drama emphasizes a 
balance and interaction between his binary terms "just" 
and "lively." Coleridge demands the reconciliation of a 
number of so-called "opposites" in the creation and 
reception of dramatic art, each parallelling chaos 
theory's relationship of order and disorder: form/passion, 
matter/spirit, real/ideal, conscious/unconscious, 
thought/feeling, mental activity/passivity, and--most 
notably in his criticism of Shakespeare--judgement/genius. 
Artaud also sets up interactive systems of the material 
and the spiritual, the real and the ideal, dictating that, 
much as in a religious ceremony, only the most 
meticulously ordered performances may directly relate to 
the deepest innate human feelings and instincts, 
ultimately calling forth the chaotic experience of 
spiritual fruition.
In this respect, Artaud's theory differs from those 
of Aristotle, Dryden, and Coleridge in that he devalues
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the dramatic text, instead placing all of the power of 
theatrical art in the performance event. Where Aristotle, 
Dryden, and Coleridge each emphasize the playwright's 
attention to the interaction of pathos and m i mesis, 
justness and liveliness, and form and passion, 
respectively, Artaud stresses only the role of the 
director as the total creative artist. The significance 
of this difference lies in Artaud's greater appreciation 
of the evanescent qualities of live performance--the very 
qualities Coleridge despises--in which Artaud finds a 
superior source of the intangible elements that inform his 
theorization of a chaotic moment.
Whether deriving from the interaction of orderly and 
disorderly elements in the text, the performance, or both, 
the chaotic moments described in each of the above 
theories give rise to similar creative/aesthetic phenomena 
that resonate with the manner in which chaos theory models 
the performance of complex systems. According to chaos 
theory, chaos may be discovered underlying simple, 
apparently ordered systems, and order may be found lurking 
beneath systems that appear chaotic on the surface. 
Furthermore, new levels of order often emerge 
spontaneously from the chaotic moments that lie on the 
cusps of interaction between order and disorder in such 
systems. This self-organization may be viewed as a result 
of Aristotle's catharsis in the clarification of the 
incidents of action, which constitutes a new level of
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order in the understanding of the reader/spectator, as 
well as in the clarity of the ordering of the action 
within the text itself. Similarly, Dryden's interaction 
of the just and lively aspects of a text or performance 
produce a heightening of the theatrical art which may be 
viewed as new level of order concerning what Dryden 
perceives as the artistic merit of the work. For 
Coleridge, self-organization occurs as a result of the 
spontaneity that lies between the active and passive 
portions of the human mind; such spontaneity produces a 
new level of order of organic unity in the work of art, 
which Coleridge recognizes as the epitome of his 
definition of beauty. Artaud's theories offer a plethora 
of instances of self-organization. One example of a new 
level of order may be observed in the unity produced by 
the director in the composition of the overall performance 
event from the various and disparate production elements.
A new level of spiritual/emotional order emerges in the 
mind/being of the spectator as well as a result of the 
psychic shock initiated by the intensity of the 
performance. Artaud even predicts that a new level of 
social order will arise in civilization as a whole as a 
result of the psychic healing of theatre audiences.
Each of these theoretical examples of self­
organization also bear affinities with Arthur Koestler's 
theories of cognition and creativity, as interpreted 
through a framework of chaos theory by Briggs and Peat.
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Koestler states that the mind often becomes trapped within 
an incorrect frame or plane of reference when attempting 
to find the solution to a problem, only to discover the 
solution through an "eureka" effect after some change in 
context leads the mind to wander accidentally into the 
correct reference plane. Briggs and Peat compare the 
depiction of a trapping plane of reference to a point 
attractor; escaping from the limiting patterns of thought 
of the point attractor requires a chaotic moment that 
leads to the self-organization of new levels of thought on 
a different reference plane. Under this theory, the most 
talented artists are those who command the greatest 
ability to freely and rapidly shift among such reference 
pianes.
Aristotle presents such a view of the playwright when 
he emphasizes the balanced employment of intellectual and 
affective mental activities in the creation of the 
dramatic text. This balance results from the addition of 
the more nonlinear, emotional responses of the mind to 
those responsible for constructing the linear, formal 
elements of the text, thus enhancing the playwright's 
abilities to shift planes of reference. The pathos must 
certainly play a similar role in the mind of the tragic 
spectator as a trigger for the cathartic clarification of 
the incidents of action. For Dryden, Koestler's theories 
explain the "natural" liveliness of Shakespeare's plays, 
as Dryden would certainly agree that Shakespeare was more
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attuned to the ineffable, chaotic moments of playwriting. 
In addition, the perception of the artistic heightening in 
the mind of the spectator must also involve shifts in 
reference planes. Coleridge's creative genius also 
employs the heightened ability to shift planes of 
reference; Coleridge equates this ability to a proficiency 
for accessing the true reality of the realm of the 
supersensuous through the employment of the imagination, 
which the audience may glimpse as well through the 
communication of the insight of the artist via the work of 
art. In Artaud's theories, the unsettling of the 
spectator's mind/being through psychic assault would be 
more than sufficient to produce the shift in reference 
frames described by Koestler; the spiritual realizations 
called for by Artaud would lie in wait for the audience on 
one of these new planes of reference.
Another point of comparison may now be constructed 
between the theories of these four critical figures. 
Aristotle, Dryden, and Coleridge each advocate an 
intellectual brand of pleasure as an integral part of the 
audience's experience of the chaotic moments associated 
with clarification, heightening, and spiritual insight, 
respectively. This intellectual pleasure manifests itself 
through the cognitive aspects of Aristotle's catharsis, 
which Aristotle associates with what he calls the inherent 
human pleasure of learning. For Dryden, the "delight" and 
"instruction" of his definition of a play interact through
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a correspondence with the interaction of the "lively" and 
the "just," thus implying the existence of a cognitive 
aspect to his notion of audience pleasure. On the most 
basic level, this cognitive pleasure is represented by 
Dryden's fundamental acceptance of the neoclassical rules, 
but one might interpret Dryden's vague reference to "human 
nature" as suggesting a more profound degree of 
realization and understanding in the spectator than a 
neoclassical1y realistic depiction of the action would 
imply alone. Coleridge's ultimate goal for the experience 
of the audience involves an intellectual pleasure that 
results from an interactive balance between the employment 
of active (conscious) and passive (unconscious) mental 
faculties; this balance may be accomplished through the 
stimulation of the imagination of the spectator. Artaud, 
of course, finds no use for intellectual pleasure in his 
aesthetic theory but does refer to a kind of cognitive 
realisation, albeit painful, that results from the 
psychic/emotional assault that the theatre event performs 
upon the spectator's being, ultimately changing the way 
the audience thinks about themselves and their 
relationships to society and the world; ironically, the 
intellect is the final affective realm in Artaud's theory.
Each of the four theorists, therefore, discerns a 
similar sort of cognitive self-organization in the minds 
of the audience as a result of the experience of 
theatrical art. These cognitive experiences interact with
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emotional/instinctual experiences, even if the feelings 
associated with the latter may not always be described as 
pleasurable. Of course, the interaction of the 
intellectual and emotional facets of the human 
mind/experience parallels the interactive, continuous 
relationship of order and disorder advocated by chaos 
theory. The philosophical notion of an indeterminate 
determinism serves as a significant fundamental assumption 
with respect to this relationship, for even simple and so- 
called "deterministic" mathematical systems may exhibit 
unpredictability because of the butterfly effect.
A balance of the unpredictable and the determinate is 
also evident in each of the four major theories discussed 
in this study, to varying degrees. For example, Aristotle 
states in his discussion of tragic plot that chance 
occurences provide the greatest pleasure when they appear 
to have been brought about by design; he also asserts that 
improbable events should occur often enough so as to make 
them seem probable. Dryden likewise alludes to an 
indeterminate determinism when he emphasizes that 
"accidents" which occur in the plot should be drawn 
deliberately by the hand of the playwright. Coleridge 
incorporates unpredictability into his system of 
aesthetics through his appreciation of the indeterminate 
quality of natural phenomena such as the weather, while 
simultaneously acknowledging the underlying order of his 
vision of the spiritual essence of nature. For Artaud,
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the order of spiritual unity involves an inherent 
unpredictability, evident in his references to the chaotic 
vortex of creation found in ancient and Eastern 
mythologies.
The notion of an indeterminate determinism also 
informs chaos theory's profoundly holistic view of the 
relationship of part to whole, in which each part is 
determined by its relationship to the whole, yet maintains 
its individuality through particular differences. This 
idea also relates to chaos theory's emphasis upon 
qualitative knowledge through similar "patterns," rather 
than the precise, predictable quantitative knowledge of 
traditional reductionist science. An aesthetic of similar 
patterns and a holistic relationship of part to whole are 
each exhibited in the theories examined by this study, 
with the most prominent examples evident in Dryden's 
"labyrinth of design," Coleridge's "multeity in unity," 
and Artaud's suggestions concerning the theatrical 
employment of myths, symbols, archetypes, hieroglyphs, and 
rhythms of light, sound, movement, and even breathing.
The emphasis upon similar patterns and a holistic 
relationship between part and whole displayed in the 
writings of each of the four theorists discussed in this 
study might certainly be described by some as exhibiting 
merely analogous, and at the worst, accidental 
resemblances to these same concepts as described by the 
principles of chaos theory. Surely, the same may be said
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as well of the other parallels with chaos theory presented 
here: an indeterminate determinism, an interactive balance 
of order and disorder, a continuous view of cognitive and 
emotional mental faculties/responses, the butterfly 
effect, self organization, and the notion of a chaotic 
moment, among others. According to chaos theory, however, 
most of nature, including human nature, behaves (and 
always has behaved) according to these fundamental tenets. 
From this perspective, one should not be surprised to 
discover hints of chaos theory in the creative and 
aesthetic theories examined here; such hints might arise 
from the theorists’ instinctual attempts to explain 
phenomena which they do not fully understand themselves.
If one counters that those aspects of the theoretical 
systems that have been compared with chaos theory may also 
be explained by the cultural constructedness of the 
overall belief structures of the theorists or of the 
theorists' respective times, then all the better; if the 
theorists' instincts match either their own carefully 
reasoned arguments or the accepted beliefs of their day, 
then each theorist should be even more comfortable 
expressing their perception of the indications of chaos 
theory as framed by their own cultural/societal 
inf 1u e nces.
At this point, the skeptic might certainly ask: Why 
has the author only addressed critical theories of the 
past? Wouldn't contemporary theories exhibit the greatest
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affinities for chaos theory? With respect to these 
questions, this study has not pretended to search for the 
creative or aesthetic theory with the largest number of or 
even most significant parallels to chaos theory; rather, 
this study has merely sought to discover if chaos theory 
may be employed to cast a new light on these theories and 
to seek the particular ideas from these theories that 
prove valuable to a theoretical structure based on the 
philosophical implications of chaos theory. With this in 
mind, an abbreviated examination of the dominant 
contemporary critical theory known as "poststructuralism" 
and its related aesthetic theory, "postmodernism," will be 
undertaken to explore the relationship of these 
contemporary theories to chaos theory. The theoretical 
ideas of Richard Foreman, a theatre artist often 
associated with the postmodern movement, will be 
investigated as a somewhat restricted case study.
Poststructuralism, in its most essential guise, may 
be interpreted as a denial of the existence of absolute 
truth, whether it be the absolute truth of metaphysics, 
presence, language, authorship, knowledge, history, or the 
subject. Theorists such as Jacques Derrida, Roland 
Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, and numerous 
others, have "decentered" the first principles of each of 
the above-mentioned notions by pointing out their 
constructedness, thereby "deconstructing" the entire 
foundation of meaning upon which each is based. Derrida's
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"trace" of that which is not itself therefore grows, 
particularly as amplified through the relativity of 
Barthes' "text," to a challenging of all inherent or 
original intent; Derrida's differance likewise expands 
into a gulf of meaningless void, "always already" eating 
away at the heart of every presumption of unity and at 
every attempt to communicate.
Postmodernism, the artistic/stylistic parallel to 
poststructuralism, therefore advocates an aesthetic of 
fracture, an aversion to the concept of the autonomous 
character, and a lack of narrative closure. Disregarding 
and even devaluing the notion of artistic unity, 
postmodern artists may and do borrow indiscriminately from 
various and often contradictory artistic/historical 
periods, forms, and styles. Such a hodgepodge approach, 
governed by no absolute value system, effectively 
dissolves the traditional boundaries between "high" and 
"popular" art/culture. Examples of the postmodernism in 
theatrical art include the staged deconstruction of 
traditional dramatic texts, the depiction of characters 
lacking consistency or identifiable traits, and the 
employment of technical elements such as lighting, sound, 
props, set pieces, slides, film, etc., as autonomous 
production elements with significance equal to the bodies 
and voices of the actors; the resulting production may be 
described ideally as a barrage of infinitely ambiguous 
signs conveying infinite/no meaning. Essentially, the
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postmodern theatre artist attempts to frustrate or subvert 
traditional audience expectations at every possible turn.
In her work, The Death of Character. Elinor Fuchs 
presents a formidable study of postmodernism in theatre, 
laden with poststructuralist theory to an extent and 
success uncommon in works of such wide scope. One of her 
fundamental premises involves the application of the 
poststructuralist decentering/deconstruction of the 
subject to the postmodern theatrical character; Fuchs 
asserts that as poststructuralism strips individuals of 
the sense of an autonomous, unified self, then the 
autonomous, unified stage character also becomes 
meaningless. Fuchs describes the human figure remaining 
on the stage as a protean, multi-masked creature who 
represents only one aspect of the total production she 
describes in one chapter of her book as a "landscape 
stage": "A new kind of pastoral, one appropriate to an 
ecological age when the human figure is no longer the 
measure of all things" (12).
Fuchs names playwright/director/designer Richard 
Foreman as one of several contemporary theatre artists 
whose work reflects her conception of the "landscape 
stage" because of his emphasis upon stage environment 
above and in place of the narrative presentation of 
psychological characterizations. Fuchs describes 
Foreman's characters as "more like characterologica1 
objects in a field crowded with things, all of which are
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infused with a deep, mysterious animation" (102). In this 
respect, Fuchs aligns Foreman with postmodernism for his 
deconstruction of the subject through his resistance to 
writing/staging psychologically deep characters. Foreman 
therefore presents the "traces" of characters, rather than 
attempting or pretending to present the "presence" of real 
individuals through the actors’ interpretation of 
characterizations.
Fuchs, of course, asserts that Foreman deconstructs 
theatrical presence through several other aspects of his 
staging as well. Most obviously, Foreman frustrates 
audience expectations through non-narrative phi 1osophical- 
poetical dialogue, the employment of bizarre, abstract 
preps, set pieces, and stage decorations (such as the 
famous "Foreman strings"), placards and projections, 
blinding flashes of light, and strange sounds and music. 
According to Fuchs, such practices deny presence by 
forcing the audience to examine their own modes of 
perception, as well as the uselessness of their attempts 
to make meaning out of the endless flow of mostly empty 
signifiers. Fuchs especially emphasizes the techniques by 
which Foreman calls attention to the constructedness of 
language and of the dramatic text itself. For example, 
Fuchs mentions the banners, legends, and projections 
containing words or phrases that may or may not be related 
to the rest of the performance, as well as the reflexivity 
of Foreman's dialogue, including one instance of a
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character writing the text of the play on a blackboard 
throughout the performance. Fuchs seems particularly 
impressed, however, by what she refers to as a 
"kabbalistic" influence on Foreman's productions, thus 
adding a definite level of mysticism to her criticism that 
appears out of place in a postmodern analysis.
By "kabbalistic," Fuchs refers to the hints she 
perceives within Foreman's productions of his admitted 
attraction to Cabala.1 The most obvious hints arise in 
the form of Hebrew letters, which Foreman employs 
mysteriously in his sets with no apparent attempts at 
meaning or relation to the other production elements.
Fuchs interprets the appearance of the scenic depictions 
of these letters as a conflicted double-presentation of 
the literal stagings of the communicative failures of 
language and the possibilities of a higher form of 
language--a "pure cosmic notation." According to Fuchs: 
"The Hebrew letters strain to connect the entire theater 
event with the great mystery of signs and codes in the 
universe" (81) .
In her analysis of Foreman's play Lava, Fuchs 
discovers such mysticism in the offstage "Voice," played 
by Foreman himself and comprising almost three-fourths of 
the lines of the play. Foreman refers to the relationship 
cf the Voice to Lava's other characters as "their author, 
their director, their boss--even the voice of God" (310). 
Fuchs also emphasizes the mystical qualities of Foreman's
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employment of an electronic "hum" and of a tape loop of 
random spoken numbers, each played over the production's 
sound system. Foreman considered the "hum" to be related 
to something "primal" that precedes language, while the 
numbers were Foreman's manner of hinting at a "pure" form 
of language, more "Platonic" than practical language. For 
Fuchs, each of these examples suggests traces of the 
mystical, the metaphysical, or the religious in L a v a . but 
Fuchs states explicitly that "there is never an 
expectation of realizing the mystery, or becoming present 
enough . . .  to make God present" (84).
Fuchs' incorporation of mysticism into 
poststructuralist theory during her discussion of 
Foreman's theatre is not inconsistent with the rest of her 
book. In her introduction, Fuchs compares the Euddhist 
notion of a n a t t a , or "no-self," with the poststructuralist 
denial of the continuous, autonomous self. Although such 
a comparison works on many levels, it fails at its very 
core when one considers that Buddhists believe in a 
transcendent reality that lies beneath the impermanence of 
all things. For the poststructuralist, on the other hand, 
reality lies in social/1inguistic constructiveness; 
peeling away the layers of meaning or layers of the self 
under poststructuralism is equivalent to peeling an onion- 
-nothing lies at the center.2 Perhaps Fuchs was misled by 
the Buddhist references to the transcendent reality as a 
"void" or "emptiness." According to Eastern thought,
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however, this "void" corresponds more to the chaotic 
whirlwind of creation discussed with respect to Artaud's 
theories (in Chapter Five) than an absolute nothingness in 
the sense of a vacuum. As stated by Fritjof Capra in his 
discussion of Buddhism: "Reality, or Emptiness, itself is 
not a state of mere nothingness, but is the very source of 
all life and the essence of all forms" (97).
Returning to Fuchs' discussion of Foreman, one 
encounters a similar inconsistency in Fuchs' references to 
Foreman’s mysticism within her overall framework of 
poststructuralist analysis. Fuchs quotes Foreman, stating 
that "in Foreman's cosmogony, God is in the 'cracks in our 
. . . systems of discourse,' but will never pass through
them” (84). But by placing something in the cracks of 
Derrida's differance, whether it may pass through or not, 
both Fuchs and Foreman allow the existence of a kind of 
truth, a thread linking the signifier and the signified, 
or--with respect to the decentered individual--a soup of 
selfness, a center that is everywhere, holding the 
fragments of being together. Thus Fuchs "decenters" 
poststructuralism's notion of infinite/no meaning by 
allowing a "trace" of truth.
Fuchs' interpretation of Foreman's theatre matches 
the latter's own statements concerning poststructuralism 
and his theatrical art. In the passage immediately 
following the above-mentioned quote that Fuchs takes from
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Foreman's introduction to Lava (regarding the "cracks" in
the "discourse"), Foreman states:
There are writers who despair that language is 
incapable of expressing the true self, and that 
a gap exists between the self and the words that 
come, but for me that gap is the field of all 
creativity--it's an ecstatic field rather than a 
field of despair. It's the field of the 
unconscious, of God; it's the unfathomable from 
which everything pours forth. (315)
In the passages that follow the above, Foreman credits art
for its ability to allow glimpses of this unfathomable,
invisible essence that lies in the "gaps." He then
states, however, that the concretization of this essence
into the work of art necessarily kills the vitality of the
impulse; representation of the gap makes it a dead thing
("the work of art") rather than a living thing ("the
impulse") (315-316).
Foreman and Fuchs each refer to a kind of mystical 
essence that is both there and not there (present and 
absent) in Foreman's theatrical art. They each witness 
something through experience and then try to explain it 
away through theory. Perhaps the contradictions and 
confusion inherent in their discussions arise not as a 
result of flaws in observations or experience, but rather, 
from the inabilities of their theory to adequately 
describe the essential nature of such observations and 
experiences. Furthermore, perhaps chaos theory offers an 
alternative approach that incorporates experience as well
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as theory, instinctual presence as well as conceptual 
absence, into the discussion of Foreman's work.
From a perspective of chaos theory, the fundamental 
(and perhaps only) failure of poststructuralism lies in 
the latter's denial of the existence of a foundation upon 
which the structures of language and culture may stand. 
Without the possibility of exact meaning, the logic of 
poststructuralism arrives at the dead end of absolute 
meaninglessness. But as Nancy Easterlin and Barbara 
Riebling state in their introduction to After 
Poststructuralism: "even though we must admit we cannot 
know everything, that is not the same as asserting that we 
cannot know anything" (2).
Modern sciences such as chaos theory and quantum 
mechanics acknowledge the limitations of the reductionist 
demand for precise knowledge. Briggs and Peat call 
attention to Kurt Godel's proof that "important logical 
systems like arithmetic and algebra will always contain 
statements that are true but which cannot be derived from 
a fixed set of axioms" (75). Similarly, quantum mechanics 
dictates that information concerning the most fundamental 
building blocks of matter may not be known with certainty. 
Briggs and Peat even go so far as to assert that these 
ideas concerning the limitations of knowledge are not new, 
quoting Aristotle from his Nichomachian E t h i c s : "It is the 
mark of an educated mind to rest satisfied with the degree 
of precision that the nature of the subject admits, and
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not to seek exactness when only an approximation is 
possible" (76).
Chaos theory challenges traditional reductionist 
ideas about knowledge through concepts such as the 
butterfly effect. The fact that a miniscule fluctuation 
or error in measurement may become magnified through 
feedback completely stifles the predictability of the 
future state of an unstable, aperiodic system, thus 
severely limiting the kinds of precise knowledge that one 
may obtain about the system. But instead of denying that 
any knowledge may be obtained, chaos theory offers new, 
qualitative methods of understanding the operation of the 
system in terms of patterns and similarities that in turn 
correspond to new ways of thinking about what constitutes 
meaningful knowledge and truth. When viewed through a
framework of chaos theory, therefore, the
poststructuralist despair in the face of infinite meaning 
becomes insignificant; even though precise truth may be 
impossible to obtain, certain patterns of meaning may 
prove more valuable than others for the purposes of 
interpretation.
Chaos theory also asserts that new levels of order 
emerge from the interactive boundary regions between order 
and disorder. From this perspective, the
poststructuralist notion of the "gap" collapses into a
continuum between the order of truth and chaos of infinite 
traces of ambiguity; meaning emerges from the interaction
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between the two. This does not throw deconstruction out 
the window. Through self-similarity, certain patterns of 
meaning will assert themselves as being more significant 
to the system than others. This is why a deconstruction 
of a Tennessee Williams play from a perspective of race 
relations seems more significant than one informed by 
traces of crop rotation techniques. Removing the 
nihilistic "gap" from the poststructuralist system of 
semiotics makes such a value judgement possible.
Chaos theory may therefore be employed to account for 
the mysticism that arises in Foreman's ideas concerning 
his theatrical art, as well as in Fuchs' poststructuralist 
interpretation of Foreman's work. The traces of mysticism 
that Fuchs calls attention to yet denies presence actually 
are present in the complex interaction of the concrete 
signifier and the ambiguous signified. Foreman states as 
much when he refers to "a third possibility between logic 
and randomness. It's something between narrative 
development and pure chance. It's the cracks in reality 
that can't be mapped, the cracks in our normal, inherited 
systems of discourse" (315). Foreman, of course, takes 
the notion of cracks from poststructuralism; as mentioned 
earlier, he finds the source of creativity in these 
cracks, or "gaps." Chaos theory suggests that instead of 
"cracks" or "gaps," Foreman is actually witnessing 
"overlaps": chaotic moments of interaction between order 
and disorder, truth and ambiguity. The traces of presence
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that both Fuchs and Foreman so clearly want to find in 
Foreman's theatre emerge from these interactions, rather 
than falling through the poststructuralist "gaps."
In Foreman's theory concerning his theatrical art, 
these traces of presence are most clearly articulated in 
the altered modes of perception that Foreman wishes to 
instill in his audience by frustrating their expectations. 
Through a framework of chaos theory, such frustrations 
may, of course, be viewed as chaotic moments. The altered 
states of perception that Foreman advocates as a result of 
his ideal spectator experience would therefore emerge from 
the chaotic moments of frustrated expectation in a manner 
akin to self-organization. But what is Foreman's ideal 
spectator experience? What are the results of an altered 
mode of perception during an ideal Foreman production?
Foreman states that the experience he attempts to 
help his audience attain is partially based on an "emotion 
of the mind" he claimed to have experienced while reading 
Ortega y Gasset. Foreman describes this experience as 
simultaneously intellectual and emotional, thus informing 
the name of his company: the Ontological-Hysteric Theatre 
(Davy 8). On at least one level, therefore, Foreman's 
ideal theoretical spectator experience may be compared 
with the notions of "intellectual pleasure" found in 
Aristotle's, Dryden's, and Coleridge's theories. The 
cognitive aspects of spectator experience found in the 
writings of all four of the theorists examined in this
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study also appears in Foreman's theoretical theatre, for
he hopes that his productions teach the audience to
question their own viewing habits. As Foreman himself
states in his book Unbalancing A c t s :
For instance, in Hotel China there were ten 
little wooden stands on the stage, and each had 
a rock placed on it which was covered by a 
handkerchief. At one point, an actor removed 
the handkerchiefs, revealing the rocks for the 
first time. As the audience was watching this, 
a legend was projected on the back of the stage 
that read, 'Do not pay attention to the rocks, 
pay attention to the color of the stands.' I 
wanted to say to the audience. Be aware that you 
can make choices in this theatrical situation, 
unlike normal theatre where everything is done 
to manipulate you into watching, thinking, and 
feeling the one thing the play's creator wants 
you to watch, think, and feel. (56-57)
Foreman's notion of the cognitive experience that his
theatre should invoke is simply one meta-level deeper than
Aristotle's cognitive approach to catharsis. Where
Aristotle wants the viewer to ask questions about the
artistic representation of "nature" and learn that "this
is a picture of so and so," Foreman wants the viewer to
ask questions about his/her perception of the
representations and learn about how and why the viewer
perceives that "this is a picture of so and so," as well
as what other perceptions may result from the experience
of the performance.
Each of the theories of the figures examined by this 
study deal with questions of the representation of what 
they perceive as "nature" on one level or another--even if 
the perception concerns the representation of
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spiritually/psychically primal symbols and archetypes, as 
in the case of Artaud's theatre, or if the performance is 
designed to induce alternate modes of perception, as in 
Foreman's theatre. Because artists look to what they 
perceive as being "nature," including "human nature," for 
inspiration for their works of art, theorists/critics must 
also look to "nature" in their attempts to explain the 
creation and experience of art.
In this respect, chaos theory promises to offer a 
common foundation for speaking about the creation and 
reception of art. Even though each artist, theorist, and 
critic will experience a different perception of "nature," 
they will nevertheless observe the same similar patterns 
and chaotic moments of creation at work underneath it all. 
The same will therefore be true in their creation and 
perception of art, thus overcoming the poststructuralist 
lack cf foundation and the postmodern impasse to meaning 
of any kind.
In looking for the most essential aspects of 
"nature," and relating it to the most essential aspects of 
art, theorists cannot help but see hints of chaos theory 
in the operation of the universe. Because they do not 
have the philosophical tools and vocabulary to adequately 
describe those aspects of nature that are informed by 
chaos theory, theorists often resort to the intangible in 
their attempts to explain what they perceive both in art 
and nature. This study has attempted to employ chaos
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theory as a method of illuminating the most essential 
concepts presented by the theorists examined in order to 
discover if any new insight into their theories may be 
provided as a result of the benefits of the hindsight of 
chaos theory. Along the way, this study sought to 
discover which aspects of the theories work and which 
aspects offer little and/or no merit when viewed through a 
framework of chaos theory, with the hopes of gleaning 
information that may assist with the potential creation of 
a "poetics of chaos theory" in future studies.
End Notes
’Fuchs employs the spelling, "Kabbalah," but for 
consistency the spelling employed in Chapter Five, 
"Cabala," will be used here, except when quoted from 
Fuchs.
2Fuchs, of course, finds similarities in the non- 
foundational nature of both systems. Poststructuralism, 
however, emphasizes a lack of foundation based on 
disparateness, while the Buddhist lack of foundation is 
rooted in connectedness. The poststructuralist self is 
everywhere, but fragmented from everything else; the 
Buddhist self is also everywhere, but continuous and whole 
wi th everything else. One might contend, however, that an 
absolute system like poststructuralism may not be 
discussed without the acknowledgement of its absolute 
opposite, mysticism.
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